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ABSTRACT
 
The premise of this paper was that many judges are
 
insensitive to the stress that is experienced by persons
 
appearing in court. The examination of the decisions of the
 
California State Supreme Court ordering the removal or censure
 
of judges supports that opinion and the conclusion that ugly
 
incidents often result because of that insensitivity.
 
A major conclusion of this paper is that abuse was the
 
basis for many complaints against judges. The draft report.
 
Achieving Equal Justice for Women and Men in the Courts. found
 
bias against women in all courts throughout the state.
 
From 1961 to 1990, thirteen judges were removed from
 
office; ninety-three retired or resigned rather than contest
 
the allegations filed against them. Public records are not
 
available as to why the judges retired or resigned or to which
 
courts they were assigned. In 1990, more than twice the
 
number of complaints were filed against superior court judges
 
than about the same number of municipal court judges. The
 
complaints were about the same. Yet, a recommendation for the
 
removal of a superior court judge has only been submitted in
 
one instance. Does the Commission use a double standard in
 
making its recommendations for removal of judges?
 
Each year the Commission in its annual report summarizes
 
the complaints against judges. Filing of false affidavits
 
is a recurring problem. Why has the treatment of a perjurious
 
written declaration been so casual?
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CHAPTER 1
 
BACKGROUND
 
I began this study with a great concern about the
 
perceptions of justice that individuals have who appear in
 
courts and note erratic and unusual behavior on the part of
 
judges. I had opposed Deputy District Attorney James J.
 
McCartney in several trials in the late sixties and had
 
observed several unusual acts that occurred during trials.
 
What little information that was available during an
 
investigation into his conduct that was done by the Commission
 
on Judicial Performance was followed with intense interest by
 
myself, other attorneys, and judges. All judges and most
 
attorneys had heard accounts of unusual incidents in his
 
court. Most of the attorneys and judges knew little about the
 
Commission and its functions. Rumors as to what had occurred
 
at the hearings provided some vague conceptions about its
 
function and the role it performed for the State Supreme
 
Court.
 
The recommendation of the Conimissioh on Judicial
 
Qualifications that Judge McCartney be removed from office was
 
not followed by the State Supreme Court, but he was censured
 
publicly for several of his actions. The punishment imposed
 
in his case by the California State Supreme Court and the
 
reasons are presented in its opinion stated in McCartnev v.
 
Commission on Judicial Qualifications.''
 
Before Judge Kenneth Lynn Kloepfer assumed office, I had
 
been on a regularly scheduled felony sentencing calendar where
 
he, as a Deputy District Attorney, represented the People of
 
the State of California and I represented a large number of
 
defendants. I felt that I knew him well from a professional
 
standpoint having observed him in court frequently over a
 
period of several years. He argued for maximum punishments in
 
virtually every case and often his examples were bizarre. He
 
regularly attacked defense attorneys for their actions in
 
representing their clients, and routinely accused them of
 
lonethical conduct.
 
Because of my contacts with Judge McCartney before his
 
election to office and with Judge Kloepfer before and after
 
his election to office, I followed the scraps of information
 
about the hearings conducted by the Commission on Judicial
 
Qualifications with intense interest. My concern about the
 
pattern of their conduct was increased due to my membership on
 
the Ethics Committee and because I had sat in the same court
 
building with Judge Kloepfer from 1982 to 1987.
 
I was appointed to the sit in the San Bernardino County
 
Municipal Court on October 17, 1975 and was aware of his
 
conduct as a prosecutor though I do not recall that he ever
 
appeared before me. He had been transferred to the Fontana
 
Municipal Court and at some subsequent time to the Victorville
 
Municipal Court before I was appointed.
 
After Judge Kloepfer assumed office in January of 1981,
 
rumors about his conduct became the subject of courthouse
 
comment. Throughout the period that he was a judge articles
 
appeared in the local newspaper/s Letters to the Editors
 
condemning and supporting his actions.
 
From September 1984 to September 1987, I was a member of
 
the Ethics Committee of the California State Judges
 
Association. I attended the meetings of the committee
 
regularly during the three years and shared in the discussions
 
of the various issues that were submitted to the committee.
 
I appreciated the high guality of the opinions and views that
 
were presented and discussed by the judges. I recall one
 
judge who at one meeting labeled me a moralist/ and at the
 
next tagged me as being a liberal. I thought the two labels
 
in such a short period were obviously inconsistent, but at
 
least he was listening to what I said, as I tried to share
 
with him and others my opinions. Many of the discussions were
 
the basis for letters responding to judges' questions and
 
written formal opinions that were distributed to all sitting
 
judges in the state.
 
In January of 1986, I received the annual report of the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance for the year 1985. This
 
was the first time that I was aware that the reports were
 
pxiblished and available to judges. Since that time, I have
 
obtained, reviewed, and reread several times all thirty
 
reports for the years 1961 to 1990.
 
When I began this paper, I had expected to review the
 
thirty annual reports and the Supreme Court opinions that have
 
imposed the discipline of removal from office upon judges and
 
write a brief paper about the weaknesses of some judges.
 
After I realized that no superior court judge had been
 
removed from office during the period of the existence of the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance, I expanded the materials
 
that I believed it necessary to examine to include the
 
opinions that had resulted in the imposition of public censure
 
upon sitting judges. Eleven superior court judges have been
 
subjected to that punishment.
 
During the past three years, in addition to several
 
newspaper articles, magazine articles, and publications of the
 
American Judicature Society, I obtained a copy of the draft
 
report, Achieving Equal Justice for Women and Men in the
 
Courts.^ As one of my main concerns as expressed in this paper
 
is the lack of sensitivity of many judges to the stress that
 
is experienced by persons appearing in court, I concluded that
 
it was necessary to review that study.
 
By chance, I foiind the book. The Appearance of Justice.^
 
It is concerned with the conduct of federal judges,and thus
 
cannot be correlated directly to my concerns about the conduct
 
of California judges. However, In my opinion, many of the
 
reports of incidents of misconduct by federal judges relate to
 
the kind of misconduct that occurs in state courts and in
 
California courts.
 
 On several occasions in the past few years, the Los
 
Andeles Times has published articles about the conduct of the
 
judges who sit in the federal courts in the Central District
 
of the State of Galifbrhia. The articles have identified
 
those several judges who are rude to attorneys and parties,
 
who are arbitrary in their actions, and who appear to believe
 
that they sit upon a throne rather than upon an expensive
 
chair created as a bulwark for a democracy,
 
I have used many of the examples as a background to my
 
conclusion that a continuing emphasis must be placed upon
 
proper actions by judges in all courts as they function in
 
their judicial roles.
 
I have included several of the statements about the
 
history of the conduct of U.S. Supreme Court justices and
 
federal judge as a preparation for my comments and reviews of
 
the conduct of judges in California.
 
As expressed above, the niatsrials tliat I; identified as
 
being relevant to this paper increased significantly. My
 
expectation that I wohld wite a paper pf length was
 
short lived. Clearly incidents occur in the cpurts when the
 
purposes of judges and people clash. Because of my personal
 
experiences and the many publications that I have identified
 
above, it was necessary to expand this paper. In addition, I
 
believe that the various articles and publications and the
 
several books that emphasize aspects of judges conduct should
 
be noted in one cohyenient source.
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In this paper I have done what had hot been done before
 
in California When I began this study.^ I have collected in
 
one article summations of all of the opinions of the State
 
Supreme Court that have resulted in the removal of judges from
 
office in California and the impdsition of public censure.
 
Further, in my summary of the annual reports of the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance, I have noted the changes
 
in the laws that control the imposition of censure and noted
 
the incidents that now include private and public reproval as
 
additional disciplinary controls upon the conduct pf judges.
 
I started this review of materials about judges with a
 
discussion of the California Judicial Conduct Handbook.^ This
 
handbook was distributed to all sitting judges in 1990. I
 
consider it a very valuable tool for sitting judges to review
 
and consider whenever they are faced with a conduct situation.
 
It provides many citations about real problems and the
 
possible conseguences of repeating the errors of judges who
 
have been disciplined in the past.
 
All of these efforts to identify the nature of the
 
mistakes that some judges make havp resulted in a long
 
commentary. I hope that my views about the publications and
 
my professiohal acquaintance with Judge McCartney and Judge
 
Kloepfer will contribute to an understanding of the
 
conclusions reached in this paper.
 
When judges commit acts of misconduct, it lowers the
 
respect for all judges. Efforts to inform, educate, and
 
sensitize judges to the significance of their appearance,
 
manners, and acts as they make rulings and control the actions
 
within the courtroom and in their chambers must continue.
 
v;:;-CHAPTER 2;
 
OVERVIEW
 
Newspapers and teilevision report atooiit the imprbper^^^^
 
conduct of government employees, teachers, doctors, lawyers,
 
and judges almost daily. The media has a responsibility to
 
inform and in the process the newspaper reporters and
 
television newscasters whet the curiosity of the public.^
 
Judges have not been above criticism and unfortunately the
 
list of those who have failed to conform to recommended and
 
imposed standards is extensive.^ An aspect of American
 
governmental polity has resulted in some of those problems.
 
Early failures to maintain the separation between the
 
executive and judicial branches contributed to patterns of
 
behavior that have continued from the early history of our
 
nation to recent times. In The Appearance of Justice^ John
 
P. MacKenzie identifies long standing problems that have
 
existed since the U.S. Supreme Court was established. His
 
examples illustrate his point that many of the founding
 
fathers did not distinguish between their roles as judges, and
 
their roles as former members of the legislative or executive
 
branches of government.
 
In 1793, John Jay, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
 
Court took a leave of absence from the U.S. Supreme Court.
 
During that absence he served as Ambassador to England and
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performed "diplomatic tasks."' He remained in that position
 
until 1795. Upon his return to the United States, he resigned
 
from the U.S. Supreme Court to become Governor of New York
 
State. Similar actions by other justices and politicians
 
occurred frequently during the early history of our nation.
 
Mr. MacKenzie details the frequent involvement of members
 
of the federal bench in cases in which they had a financial
 
interest. Despite this financial interest they pretended to
 
a lack of bias that was not reasonable.
 
For years federal judges have used as an excuse for their
 
ignoring common sense a federal court rule that they should
 
not remove themselves from cases if they "believed that they
 
could be fair." Mr. MacKenzie discusses at length the "Velvet
 
Glove" tactic.^V The judge by denying any bias places the
 
burden on the attorney to waive his right to object to a
 
certain judge hearing his case.
 
The subtle ways in which an attorney can be discriminated
 
against in a later case provide the leverage that has resulted
 
in attorneys declining to risk challenging federal judges
 
about their financial interests in cases. Full disclosure by
 
many federal judges often would have shown a bias.
 
In California, the use of an affidavit of prejudice in a
 
case is used to prevent a judge who is perceived to be biased
 
from hearing a case.^^
 
The title of this paper "Judges and Ethical Perceptions"
 
could focus upon the personal perceptions of judges or upon
 
this perceptions^^^ o the people before a judge.
 
This paper will focus upon the perceptions of people as they
 
observe the conduct of a judge as that judge fianctions in a
 
judicial capacity. The conduct of judges against whom
 
complaints have been filed constitutes the basis for the
 
summations and conclusions that will be presented. Persons
 
include the public, litigants, attorneys, and employees.
 
effort has been expended by the California Judges
 
Association (CJA), the Ethics Committee of the CJA, the
 
American Bar Association, the American Judicature Society, the
 
National Conference of Judges, and other organizations to
 
establish programs to improve the conduct of judges.
 
Another aspect of the study relates to seminars that are
 
conducted to help judges. Many seminars are conducted to
 
assist judges to recognize what may be perceived as problems
 
in interacting with women or men, and minority ethnic groups.
 
Special sessions have been provided for several years at
 
the California Judicial College by experienced judges teaching
 
newer judges and experienced judges to alert them to the
 
possibility that they may have prejudices that can be
 
reflected in their conduct and in their decisions.
 
Another aspect of this study will be an examination of
 
those situations that are caused by the judge. Inexperience,
 
frustration, anger, and other factors have been reported and
 
relate to the misconduct of judges. Such complaints have been
 
lodged with the Commission on Judicial Performance and have
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been examined and detailed in the published decisions of the
 
California State Supreme Court.^
 
An important aiin of this paper is to provide judges with
 
suggestions as to a word or a phrase or a short statement that
 
can be discreetlY displayed on the bench. It may be a short
 
sentencej, or an acronym, or an old Lutin word (ie., a Latin
 
word without vowels). The purpose is to provide in a short
 
word or brief phrase a mnemonic device that appeals to the
 
judge and will cause the judge to pauso and consider his or
 
her actions.
 
Just advising a judge to use common sense will not always
 
help the judge through a difficult situation. Coiamon sense
 
often is a trap. Even a brief examination of the complaints
 
filed by unhappy litigants or members of the public illustrate
 
the bizarre conduct that has occurred in courts in the guise
 
of dispensing justice. Often no element of common sense can
 
be found that led to the conduct.''^
 
Many judges and court commissioners conduct proceedings
 
for 300-500 persons a day. A court that has 100 cases called
 
per day is not unusual. When so many nervous persons are
 
ordered to appear before a somber figure in a black robe
 
strange incidents often occur. The cau^^ the
 
incidents are obvious.
 
Persons are placed in a strange environment. The judge
 
has great authority over the persons; even -the language used
 
by the judge and the attorneys is different from that of the
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public. The normal reactions, conduct, and language of the
 
persons appearing is often inappropriate. Staff, attorneys,
 
and judges speak words that do not always mean what they mean
 
outside of a courtroom.
 
It is my contention that many judges lack sensitivity to
 
the emotional impact of the courtroom environment upon those
 
who are Strangers to the process. Efforts of the judicial
 
system to overcome this lack of sensitivity or concern have
 
been intense during the past fifteen years. I believe that
 
despite the intense efforts made to affect the conduct of all
 
judges, that many judges fuhction within a shell that
 
virtually defies penetration by usual practices.
 
Through this paper, I Shall make another attempt to
 
change the attitude of judges as they sit on a bench and make
 
rulings there or in their chambers during judicial
 
proceedings. I shall call this approach by the trite phrase,
 
"shock treatment." We have grown up in the judeo-christian
 
environment concerhed about what were labeled the seven dehdly
 
sins. They are encompassed within the Ten Commandments. When
 
judges examine the many ihstances in which the conduct of
 
their associates has been unreasonable, they may wish to adopt
 
or adapt some idea to assist them through an unexpected and
 
unwanted incident.
 
Many attorneys practice law with the intent to create
 
conflict in the courtroom with the judge and try to
 
deliberately cause the judge to become angry in order to force
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error by the judge. This aspect of the probiem hhs
 
discussed in any of the reports of the Commissioh on tTudicial
 
Performance about the conduct of judges. I will not address
 
.■that,'"^problem./; ; ■ 
i shall review ths^^ t^^ reports 6f the ebitiraisision pn 
■Judicial Perforiftance ahd will dispuss from those numerous 
complaints at least seven deadly sins committed by judges as 
they function in their judicial capacities. 
Traditionally, the seven deadly sins have been listed as 
anger, covetousness, envy, gluttony, lust, pride, and 
sloth. Since gluttony will be deleted from the accepted 
list of seven deadly sins this year and has never been listed 
as a complaint against a judge, Iwill not refer to the seven 
deadly sins and will not limit the identification of deadly 
sins of judges to six or even seven. The terms for the deadly 
sins are strong and some of them may even evoke abhorrence or 
disgust. Some persons may argue that the words are too strong 
to use in describing the flaws of judges. 
However, even a cursory review of the kinds of complaints 
that have been lodged against judges will dispel that naivete. 
Further, judges and observers of judicial conduct have debated 
this question, "What standards should be imposed upon the 
behavior of those who control the lives of thousands of 
persons?" Should we ignore the history written in the record 
of the complaints of persons appearing in the courts of 
California for the last thirty years? The second question 
 demands a clear "no" answer.
 
This paper does not purport to be a psychologicai study
 
of the conduct of judges. This is an empirical study. It is
 
personal in that it will reflect many of my observations and
 
impressions about other judges. My experiences will reflect
 
my contacts with judges from all counties of the state during
 
training and educational seminars for twelve years. For three
 
of those twelve years, I was a member of the Ethics Committee
 
of the CJA. I shall use my experiences as a framework for
 
identifying problems and as support of my selectioh of
 
examples of misconduct and examples of possible ways to
 
correct the problems that judges experience and often create.
 
As I have reviewed the materials on the misconduct of
 
judges, I have been struck by the lack of attention devoted to
 
the problem of ethical coriduct of judges twenty to twenty five
 
years ago and the emphasis that has been placed upon judicial
 
conduct in publications, newspaper articles, books, and
 
training programs during the past few years.
 
In a small collection of administrative papers provided
 
me when I was appointed was a two page pamphlet listing the
 
seven canons of judicial conduct. My attention was not
 
directed to any materials on the subject.
 
Now a judge must attend a five day course within two to
 
three months of taking the bench. The course includes intense
 
scrutiny of attitudes of judges that can lead to charges of
 
bias against ethnic groups and women. In addition, all judges
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must attend a two weeks seminar in the July following their
 
appointment or election to office. In this perigd they
 
review in greater detail various aspects of the duties and
 
responsibilities entailed in functioning a:s a judge.
 
Throughout each year/ special programs are conducted
 
lasting from one and one-half to five days on yarious subjects
 
that are critical to judges who wish to maintain currency on
 
the law and on approaches to solving the various problems that
 
frequently arise in the court. Although attendance is not
 
mandated, the seminars are well attended and reimbursement of
 
expenses of attending is paid for by many counties.
 
Most of the seminars include courses that deal with
 
biases and prejudices. All the judges that are registered for
 
the seminar must attend those particular classes.
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CHAPTER 3
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Judges function in a fishbowl. When they sit in a court
 
room they are always at center stage. Even when other actors,
 
the attorneys or witnesses, are performing, the presence of
 
the person in the black robe transcends the situation.
 
Despite the apparent openness, as in most court rooms there
 
are no walls or partitions between the spectators and the
 
judge, there is little communication between the public
 
(including witnesses, and litigants) and the judge- Witnesses
 
will rarely speak directly to the judge and the judge should
 
hesitate to speak to witnesses.
 
At arraignments the persons charged with a crime are
 
expected to know fully the seriousness of the crime, the
 
affect it can have on their lives, and the proper words to say
 
when the judge wants an immediate response to a question.
 
However, even the criminals who appear frequently in court
 
lack average language skills. Based upon my experience as a
 
teacher in a one room school and in an elementary school, it
 
is my opinion that many of the ninth grade dropouts that I
 
have represented read at a third or fourth grade levels
 
Judges and attorneys often rely upon inadequately trained
 
translators and bailiffs to explain complex legal concepts to
 
those charged with crimes; Expediency has been used as an
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 excuse for rushing through arraignments and accepting pleas
 
from persons who do hot have the faintest conception of what
 
the criminal justice process entails./'®
 
The clerk or the bailiff or the court reporter may pass
 
a note or whisper a message to the judge. A limited
 
communiGation occurs between the pUbiic and the staff and
 
questions are sometimes posed to the judge. Criticisms of
 
mannerisms, or of attitudes of a judge seldom are made and
 
probably less often are brought to a judge's attention. Even
 
family and friends may fail to identify problem areas for a
 
judge.
 
Part of the reason for this one way path of commtinication
 
is the possible violation of the prohibition upon ex parte
 
contacts with a judge. The potential for abuse of the
 
judicial process is so great that a judge must look to other
 
ways to assure himself or herself that the perception that the
 
public, the attorneys, and the litigants have is what the
 
judge desires and that it is correct.^'
 
Ethics is a subject that generally has been brushed aside
 
by judges as they perform their adjudicative furiqtion. In the
 
past few years the business community, the educational
 
systems, the politicians, and judges have been alerted to
 
problems in major sectors of some of our populous communities
 
to serious deficiencies in ethical practices.^®
 
For many years the Ethics Committee of the California
 
Judges Association has provided guidance to judges who ask for
 
■ 17 '
 
assistance to help resolve prbbleins that have risen in court
 
administration and in judicial functions. The committee has
 
published informal and formal opinions on a variety of
 
subjects. Its functions do not include the practice of law
 
and it refuses to address the issues that require the
 
interpretation of statutes. The opinions are advisory in
 
nature. The committee does not practice law, condemn conduct,
 
nor prescribe actions. The burden of making a judgement is
 
left upon the judge.
 
The Center for the Study of Judicial Education and
 
Research conducts concentrated study programs for judges in
 
all areas of judicial activity and since 1980 has presented
 
programs on jurisprudence and the humanities.
 
The jurisprudence and humanities programs were designed
 
to relate the day to day activities of judges to legal
 
concepts that form the basis for much judicial conduct. They
 
provide a basis for the relation of ethical conduct to
 
judicial conduct.
 
In 1960, a Commission on Judicial Qualifications was
 
authorized by the legislature. The Commission began
 
functioning in 1961 and submitted its first five page letter
 
report to Governor Edmund G. Brown on January 26, 1962.
 
In 1961, seventy five complaints were filed against
 
judges. The pattern of reporting actions was set in broad
 
terms and an analysis indicated that most of the complaints
 
were made by dissatisfied litigants. The commission takes no
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actioh on the question of whether or not the judge was cprrept
 
in a legal matter. It relies upon the appellate process to
 
resolve such questions.
 
During the year, two justice court judges, one municipal
 
court judge and one superior court judge resigned or retired
 
while investigatiohs were pending. No recommendation for
 
removal or retirement was filed with the Supreme Court as of
 
December 31, 1961.
 
Reports have been submitted annually and the last few
 
have been about seventy pages long. They include a summary of
 
the complaints that have been made about judges. The more
 
recent reports provide an analysis of the complaints and
 
report on the actions taken to assist judges to improve their
 
conduct, and to resolve problems.
 
A brief summation of the actions of the Commission on
 
Judicial Qualifications reported upon in 1990 indicates that
 
about 600 of the 885 complaints investigated were resolved by
 
a response to the complainant. Often the complaint was
 
unfounded or was simply based upon dissatisfaction with the
 
judgement that was made in a case. About thirty of the cases
 
were resolved by asking the judge to explain his or her
 
actions. Some 200 cases required investigation. Most of
 
those were resolved by letters to the judges that made
 
suggested modifications in behavior.
 
These two very brief summaries of the two reports
 
submitted to the governors in 1962 and in 1991 illustrate the
 
quantitative changes that occurred in the California courts
 
during that period.
 
Many of the complaints filed against judges require
 
formal investigations into extremely serious allegations. The
 
process requires the appointment of hearing masters. Evidence
 
is taken over a period of a few months and then after review
 
formal recommendations are made to the State Supreme Court.
 
The State Supreme Court reviews the transcripts of the
 
hearings and the recommendations, and provides the judge being
 
investigated an opportunity to object to the recommendations
 
and to present evidence in mitigation of the derelictions
 
alleged. After many months, the State Supreme Court will
 
issue its decision.
 
In the past thirty years, the Commission on Judicial
 
Performance has recommended to the California State Supreme
 
court that only one superior court judge, the Honorable
 
Charles F. Stevens of the San Diego County Superior Court, be
 
removed from office. The State Supreme Court found the
 
evidence insufficient to justify his removal from office and
 
dismissed the action.
 
Ten municipal and justice court judges have been removed
 
from office for judicial misconduct. It was recommended that
 
Judge James J. McCartney be removed from office but he was
 
censured. It was recommended that Judge Kenneth L. Kloepfer
 
be censured but he was removed from office. Municipal Court
 
judge: Charles D. Boags was removed from office after being
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 convicted of crimes of moral turpitude and the judgment had
 
become final. Lewis A. Wenzel, a San Diego County municipal
 
court judge was convicted of associating with prostitutes. A
 
recommendation that he be suspended from office was submitted
 
by the Commission on Judicial Performance to the State Supreme
 
Court. Although the conviction was overturned on appeal, he
 
resigned from office and the State Supreme court held that the
 
issue of removal was moot and took no further action in the
 
case.
 
Associate Supreme Court Justice Marshall F. McComb was
 
removed from office because of senile dementia and San Diego
 
County Municipal court Judge Robert Roick was removed from
 
office because of health problems.
 
Many judges have retired or resigned upon notice of the
 
initiation of an investigation. Other municipal qourt judges,
 
superior court judges, justices, and justice court judges have
 
retired or resigned from service rather than contest the
 
findings of the commission. The Commission on Judicial
 
Performance reports each year the status of such
 
investigations and the actions taken by the California State
 
Supreme Court as it agrees with the recommendations, modifies
 
them, or disagrees with them.
 
The reports of the Commission on Judicial Performance
 
have changed through the years from brief letter repdrts to
 
formal summations of the actions taken by the commission. The
 
reports include the authority for the actions of the
 
■ 21 , ; ■
 
commission, analyses of the complaints, and summations of the
 
actions taken on the complaints.
 
The reports reflect the changing nature of the judicial
 
function during a; period of significant increase in the
 
population of California, the changing ethnic composition of
 
California, and the large increase in the number Of cases
 
filed in the courts.
 
California, because of its size and the size of its Court
 
system/ cannot be labeled a microcosm of American society or
 
of the diverse American court system. However, the problems
 
that have been experienced in California have been experienced
 
in bther jurisdictions and in the federal courts;
 
California was the first state to establish a commission
 
to examine the conduct of judges and to provide a method to
 
assure that citizens had an agency to which they could submit
 
complaints about judges. The title of the Commission on
 
Judicial Qualifications was changed in 1976 to the Commission
 
on Judicial Performance. This change reflected the changing
 
role of the commission as its duties and responsibilities were
 
clarified and as they were modified. During the thirty years
 
of the existence of the commission, 45 states have established
 
similar commissions and the remaining five have a similar
 
procedure that examines the conduct of their judges.
 
The federal bench came under scrutiny in the sixties
 
because of the alleged misconduct of Associate Supreme Court
 
Justice Abe Fortas and Associate Supreme Court Justice William
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p. Douglas. Each of them had accepted retainer fees for
 
performing duties and responsibilities for corporations that
 
could have conflicted with their responsibilities as DiS.
 
Supreme Court
 
John P. MacKenzie in. The Appearance of Justice.
 
presents a fascinating expose of the deficiencies and
 
questionable conduct of many of our more famous U.S. Supreme
 
Court Justices. Mr. MacKenzie discusses at length the lack of
 
control over federal judges and justices and argues that the
 
public is entitled to know about the charges made against many
 
of them. State and California judges are subject to similar
 
scrutiny and the State Supreme Court opinions that confirm or
 
modify the recommendations of the Commission on Judicial
 
Performance provide a review of the conduct of judges who have
 
been charged with prejudicial conduct or with misconduct.
 
The problems that judges experience through inadvertence
 
or lack of concern are significant. The procedures that have
 
been designed to assure that competent attorneys are appointed
 
to be judges do not function well. Occurrences with reference
 
to confirmation hearings held for nominees to the U.S. Supreme
 
Court Supreme Court by the Judiciary Committee and in the
 
Senate relate to some of the complaints filed against members
 
of the state judiciary.
 
During the time that Associate Justice Abe Fortas was on
 
the Supreme Court he frequently went to the White House and
 
attended meetings of President Lyndon B. Johnson's kitchen
 
cabinet. He was a close friend of President Johnson and made
 
suggestions and proposed actions that should be taken,
 
Apparently, he did not discriminate between his role as a
 
Supreme Court Justice and that of a political advisor.
 
After President Johnson nominated Associate Justice Abe
 
Fortas to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, his
 
friendship became an issue during the confirmation hearings.
 
Had not Justice Abe Fortas been a clQSe friend of President
 
Lyndon Johnsoh, his guestionable and errant conduct would not
 
have been examined when he was nominated to be the Chief
 
Justice of the United State Supreme Court.
 
The Senate and public became engrossed with a problem
 
that would not go away. In addition to giving President
 
Johnson and his staff advice, Fortas had accepted a lifetime
 
retainer from a corporation. Further, the corporation assured
 
Associate Justice Fortas that his wife would be provided a
 
similar lifetime benefit if he should die. Because of these
 
and other allegations, he finally withdrew his name from
 
consideration for appointment to the most prestigious legal
 
position in the country.
 
President Richard Nixon tried to change the composition
 
of the U.S. Supreme Court so that it would favor his political
 
views and in doing so nominated unqualified persons to sit
 
upon the Supreme Court. Many older Americans recall the names
 
of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell as being
 
those incompetent persons. Nixon's nominations of these men
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were rejected by the Senate.
 
President Ronald Reagan nominated the brilliant and
 
radically conservative Appellate Court Justice Robert Bork to
 
be a U.S. Supreme Court justice. However, the public did not
 
appreciate Bork's brilliance and probably were perplexed.by
 
the narrow views that he espoused for the role of women in
 
American society. Because of television the public became
 
aware of the nature of the confirmation process, and possibly
 
to the politicians' dismay, future confirmation hearings will
 
continue to be transmitted throughout the world.
 
Fortunately for the public, all governors and all
 
presidents make many excellent appointments to judicial
 
positions. Whether or not the good appointments outnumber the
 
poor ones can not be determined until several decades after
 
the appointments are made.
 
The piablic occasionally becomes distressed with what they
 
perceive about the conduct of state court judges and unseat
 
those that they do not believe should continue in office. The
 
most dramatic in the history of California was the unseating
 
from the State Supreme Court of Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth
 
Bird, Associate Justice Cruz Reynoso, and Associate Justice
 
Joseph Grodin in the 1986 general election.
 
In that time period, the electorate favored the death
 
penalty. Because of decisions made by the "Bird Court," and
 
the strong articles written condemning these supreme court
 
justices, the perception of the public was that they would not
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confirm the imppsition of the death sentence upon a criminal.
 
They were unseated.
 
Despite the concentrated efforts of dedicated judges to
 
the task of orienting newly appointed and newly elected judges
 
to the problems of being a judge, unusual mistakes occur.
 
They occur with experienced judges and with those of a few
 
years experience and those who are new to the role.
 
Many of the complaints about judges are about the conduct
 
of judges as they react to litigants, lawyers, parties, and
 
their staff in the court room. Often incidents occur that are
 
precipitated by violations of basic rules of common courtesy.
 
It is the position of this writer that the problems are
 
basic to a need for sensitivity on the part of judges to the
 
lack of orientation to the judicial process that is found
 
among the majority of persons who enter a court room as a
 
plaintiff or a defendant.
 
A major study that has been prepared in draft form
 
addresses the problems of gender bias in the courts of
 
California.^^ Significant progress has been made in attacking
 
all the problems that may arise as a judge engages in conduct
 
that affects the lives of litigants and those who work in his
 
presence or observe the functiohing of the judicial process.
 
Despite the progress, the number of incidents continues
 
to increase. This is partly a function of the increase in the
 
number of full time judges who sit in California. It is also
 
a function of the increased awareness of the public that it
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has a right to hold judges accountable for their conduct.
 
In examining the various problems that occur that related
 
to overt and covert behavior of judges, I have been struck
 
with their apparent relationship to the seven deadly sins.
 
Gluttony is to be dropped from the list this year. The
 
remaining ones should be considered in relationship to the
 
kinds of problems that have evoked complaints from citizens,
 
attorneys, associates, the employees and parties to court
 
.actions.­
I shall examine the various reports and documents that
 
reflect what has been done to help resolve many of the
 
problems. I expect to establish some warning: signs, phrases,
 
or even acronyms for judges to think about as they go about
 
their daily assignments.
 
Why should this paper address a problem that is well
 
known? Annual reports are published and at least since 1985
 
have been distributed to all sitting judges. Reports have
 
been submitted to the Governor since 1962. Yet, in 1989> in
 
San Bernardino County, neither the Administrator of the
 
Municipal Court nor of the Superior Court had a file of the 29
 
reports.
 
In my opinion, no judge can function properly without a
 
basic view about life and its purposes. Whether a judge
 
verbalizes or expresses it in some way, the criminals, the
 
litigants, and the lawyers know what it is. However complex
 
the judge may be, the public will usually evaluate a judge in
 
21
 
 simplistic terms as being either a "hanging judge/" or one
 
who is compassionate and concerned about what happens to the
 
people who appear before him or her.
 
; in theory all judges are fine men and women who dress in
 
a black robb as they rule uporx issues that affect the persgns
 
that appear before them. Actually, some of those judges make
 
mistakes. In the past, prpbleme have been identified and they
 
will be identified in the future.
 
What can be done to prevent all mistakes? Of course that
 
is a goal that will never be reached. However, since problems
 
do continue to occur, various approaches must be taken to try
 
to prevent judges from making inadvertent, careless, or even
 
intentional mistakes. Acceptance of the idea that a person
 
may have prejudices or biases that affect his or her court
 
room demeanor will constitute a major step in preventing abuse
 
of attorneys, litigants, staff, witnesses, and observers.
 
I have known of judges who have had posted on their desks
 
warning words that were expected to cause them to pause and
 
make a considered response to a significant occurrence.
 
Perhaps the word or phrase was not strong enough.
 
Whether or not such phrases as, "Do not be lustful," or
 
"Do not be a thief," or "Do not abuse women!" will prevent
 
some of the mistakes that judges make can not be assured, but
 
such strong statements do emphasize the nature of many
 
complaints that are made against judges from year to year.
 
The seven deadly sins are: anger, covetousness, envy.
 
lust, pride, sloth, and gluttony. A question that I shall
 
consider often during this study is, "Do the seven (now six)
 
deadly sins relate to the conduct that results in complaints
 
being filed with the Commission on Judicial Performance.
 
However, limiting this paper to the six deadly sins would
 
not suffice as a basis for examining the problems experienced
 
within the court systems. This paper will examine aspects of
 
the functioning of the judicial process that range beyond the
 
six deadly sins and may be based upon legislation and
 
interpretation of statutes and general standards of morality.
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CHAPTER 4
 
PURPOSE
 
I began this paper in 1989 with the limited intent to
 
examine the thirty annual reports of the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance and relate those reports to what I knew
 
about judicial conduct and misconduct. As I began that task,
 
I became aware of other publications that had become available
 
since my retirement in 1987. Among them are The California
 
Judicial Conduct Handbook and Achieving Equal Justice for Men
 
and Women in the Courts. In addition, I chanced upon John P.
 
MhcKenzie's book. The Appearance of Justice. Each of these
 
influenced my views and in order to place the concepts of
 
judicial conduct and misconduct in proper perspective, I
 
believed it necessary to review them and comment about their
 
evaluations of conduct that occurs in the courts, and to note
 
any recommendations made.
 
When I realized that no superior court judge had been
 
removed from office by the California State Supreme Court, I
 
decided that I must include in my examination of the reports
 
of the conduct of judges in California those opinions of the
 
California State Supreme Court that imposed public censure
 
upon a judge. The result has been a long paper.
 
It was not until the publication of the California
 
Judicial Conduct Handbook in 1990 that summaries of all of the
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decisions by the Supreme Court that resulted in the removal of
 
judges from office were published in one book. Section V of
 
the Handbook also includes the decisions that imposed public
 
censure upon judges.
 
I have independently reviewed the cases and the thirty
 
annual reports of the Commission on Judicial Performance from
 
1961 to 1990. During my review of a variety of newspaper
 
articles, magazines, and books, I found no reference to any
 
articles published on the subject of the disciplinary actions
 
of the Commission on Judicial Performance.
 
Jack E. Frankel was an excellent spokesman for the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance. During the thirty years
 
that he directed its activities he presented programs and
 
appeared before legal and judicial organizations throughout
 
the country to emphasize the nature of and the importance of
 
the Commission and similar organizations.
 
As a result of my examination of all of the reported
 
cases of the Supreme Court on the subject of removal from
 
judicial office and public censure and the annual reports of
 
the Commission, and other publications and books referred to
 
above, this paper has increased in length. If I had not
 
included these specific publications and articles in my review
 
of the conduct of judges, I think it would have been seriously
 
■flawed.;. 
Only by examining these very specific articles and 
opinions have Igained a broader understanding of the nature 
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of the actions that constitute judicial misconduct that has
 
occurred and continues to occur q,n the state of Gaiifornia.
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the opinions of
 
the California State Supreme Court regarding removal from
 
office and public censure of judges to determine the nature of
 
the actions that resulted in public discipline.
 
In addition, I expect to propose an acronym, or phrase,
 
or sentence that will serve as a device to help judges avoid
 
inappropriate conduct as t^ perform their judicial
 
functions..
 
Private, state and federal organizations have prepared
 
guides, books, and devoted articles in magazines and flyers to
 
alert judges to the high probability that they Could be
 
disciplined or even removed from office for inappropriate
 
conduct.
 
Since 1960, there has developed a virtual growth industry
 
that deals with the promulgation of advice to judges. In
 
California, reports of perceived judicial miscCndUct have
 
increased significantly in the past thirty years. Steven
 
Lubet has siommarized one aspect of judicial misconduct in a
 
small book titled Bevond Reproach; Ethical Restrictions on the
 
Extraiudicial Activities of State and Federal Judges.—
 
Barbara L. Solomon has published in convenient form the
 
summaries of published advisory opinions of various state
 
supreme courts that have reviewed the actions of erring
 
judges. Her collection relates primarily to the advice
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contained in the Canons of Judicial Conduct published by the
 
American Bar Association.^^
 
Despite these and other efforts to assist judges, the
 
reported incidents of inappropriate conduct increase each
 
year. This paper is an effort to collect examples of such
 
conduct in one article and thus emphasize for the reader and
 
judges the requirement that judges take steps to eliminate the
 
many obvious and often blatant acts of misconduct that occur
 
each year in the California courts.
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CHAPTER 5
 
PROCEDURE
 
1 have antiGipated that this paper will be based upon
 
many of my personal experiences and evaluations. I will use
 
as background for my discussions and comments, several
 
publications and reports about judicial conduct. They
 
include:
 
THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK. It provides
 
a convenient reference to the kinds of inappropriate incidents
 
that have occurred in courts and in chambers and makes
 
suggestions that may help judges avoid similar misconduct.
 
The opinions of the California State Supreme Court
 
ordering that certain judges be removed form office.
 
The opinions of the California State Supreme Court
 
ordering that certain judges be censured publicly.
 
The thirty annual reports of the Commission on Judicial
 
Performance from 1961 to 1990.
 
The draft report of the Judicial Council Advisory
 
Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts that has been published
 
and distributed for comment. It is titled Achieving Equal
 
Justice for Women and Men in the Courts. The Los Angeles
 
Times has praised its proposals as "being brilliantly to the
 
point. Sexual bias is one of the areas that is of concern
 
to many judges and to the public.
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As mentioned above, I hope to develop an acronym that may
 
serve as a reminder to judges to stop before exacerbating a
 
situation that may have gotten out of control. There is a
 
glut of information available on the subject of judicial
 
miscpnauct. The numbers of reported incidents have increased
 
significantly in the past thirty years. Investigations are
 
conducted in confidence. Reports are made to the Governor
 
each year of the number of incidents, and the results of the
 
investigations of those incidents. Judges are provided copies
 
of the annual reports. I am unaware of any studies that have
 
been made of the use that judges make of the reports.
 
I shall comment from time to time on newspaper articles
 
and magazine articles that have discussed or commented upon
 
misconduct of judges. Other than references in articles to
 
U.S. Federal Judges, my comments will relate to California
 
judges and California courts.
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CHAPTER 6
 
CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK
 
When I was appointed to the bench in 1975, there was
 
little emphasis directed to ethical issues. A judge who sat
 
in a court house twenty-five miles away "appointed himself to
 
advise me" and I began functioning. I don't recall his ever
 
contacting me nor do I recall asking him any questions. One
 
of the judges in the courthouse where I sat was very helpful
 
and gave me practical advice about various aspects of
 
perforjming judicial responsibilities.
 
Most judges that I knew were too busy working to be
 
concerned about a new judge. However, a few did intrude with
 
unneeded and unwanted advice. One even sent his bailiff into
 
my court room to sit and observe and report to him about my
 
actions.
 
T attended a two and one half day seminar in early
 
December after taking the bench in October of 1975. In July
 
of 1976, I attended an intensive two weeks seminar conducted
 
by the California Judges Collega.^^
 
Through the next feiw years many additional programs were
 
established to orient new judges and to remind more
 
experienced judges of their duties and responsibilities. Now,
 
newly appointed and newly elected judges must attend a five
 
day program within ninety days of taking the bench. This
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course is followed by a two weeks course that judges are
 
expected to attend in July.
 
Judges may select and attend a variety of programs that
 
are usually presented by sitting judges who have expressed a
 
particular interest in a subject or have been recognized as
 
experts in some significant evidentiary or procedural issue.
 
These programs have been improved as those who teach now have
 
built upon the past. University professors frequently present
 
specialized areas or assist judges in the preparation and
 
presentation of subjects that are considered to be important.
 
The programs are of great value as they provide
 
opportunities for judges to exchange ideas and discuss
 
problems with other judges who face similar issues. Most
 
counties provide financial support for judges to attend a
 
reasonable number of these varied programs each year. .
 
Pamphlets and manuals that are used by judges and
 
professors are available to judges upon their making a request
 
for them and are presented to judges who attend sessions. The
 
California State Bar and the Rutter Group are two of several
 
organizations that present programs on additional subjects
 
that are helpful to judges as well as to attorneys and
 
paralegals.
 
One of the more valuable of recent publications of the
 
California Judges Association is the California Judicial
 
conduct Handbook. This book was distributed to all sitting
 
judges shortly after it's publication in 1990. It is
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available on request to retired judges who are members of the
 
California Judges Association.
 
The Hon. David M. Rothman comments in the introduction
 
that the California Judicial Conduct Handbook was compiled to
 
provide a source for all "materials related to judicial
 
conduct in California since 1960. That date was selected
 
as the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications was
 
authorized by the legislature in that year. Its history and
 
the California State supreme Court decisions that have
 
confirmed or modified the recommendations of the commission
 
are invaluable resources to judges and to students who wish to
 
understand the duties and responsibilities of judges.
 
In my opinion. the Handbook is practical and should be of
 
value to new and to experienced judges. The first major
 
section, "Judicial Conduct," is divided into two parts. The
 
first is titled "Conduct in the Courthouse" and the second is
 
titled "Conduct in Private Life."
 
This handbook is realistic as it starts with a
 
comprehensive table of contents and ends with a practical
 
index. It provides a summary of situations that a judge must
 
face upon donning a judicial robe in the context of real court
 
situations. Thus, a judge who encounters a problem will be
 
able to review quickly the suggestions and examples of actions
 
taken by judges who have confronted unusual problems.
 
SECTION A. CONDUCT IN THE COURTHOUSE
 
The first section consists of a very extensive listing of
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conduct that should be avoided. Accompanying the comments are
 
references to the judicial canons, informal or formal opinions
 
of the ethics committee, and case citations.
 
A new judge should read the table of contents before ever
 
stepping out from chambers to assume the role of judge. Short
 
messages are communicated in the brief headings of each
 
section. A judge is somewhat like a circus performer. He or
 
she must constantly walk a tight rope as regards his or her
 
conduct and as he or she functions as a judge. These
 
constructive suggestions should help a judge maintain his or
 
her balance. ;;
 
The ability to remain aware of all of the very
 
significant elements that make up the events that occur
 
predictably and unpredictably in a court room is the major
 
factor that distinguishes good and bad judges.
 
Judge David M. Rothman begins the section on "Conduct in
 
the Courtroom" with an admonishment about not becoming
 
involved (with litigants or attorneys) and to gain self
 
awareness. Functioning as a judge in a busy court can be
 
compared to the role of the ringmaster in a circus. As the
 
ringmaster must be aware of the various "acts" that may be
 
occurring simultaneously, the judge must be aware of all the
 
factors that make up the judicial propess.
 
One area that has proven the downfall of some judges has
 
been a failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
 
Actions taken by judges that evidence prejudices and bias
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against women, blacks, Spanish-Americans, or other
 
identifiable groups have been officially disapproved by the
 
members of the CJA. It is significant to note that the vote
 
to bar membership in organizations that discriminate except
 
for religious organizations was very close.
 
The vote on the question was presented to the members of
 
the CJA in 1986. A brief summary of the background for the
 
vote follows. In 1984, at the annual meeting of the American
 
Bar Association, the question of membership in discriminatory
 
organizations was debated. The issue had been debated at
 
three prior annual meetings of the American Bar Association.
 
The delegates finally approved a resolution that decried
 
membership in organizations that "invidiously discriminated."
 
In 1985, the issue was made an agenda item for discussion
 
at the annual CJA meeting. It was discussed by those for and
 
against the adoption of such a statement by the CJA. By a
 
vote of the members present it was agreed that the matter
 
would be presented and voted upon at the 1986 annual meeting
 
of the CJA.
 
The question of whether or not judges could appropriately
 
be members of organizations that discriminate was discussed
 
and debated at many seminars and meetings of judges throughout
 
the state from October of 1985 to September of 1986.
 
At the 1986 annual meeting, after an emotional and
 
lengthy discussion, it was passed by, only two votes of the
 
approximately 400 members present plus nineteen votes that
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 were voted by proxy. Thus, the ban upon membership in
 
organizations that "invidiously discriminate" became the
 
official position of the CJA at the 1986 meeting. The problem
 
has not been resolved as some judges continue their membership
 
in organizations that discriminate against women and against
 
ethnic groups.
 
As mentioned above a study of the incidence of gender
 
bias in California courts was published in 1990 and has been
 
distributed to judges and bar associations and to other
 
interested groups for comment. Recommendations have been made
 
and it is expected that many of them will be implemented.^^
 
Each section of the Handbook has pertinent comments and
 
specific examples about conduct that should be avoided. It is
 
not my intent to summarize all of the many sections of this
 
excellent guide, but I do wish to highlight some of the
 
comments that Judge Rothman makes.
 
It is important to emphasize that the examples that Judge
 
Rothman uses are taken from informal and formal opinions of
 
the Ethics Committee of the CJA, from commentary to the Canons
 
of Judicial Ethics, from annual reports of the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance, from decisions made by the California
 
State Supreme Court as it has reviewed recommendations of the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance, and from comments of
 
experienced judges made at seminars.
 
I shall select some of the more egregious examples of
 
misconduct of judges to illustrate my opinion that there are
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at least six deadly sins coiamitted by •judges in their judicial
 
roles.
 
"Expression of racial and ethnic bias Although some of
 
these comments were supposedly attempts at humor, the Supreme
 
Court in reviewing the recommendations of the Commission oh
 
judicial Qualifications found them to be offensive and
 
inappropriate.
 
Comments of Judge Chargih, Judge Geiler, Judge Stevens
 
and Judge Kennick were found to be abusive for making such
 
remarks as "hot tamale" to persons with Spanish surnames, and
 
"blacks liking watermelon" to blacks. These are just two
 
examples of many instandes that bccurred both on and off the
 
bench by these and other judges.
 
Newspaper and magazine articles and official reports have
 
noted the many instances of bias against women that occur in
 
courts. "Five reported cases have involved incidents of
 
gender bias by judges, including lewd remarks in ^street
 
language^ to and about a clerk, stereotypic remarks about
 
women, verbally berating a woman attorney, telling sexist
 
jokes to women in chambers, and repeated use of terms of
 
^endearment.' Although these are obvious examples of
 
inappropriate verbal expressions of bias, the study found that
 
such behavior extends to all aspects of the judicial
 
process
 
i shall comment below on the study of gender bias that
 
was completed in 1990, but think that the summary comments by
 
42
 
Judge Rothman in the Judicial Conduct HandbooJc warrant quoting
 
at this time. Gender bias hhs been found in "...many other
 
aspects of the judicial process, including failure to control
 
attbrney misconduct, inequality in judicial appointments^
 
custody and support rulings in dissolution proceedings that
 
have a disparate impact on women, judicial prejudices toward
 
the victims of domestic violence, obstacles to access to the
 
court for those victims, disparity of available services and
 
facilities between women and men in jail, lack of adequate
 
care for the particular health needs of women in jail, and
 
lack of a comprehensive personnel and standards on gender bias
 
in the judicial system.
 
Judges must not prejudge cases. The opinion and decision
 
of the California Supreme Court case in Kloeofer v. Commission
 
is instructive as to many actions which demonstrate judicial
 
excess. The appellate division of the San Bernardino County
 
Superior court found that the trial judge (Kloepfer) had
 
"displayed such animosity toward the defense in the trial that
 
it denied even the semblance of a fair trial. The judge was
 
rude, abusive and hostile to a defense witness; he made it
 
clear that he disbelieved the witness, and he was abusive to
 
the defendant.
 
In another case wherein a motion to suppress certain
 
evidence had been granted. Judge Kloepfer refused to grant a
 
motion to dismiss the charges and expressed the opinion that
 
as he had read the report, he believed that there was enough
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evidence to convict and tha.t the defendant was guilty of the 
'charge. ■ 
The examples of bizarre conduct tliat have been recorded
 
in the history of the reports of the Commission are many• A
 
few examples of a judge acting as an advocate are listed.
 
"Making recommendations to the prosecutor, giving one
 
witness the raspberry, passing a sympathetic note to a
 
witness, calling some witnesses, excessive examination of a
 
witness, and inappropriately curtailing the examination of a
 
witness, and also disallowing cross-examination of a witness,
 
conducting investigation in a case, entering judgement without
 
giving an opportunity for presentation of a defense, home
 
towning (ie., giving local attorneys advantages), acting out
 
of revenge, use of language that infers guilt of a defendant,
 
and making inappropriate comments to a jury after the
 
verdict.
 
Many judges have been disciplined privately and some
 
publicly for displays of anger and abuse of court personnel,
 
attorneys, and parties. All judges should be aware of the
 
causes of frustration and must control their anger.
 
The old saw that "power corrupts and absolute power
 
corrupts absolutely" should be frequently reviewed by judges.
 
(This conclusion was stated by Lord Acton in 1887 in a letter
 
written to Bishop Creighton.) S6me judges believe that when
 
they were installed in office, that they were anointed. The
 
examples of abusive conduct serve as k reniinder to judges of
 
the hecessity to be courteous to all persons in a courtroom
 
and to consider the impact of their actions upon litigants,
 
the attorneys/ and the spectators..
 
All of the examples listed have been detailed in the
 
reports of the Commission on Judicial Performance and can be
 
found in the cited cases wherein the California State Supreme
 
Court sustained the recommendations of the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance.
 
The frequency of the word abuse to describe actions
 
should serve as a warning in itself. Examples are: "Abusing
 
staff, abusing victims, abusing 1itigants, abusing pro per
 
litigants, and abuse of persons speaking a foreign
 
language.
 
Too many judges have coerced guilty pleas from defendants
 
by threatening to impose more severe sentences in event a
 
person chooses to go to trial and is convicted. The opinion
 
reference Judge Ryan illustrates such conduct. The Supreme
 
Court repeated its admonishment, "The desire to expedite
 
proceedings does not justify any action that discourages
 
defendants from exercising their constitutional rights.
 
The California Supreme Court decisions and their opinions
 
are packed with examples that may astound those who read of
 
the often lengthy period during which some judges frequently
 
abused persons appearing in their court and abused the
 
judicial process. The names of some of the judges are well
 
known, ie., Kennick, Ryan, Geiler, Cannon, McCullough.
 
Kloepfer, Gonzalez, Gubler, and Stephens. The length of the
 
list supports my position that many judges lack sensitivity to
 
the emotional state of persons who appear in court.
 
The conduct Of several of these judges as reported in the
 
recommendations of Commission on Judicial Performance and the
 
opinions of the California State Supreme Court confirm the
 
need for the Commission and for the establishment of published
 
procedures to assure that complaints are examined.
 
Instances in which judges have attempted to use their
 
office for private interests have occurred. Canon 2b of the
 
California Code of Judicial Conduct states, "Judges should not
 
allow their families, social, or other relationships to
 
influence their judicial conduct or judgment
 
In recent years, two judges have become involved in
 
trying to influence the district attorney not to prosecute
 
family members. Judge Boags involved himself in some 200
 
tickets that had been given to friends of his son. He was
 
convicted of a misdemeanor offense involving moral turpitude
 
and was removed from office.'^'
 
In another case, the Los Angeles Times alleged that Los
 
Angeles County Superior Court Judge James Correl had gone to
 
the Whittier police station and had used his judicial
 
authority inappropriately. "By using his judicial authority
 
(he) avoided posting $500 bail for his son or letting him
 
remain in jail for six hours, the standard time Whittier
 
police hold drunk driving suspects before releasing them on
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 their own recognizance."^® A recent newspaper article
 
indicated that the Commission on Judicial Performance would
 
not take any public action on the matter.
 
Some examples of abuse of judicial power follow:
 
"Conducting investigation in case not before the judge,
 
conducting an improper ex parte investigatioh, fabricating
 
reasons for ruling, retaliatory ruling, ruling to firighten the
 
accused, and attempting to influence tha prosecution."^^
 
Judges have the power to impose sanctions upon persons,
 
staff, litigants, or attorneys for interfering with the
 
judicial process or for inappropriate conduct. The power to
 
hold persons in contempt may be enforced with fines or jail
 
sentences. It is a power that must be used with discretion.
 
Unfortunately, its use has been abused by judges carried away
 
with power, frustration, anger, or on occasions animosity.
 
If a judge holds a person in contempt he or she must
 
establish a record that desoribes the incident. Then, that
 
record can be reviewed by an appellate court to determine
 
whether or not the action was proper. Often, such records are
 
incomplete and for that reason contempt orders are often
 
reversed.
 
Judges should be cautious in using humor during judicial
 
proceedings. Too many judges have told "dirty jokes" to women
 
attorneys or in the presence of women clerks or other staff
 
personnel.
 
The types of incidents that have resulted in reprimands
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and in some judges being lonseated are grotesgue. Judge
 
Geiler, during a trial expressed his disbelief of a witness's
 
testimony by making the noise known as a raspberry. He had a
 
battery operated dido (sometimes called a cattle prod) that he
 
threatened to use on an attorney if he asked certain questions
 
during a preliminary hearing. On another occasion he touched
 
the same lawyer oh the buttocks with the dido and laughed
 
about the incident with his clerk. Judge Geiler's vulgar
 
physical contact with a court commissioner was inappropriate
 
and should serve as a warning that the Commission and the
 
Supreme Court will not consider such actions as "friendly
 
horseplay.
 
The records are filled with examples of inappropriate
 
conduct by judges. Rumors about incidents often are heard.
 
Some such statements astonish and occasionally result in
 
complaints to the Commission on Judicial Performance. Trying
 
to separate fiction from fact is not easy and much of the
 
effort of the Commission is devoted to distinguishing
 
significant from trivial charges.
 
When an individual, or a commission, or the Supreme Court
 
reviews the records of complaints against an individual or
 
against judges as a group, it is difficult to believe that
 
such outlandish behavior has occurred. In America, judges are
 
either appointed to office by the governors of the states or
 
run for office. The members of the federal judiciary are
 
nominated and if approved by the Senate are appointed for life
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by the president. The requirement that a judge has been an
 
attorney for several years before being eligible to assume
 
office would seem to assure that clowns and buffoons should
 
not apply, be appointed, or elected.
 
A problem that may never be solved is that many persons
 
change personality when they are appointed to a judicial
 
position. In California, there is no set procedure. The
 
governor may ask for recommendations to certain positions or
 
the local bar associations may make recommendations. Once the
 
candidate's name is accepted by the governor as a candidate,
 
judges and attorneys are requested to rate the proposed judge
 
on various factors that are believed to provide a reasonable
 
degree of probability that the person will be an excellent
 
judge.
 
The system used in California and that of the federal
 
government has not functioned well for the past fifteen or
 
more years. Whether or not a merit system would function more
 
effectively is npt likely to be tested comprehensively in the
 
states or by the federal government for the next twenty five
 
years.
 
Since 1983, the major factor that has been used by
 
California governors to determine whether or not a person will
 
make a good judge is whether or not that person has ever been
 
a prosecutor. This factor is apparently considered to be
 
critical in order to assure that the judge will impose harsh
 
sentences on those convicted of crimes. All other traits or
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characteristics fade into the backgroundi
 
Typically/ prosecutors and ^ X'prosecutqrs band together
 
and rate career prosecutors and former prosecutors as being
 
those who possess all of the characterlstiGS that will assure
 
outstanding performance as a judge. Lack of other legal
 
experience is considered lonimportant. Whether or not the
 
person is industrious or even intelligent is unimportant.
 
Denials of a litmus test for persons being considered for
 
appointment to the bench in California are met with disbelief
 
by many observers.
 
The problem of trying to predict the ability of a person
 
to function as a judge exists whether a person is being
 
considered for appointment or whether that person runs for
 
judicial office. Unless the person can claim that he or she
 
was an aggressive prosecutor and has a burning desire to be
 
harsh and to impose maximum sentences, he or she is unlikely
 
to be elected to judicial office.
 
A further complication is that after being seated a judge
 
must consider how those with a biased viewpoint will look upon
 
his or her rulings. The court observers, probation officers
 
who carry law enforcement badges, prosecutors, and the law
 
enforcement personnel who testify in court will keep tabs on
 
the judge. When the judge runs for office, as all state
 
judges must do, the support of the law enforcement agencies in
 
the local area is critical to victory in a contested
 
election.
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The comments above are made preliminary to a brief look
 
at a major factor in rating or considering the effectiveness
 
of judges, ie., how judges deal with people. Unfortunately,
 
most former prosecutors lack empathy for the disappointments
 
and hurts that people experience. Most prosecutors, appear to
 
believe that all of the defendants that appear in court are
 
Wdrthless. Despite their reliance upon friends and attorneys
 
to support them in their effort to become judges, they often
 
change personality when they take the bench. Abusiveness
 
toward attorneys is one^ , of t:he factors that Judg
 
notes.
 
Verbal assaults are frequent. Some examples follow:
 
"Shut up! (plus an obscenity) in a telephone conversation with
 
a prosecutor, I don't have time to practice law for you,
 
rudeness to attorneys to encourage settlements, anger with
 
counsel for refusal to stipulate to probable cause, and making
 
a request that resulted in forcible removal of a public
 
defender from a courtroom by two marshals.
 
Rumor has surfaced that one judge who referred in open
 
court to an attorney as being brain dead (only one of several
 
grotesque and abusive statements) is under investigation by
 
the Commission on Judicial Performance. Since no superior
 
court judge has been removed from office by the Supreme Court
 
for wilful misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the
 
administration of justice, even if reprimanded a judge's
 
conduct is not likely to change.
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Some judges have created problems for themselves and for
 
the judicial process by interfering with attorney-client
 
relationships. Many public defenders have suffered abuse from
 
judges who apparently disapproved of the system. Some of the
 
examples of inappropriate conduct come from the decisions of
 
the California State Supreme Court that have been referred to
 
above. The names of Judges Cannon, Wenger, Gonzalez,
 
Kloepfer, and Ryan have appeared frequently in the footnotes
 
of this handbook about this subject as well as others.
 
Some judges have difficulty in disassociating themselves
 
from long term friendships with police officers and district
 
attorneys. One trap is the long established weekly or monthly
 
poker game. Care must be exercised to prevent the game from
 
becoming an extension of the court.
 
A morning coffee klatch of judges and attorneys in San
 
Bernardino County was perceived by some as being a preview to
 
"coming attractions in the court room" and was categorized by
 
one attorney as being "Thunderbird Justice.
 
For many years probation officers went to judges with ex
 
parte statements and information about recommendations for
 
sentences. The system had evolved over many years and was
 
accepted by new judges as "it had always been done that way."
 
Finally, the practice was challenged and an Appellate Court
 
found such a practice to be inappropriate.^®
 
Neither prosecution nor defense should take advantage of
 
long time friendships to discuss either calendars or actions
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that may be taken in particular cases. The appearance of
 
impropriety is obvious to defense attorneys who are often
 
aware of such practices by Deputy District Attorneys and
 
probation officers in the past. They had no way to prevent
 
what the judge had come to consider a convenient process to
 
help him schedule cases and estimate the length of
 
proceedings.
 
Can a judge ask for comments from other judges about
 
issues, sentencing, procedures or other aspects of the
 
judicial process? The commentary on Canon 3A(4) does not
 
"preclude judges from consulting with other judges, or with
 
court personnel whose function is to aid the judge." However,
 
some judges do not agree and object to one judge consulting
 
another on issues in a case or sentencing practices.
 
A judge should look very carefully at the term "court
 
personnel" if he or she is contemplating soliciting advice
 
regarding judicial actions. Ex parte ^  discussions with
 
probation officers are inappropriate. Discussions with a
 
courtroom clerk; or a bailiff/ or a court reporter about
 
evidentiary issues, or sentencing matters, or conduct of
 
parties, attorneys, or even the public is unseemly.
 
Judges should be very careful not to delegate judicial
 
functions to other persons Judge Jaiiies J. McCartney
 
violated this most basic concept by conferring with a bailiff
 
and accepting recommendations from the bailiff as to what
 
sentences should be imposed on convicted persons.
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A judge should be aware of the wide range of incidents
 
that can occur because of contacts with the public, with the
 
police, with attorneys, and with other judges. The lists of
 
kinds of incidents that should alert a judge provided in the
 
Handbook are practical and helpful.
 
Ex parte appearances are an example of the need for
 
caution on the part of a judge. Settlement conferences may
 
result in inopportune comments. The helpful friend or
 
official should not intrude in the judicial function.
 
However, anyone who has been a judge recognizes that the
 
advice that is provided is without limit. Tact, diplomacy,
 
deliberate reticence, and refusal to respond to questions or
 
to appear to concur with suggestions may help a judge through
 
difficult situations.
 
The judge's small staff, ie., the bailiff, the courtroom
 
clerk, and the court reporter are critical to the impressions
 
that the public and other court house personnel have of that
 
judge. Despite the importance of dealing courteously with
 
such people, abuses by clerical and judicial aides happen.
 
The manner of the abuse by judges that occurs is
 
expressed in some of the brief statements made in the
 
Handbook; "Berating clerk or reporter for lateness, berating
 
a reporter for asking a witness to speak up, volatile
 
outburst, or using profanity to a clerk/ ordering arrest of
 
court reporter who went on vacation, grabbing a court
 
commissioner (inappropriately)."^^
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Judges often display a lack of judgment or discretion in
 
their activities. One judg'e, who wrote several times to the
 
Ethics Committee requesting advice, belonged to more than
 
fifty drganizatiohsv Mhny of them had conflicting goals. He
 
expected the secretary who performed the administrative work
 
for several judges to take care of his communications with all
 
of these diverse organizations, to prepare his personal
 
correspondence, and to type his notes for his lectures at a
 
local law school. The judge was unable to distinguish between
 
judicial, quasi-judicial, and non-judicial activities.
 
One judge became a member of the board of a national
 
organization. He attended two day meetings in New York City
 
ten months out of each year. In addition he had to fly to and
 
from New York. His first step to justify the absence was to
 
take night traffic sessions and then to claim that as he was
 
working one or two evenings per month that he should be
 
compensated for that time by being excused from his work on
 
normal workdays. This continued over a five year period and
 
continually affected the work load for the remaining judges.
 
A few years ago, the San Bernardino County District
 
Attorney decided that he did not have enough deputies to
 
provide a prosecutor in courts that were hearing traffic
 
trials. An appellate court had held that a prosecutor was not
 
needed in such cases. The appellate court justices and the
 
District Attorney did not appear to understand that judges do
 
not call witnesses or prosecute cases. One of the duties of
 
judges is to assure that correct judicial procedures are
 
followed^
 
One judge took the ppsition that if a prbsecutor was not
 
present, then he would not call the law enforcenient officer to
 
the stand to testify. Many 1 were written to the
 
"letters to the editor" in the local paper. Some condemned
 
the judge. He did respond to the criticism but did not
 
clarify the reason or reasons for his acts.
 
The contentions were various and the several judges who
 
worked in the same complex did not agree. Some would call the
 
officers as witnesses, others would not. The importance of
 
the judge in a trial maintaining his or her objectivity was
 
lost on the public, on the police, by the prosecutors, and by
 
the newspaper editor. The judge who intrudes in a trial
 
becomes either a defense attorney or a prosecutor.
 
Although asking a simple question may clarify a
 
situation, a judge should be cautious about involving himself
 
or herself in a case. Some judges are disliked by either the
 
defense or by the prosecution for appearing to favor one side
 
or the other. Jurors are very perceptive and it is critical
 
that a judge not favor or appear to favor either side.
 
Many persons were outraged at what they perceived to be
 
a waste of the time of the officers who had come to court to
 
testify. Some law enforcement officers were angry because
 
they could not "convict" the traffic violators. However, what
 
may appear to some to be a tempest in a teapot may have great
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 sigiTiific^nce to concepts held strongly by other persons.
 
i
 rather lengthy exchange of letters to the editor
 
over several months, the point was lost by the public. The
 
judges in the complex disagreed because some of them did not
 
want to lose police support in their next election. The press
 
failed to explain the significance of the positions being
 
taken by the several actors. The editor failed to exercise
 
his responsibility to identify the issues involved for
 
defendants, the police, the District Attorney and the judges.
 
None of the parties appeared to read or understand the
 
positions being espoused by their opposition. The articles
 
that were written exacerbated the situation. Probably the
 
only benefit that was derived was the sale of a few more
 
newspapers by the publisher of the paper.
 
Few persons would want a judge to be prosecutor in a case
 
as they can be in Italy. But then, I have to pause, because
 
most persons that react to judicial procedures want the judge
 
to assure that all persons, except their friends and
 
relatives, are convicted.
 
The most recent rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in
 
areas of protection of the rights of the people narrow the
 
control over those rights and make it easier for convictions
 
to be gained and harder for convictions to be overturned.
 
Headlines in articles and cartoons lampooning the U.S. Supreme
 
Court give a perception that the U.S. Supreme Court as
 
constituted is determined to take away some of the significant
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rights of the people that were thought to be embedded in the
 
Bill of Rights.
 
A few years ago, a group sent a questionnaire to superior
 
court and appellate court judges in California asking that
 
they respond to certain questions about abortions and right to
 
life concerns. The Ethics Committee after careful study of
 
the issue held that "Such questions cal1 for a prejudgment of
 
issues that may come before the judge. To respond would
 
impair the judge's duty to act at all times to promote public
 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
 
by improperly prejudging a pending or impending legal issue,
 
or appearing to dO':..sb."^^/-;';.
 
All of the petty issues that arise in any aspect of life
 
can become a feature of judicial concern. A courthouse is
 
like a beehive and the activities of the various players can
 
easily become public knowledge and public concern.
 
Controversies among judges may affect the efficiency of
 
the court and have resulted in reprimands of judges. A judge
 
must be prudent in conduct and in expression through the
 
entire course of his daily judicial activities.
 
Judges should refrain from expressing displeasure about
 
affidavits being filed against them and must not take any
 
action to influence another judge assigned a case in such an
 
instance. Response to public criticism or use of the press
 
as a vehicle to express indignation is loaded with danger.
 
a thick skin is the only sure way to prevent a
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 situation from escalating and creating greater emotion and
 
concern.
 
Often family and business relationships may result in
 
situations that can compromise the integrity of a judge. The
 
smaller the community the greater the possibility that a
 
situation can arise. Judges should continually review the
 
"duty to decide cases" with the possibility that a conflict
 
exists due to relationships caused by family or business.
 
As I have reviewed my awareness of the activities of the
 
Commission on Judicial Qualifications (Performance) I am
 
struck by the lack of information that had been made available
 
about the functioning of the Commission during the great
 
majority of the time that I was on the bench. Other than an
 
occasional article in the newspaper about the results of
 
hearings, the operation was "hush-hush." All attorneys and
 
judges in San Bernardino County were aware of the length
 
investigation into the conduct of Judge McCartney, but only of
 
rumors and vague statements about what had occurred during the
 
actual hearing. A similar statement can be made about the
 
procedures involved with the eventual removal from office of
 
Judge Kloepfer.
 
The nature of complaints and the lengthy procedure
 
required to process, investigate, conduct hearings, make
 
recommendations, and review the recommendations make it
 
difficult to maintain confidentiality. Probably the most
 
difficult aspect of the process is calling witnesses away from
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work place to testify and then that the results may be
 
unknown for many months.
 
The suggestions that are made result from the history of
 
investigations and should be taken very seriously by anyone
 
unfortunat!^ enough to be subjected to complaints and an
 
investigation. These are examples of conduct that has caused
 
reaction and comment and discipline other than the serious
 
incdnyehience that ma^ have resulted from the complaints.
 
"Interfering with the investigation and banning a
 
perceived accuser from court,
 
"Disingenuous reply to inquiry from commission,
 
"Unwillinghess to examine courtroom demeanor,
 
to provide reasonable cooperation,
 
''Indifference to in<3uiry.
 
The process is prolonged and certainly upsetting to the
 
judge being investigated/ and to iiie or her family dr firiends.
 
The results can extend to removal from office and disbarment.
 
In the past, many judges did not contest the allegations and
 
retired to save a retirement benefit or to assure that they
 
could practice law.
 
Up to 1980/ sevdnty-three judges had retired or resigned
 
rather than contest or even await the results of a formal
 
investigation into their conduct.
 
Because of some problems that have arisen due to the
 
nature of the charges, the Commission has proceeded with
 
actions to hear and make recommendations even though some
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judges under investigatiGn have resigned or retired. This has
 
been done to prevent a judge from running for judicial office
 
in the future or to determine whether or not a judge should be
 
pirohibited from practicing law.
 
SECTION B. CONDUCT IN PRIVATE LIFE
 
Plutarch in Lives; Caesar, reports an oral tradition that
 
"Caesar's wife must be above suspicion!" So, the conduct of
 
judges, male or female, must be above suspicion. New judges
 
should be aware that whatever they do, their conduct both on
 
and off the bench will be scrutinized and evaluated. They
 
should also note that the results of the evaluations wilL not
 
be provided directly to the judge.
 
within an all but impervious glass bOwr.
 
Like the child in Texas who lacked an immxine system and lived
 
out his life in a large plastic balloon that provided him a
 
sterile enyirpnment, so judges live in isolation from much of
 
the turmoil that surrounds them. Seldom will relatiyes,
 
friends> or their staff bring criticism to their attentiph.
 
Judge Rbthiflan begins his discussion of section two of the
 
Handbook with three important quotes from the commentary about
 
the canons listed in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
 
"Judges must expect to be the subject of constant public
 
scrutiny. Judges must therefore accept restrictions on their
 
Gpndupt thht might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
 
citizen and^:^ so freely and willingly."^'
 
When a judge examines his or her conduct or the conduct
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 of associates he or she should keep in mind these two 
principles of the Code of Judicial Conduct♦ 
"An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable 
to justice in our society. Judges shpuld participate in 
establishing maintaining, and enforcing, and should themselves 
observe high standards of cohduct so that the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary may be preserved. 
"Judges should respect and comply with the law and should 
conduct themselves at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary 
perhaps a judge may ask, why should lbe disciplined fof 
what I do in private? The history of the Commissioh ot 
Judicial Performance throughout the yeaps of its existence has 
assured that its acts and recommendations were in conformity 
with the law and that its procedures were in compliance with 
the Galifornia Rules of Court. Standards for the imposition 
of discipline have evolved from the cases that resulted from 
complaints about judges. 
"Judicial discipline for misconduct in private life can 
only be imposed for conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. 
Wilful misconduct, the more serious offense warranting 
discipline under the Constitution, can only take place where 
a judge acting in his or her official capacity commits it (an 
act) in bad faith"^^ 
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The principles are succinct, and provide excellent guides
 
for behavior. However, just as there are many examples that
 
are provided to help judges avoid inappropriate behavior in
 
the courthouse so there are many examples of misbehavior that
 
have occurred and have resulted in discipline or have
 
contributed to a judge being removed from office even though,
 
the conduct occurred outside of the courthouse.
 
High emotions resulted when one judge threatened to jail
 
a telephone employee if his phone service were interrupted.
 
^iidge Noel Cannon threatened to ehoot a traffic office who had
 
stopped her for excessive use of her horn. On another
 
occasion she threatened to shoot one of the sejrvice employees
 
at the apartment complex where she lived.
 
One judge at a soccer game, became angry with one of the
 
spectators and stated that he was a pervert. After the
 
incident pqcurred, the judge initiated probation vidlatibn
 
Proceedings against the man
 
A value of the Handbook is that suggestions are made
 
that provide broad guidelines to judges, "Nop-judicial
 
activities, whether quasi-judicial or extr^-judicial in
 
nature, should not be allowed if there is a substantial
 
likelihood that the undertaking will:
 
1. interfere with the performance of official duty;
 
2. interfere, or seem to interfere with the impartiality
 
of the participating judge; or
 
3. impair the dignity and prestige of the judicial
 
office.
 
Instances have happened when judges interfered with law
 
enforcement officers, with the procedures and independent
 
judgement of other judges, and with administrative personnel.
 
Ego (pride) appears to be the source of many of the problems
 
that judges create for themselves. Many small matters may be
 
indicative of more serious problems.
 
Judges should not use their status to obtain preferred
 
seating at a restaurant, or for hotel accommodations, or
 
cheaper plane fares.
 
Judges should be careful not to abuse the use of the
 
telephone system in a courthouse for personal advantage. Some
 
judges pay for a private line in their chambers.
 
Letterhead stationary is another aspect of judging that
 
requires concern and attention to detail. Many judges pay for
 
their own stationary which usually has a line at the bottom
 
stating, "Not paid for with pviblic funds." The line that must
 
be drawn can create some interesting anomalies. A judge
 
should think about the purpose of a letter before he or she
 
mails it at public expense.
 
One judge was distressed that a clerk in a court where he
 
was visiting rejected mail that had been mailed at county
 
expense where he normally sat. The mail consisted of payment
 
of bills, social letters, and letters to friends. He was
 
wrong a;nd the clerks in the court where he normally sat were
 
wrong, but practices of judges are seldom questioned.
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Judge Rothman provides four examples of letterhead
 
stationary that he belieyes may be used appropriately in
 
different situations. After reviewing the examples a judge
 
can decide which letterheads are proper for use. It is
 
unlikely that all the members of the ethics committee will
 
agree upon the recommended letterheads and some of the
 
exampleso However, a judge should take care that his or her
 
actions are; proper.
 
Not all non-golfers belifeye that a judge, even on private
 
stationary which uses his title, has a right to request
 
golfing privileges at a spa.^
 
Acceptance of judicial office mandates that the judge
 
divest himself of interests in businesses that may come before
 
him. In discussions above the impact of many improper
 
relationships with companies and relatives who have interests
 
in businesses that came before certain judges were noted.
 
Narrow lines must be drawn for the guidance of judges and high
 
barriers must be erected to prevent the appearance of
 
impropriety.
 
A judge may not be a salesperson for a product or a
 
service as it certainly would affect many persons responding
 
to "judicial" hyperbole praising the product. Judges who have
 
been G.P.A^s or real estate brokers have special limitations
 
upon their conduct. A judge should examine the kinds of
 
situations that may arise before accepting judicial
 
responsibilities.
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Judges may not accept gifts in excess of $1000.00 per
 
year as an honorarium for speeches, articles, or publications
 
on the governmental process except for travel expenses. A
 
practical guide for those gifts from exempted organization is
 
provided on p. 11-23 of the Handbook.
 
The strength of some of the prohibitions is shown by
 
reference to the California Constitution. Art. I, Sec. 7.
 
"Acceptance of a pass or discount [from a transportation
 
company] by a public officer... shall work a forfeiture of
 
that office." Judge Rothman comments that frequent flier
 
miles may be accepted by judges as the same benefit is
 
extended to the general public.
 
Judges are not divested of their rights as citizens when
 
they take the oath of office. They have a right to and should
 
participate in civic and charitable activities. However,
 
there are some restrictions upon judges' activities in
 
organizations outside the courthouse:
 
"The activity must not reflect adversely upon a judge's
 
impartiality and the activity must not interfere with the
 
performance of a judge's judicial duties. Judges may not
 
participate in fund raising, no matter how worthy the cause.
 
The list of kinds of activities that may engage the off
 
time activities of judges is lengthy. In the examples giyen
 
above some of the basic ground rules have been Stated or
 
restated. A worthy goal or purpose will not be sufficient to
 
insulate the judge from criticism if the organization or its
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 officers stray out of the guidelines that affect judges.^'
 
Persons who have been politically active before assuming
 
judicial office should be alert to the prohibitions that exist
 
and control the activities of a person who takes the oath of
 
judicial office. In addition, there are many questions that
 
are discussed in the Handbook that do not provide clear "yes"
 
or "no" answers to some specific questions. Even restrictions
 
that would appear to be obvious have been violated by judges
 
or by pblitical candidates seeking endorsement or approval of
 
candidacy from a jiadge.
 
Judges can be active with regard to measures related to
 
the improvement of the law. In 1986, a measure proposed that
 
salaries of all public elected and appointed officials, and
 
school administrators, and many other employees be limited to
 
a salary of $64,000,00 psr year. The ethics committee, upon
 
receiving a request from the executive board of the CJA for a
 
recommendation, debated intensely whether or not the CJA and
 
judges could join with an umbrella group cohsisting of
 
politicaT organizations, school organizations, the district
 
attorneys' organization and many others to actively oppose the
 
measure. The recommendation of the Ethics Committee was that
 
such united action would be proper.®'^
 
Several simple questions that often are posed to judges
 
are discussed. "When is it appropriate to wear a judicial
 
robe? When may a judge's photograph accompany text of an
 
article? Can a judge's photograph appear with a commercial
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article? Can a judge's photograph in his or her robe
 
accompany a request for funds by a worthy organization?"®^
 
Can a judge properly assist a political candidate who
 
influenced the judge's appointment to office? When and for
 
whom can a judge solicit funds for a campaign? These and many
 
other questions are answered. However, for some questions
 
there is no clear answer. Then, a judge must evaluate all the
 
factors and must make a reasoned decision as to what he or she
 
will do.
 
As mentioned above, the topics that are discussed in the
 
Section of the Handbook on judicial conduct are almost without
 
limit. Virtually any aspect of good or bad conduct may be
 
found within the summaries of the annual reports on judicial
 
conduct and many of the comments above have been extracted
 
from them.
 
In the annual reports the comment is frequently made that
 
the summaries of complaints do not reflect the high quality of
 
the work of the many judges who are not criticized during long
 
tenures on the bench. I have not tried to summarize or list
 
all of the mistakes that have been made by judges either on
 
the bench, in chambers, or during participation in community
 
activities. I have tried to highlight the kind of conduct
 
that has occurred and in addition to illustrate the problems
 
that are created for judges when they let emotions disrupt a
 
judicial proceeding.
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CHAPTER 7
 
THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
 
I have referred briefly to the history of the Commission
 
on Judicial Qualifications above. In 1975, the name was
 
changed to the Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission)
 
The Commission has jurisdiction only over sitting judges and
 
justices of the appellate courts and the state supreme court.
 
A review of annual reports confirms the evolving nature of the
 
work of the Commission. From 1960 to 1990, the personality
 
and driving force behind the development of the concepts that
 
resulted in the formation and the procedures that came to be
 
a part of work of the commission was the senior attorney of
 
the commission and later its executive director, James E.
 
Frankel.
 
In California, from the time of the establishment of the
 
first Commission on Judicial Qualifications in the United
 
States in 1960, until James Frankel's retirement in 1990, he
 
led the efforts to clarify concepts, to identify problems, and
 
to assure the protection of the judges and the judicial system
 
from flawed conduct. His leadership was recognized throughout
 
the nation and his efforts to improve the work of the
 
commission served as a guide to those following his pioneering
 
efforts throughout the country.
 
The actions that can be taken by the Commission on
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Judicial Performance are those authorized by the California
 
Constitutipn. Thus, a jud#e cannot be placed^
 
of temporary suspension. Judges; are often sent advisory
 
letters that comment about inappropriate conduct that does not
 
justify the imposition of public or private censure. The
 
judge can respond to the criticism, however, no formal hearing
 
results. Though argued against by some, copies of letters
 
sent to judges are retained in a judge's file for possible use
 
in the future.
 
California Rules of Court have been written that
 
authorize certain punishments. Notice of the intent of the
 
court to impose private admonishment of a judge's actions
 
provide the judge with an opportunity to appear and to have a
 
formal hearing.®^
 
Since its establishment and through 1989, the Commission
 
on Judicial Performance has recommended that fourteen judges
 
be removed from office. The State Supreme Court has rejected
 
its recommendations in two cases. The recommendation that the
 
Hon. Charles F. Stevens of the San Diego Superior Court be
 
removed from office was dismissed for insufficiency of the
 
evidence. The recommendation that the Hon. James J. McCartney
 
be removed from office was rejected and he was publicly
 
censured.
 
Through 1990, the Supreme Court has removed ten judges
 
from office for conduct tending to bring the judiciary into
 
disrepute or for wilful misconduct. The recommendation that
 
the Hon. Kenneth L. Kloepfer of the San Bernardino County
 
Municipal Court be censured was rejected and he was removed
 
from office in 1989. The Hon. David Kennick of the Los
 
Angeles Municipal Court was removed from office in 1989.
 
The conviction of the Hon. Charles D. Boags of the
 
Beverly Hills Municipal Court on charges of obstruction of
 
justice became final in 1990 and he was removed from office
 
pursuant to the California Constitution, Article VI, section
 
18 b.
 
Two judges have been removed from office who were
 
physically or mentally incapable of performing their judicial
 
responsibilitiesi It was recommended that Judge Lewis Wenzel
 
of the San Diego County Municipal Court be suspended from
 
office after being convicted of associating with prostitutes.
 
His conviction was overturned but he did resign from office.
 
The State Supreme Court took no action after holding that the
 
question of his sitting as a judge was moot.
 
A total of thirteen judges have been removed from office
 
by order of the California State Supreme Court. The Supremie
 
Court reviews the recommendations of the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance and gives the respondent judge an
 
opportunity to refute the allegations or to present evidence
 
in mitigation of the charges. The findings and conclusions of
 
the Supreme Court are published and are available to the
 
courts, the respondent judge, judges, attorneys, and the
 
public for review.
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In addition to the published opinions reference the
 
removal of judges from office, the dpinions of the Supreme
 
Court regarding the fijndings that justify the imppsition of
 
public censure of a judge are available to the judge, the
 
courts, judges, attorneys, and the public*
 
The findings of the Supreme Court wito regard to the
 
necessity for removal from office and the findings with
 
reference to the requirement for public Censure provide
 
guidance to sitting judges as to conduct that is
 
inappropriate. The next two chapters of this papet will
 
consist of reviews of the opinions of the Supreme Court with
 
regards to removals and public censures of judges.
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CHAPTER 8
 
SUMMARIES OF CASE OPINIONS ORDERING
 
REMOVALS FROM JUDICIAL OFFICE
 
SECTION A. Geiler v. Commissions^
 
The Hon. Leland W. Geiler, a judge of the Municipal Court
 
of Los Angeles County, was removed from office by order of the
 
California State Supreme Coiirt in 1973. This was the first
 
time that a judge was removed from office in California
 
pursuant to the authority provided in 1960 which established
 
the Commission on Judicial Qualifications. In one previous
 
instance, Charles F. Stevens v. Commission on Judicial
 
Qualifications,®^ the recommendation for removal was not
 
accepted. In this case, as in all of the subsequent instances
 
of removal from office, the Supreme Court has acted with
 
restraint and has carefully defined its authority and powers,
 
and has explained the necessity for its action. Often the
 
court has cited its rulings in other cases to explain its
 
rulings in later cases.
 
Probably the two most important distinctions that the
 
court has made in issuing its findings, rulings, and
 
conclusions are the difference between wilful misconduct and
 
prejudicial conduct. The court pointed out in this case that
 
the "Phrase ^wilful misconduct in office' in the
 
constitutional provision setting forth grounds for removal
 
73
 
connotes something graver than the lesser included offense of
 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
 
brings the judicial office into disrepute; the more serious
 
charge should be reserved for unjudicial conduct which a judge
 
acting in his judicial capacity commits in bad faith, while
 
the lesser charge should be applied to conduct that a judge
 
undertakes in good faith but to an objective observer, the act
 
would appear to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct
 
prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial office.
 
Although the procedures followed by the State Supreme
 
Court may be referred to often, the purpose of this paper will
 
not be served by reviewing the procedural standards
 
established by the Supreme Court or the institutional
 
requirements or functions considered by it. This review has
 
been made to identify the nature of inappropriate actions that
 
resulted in a judge being removed from office. In making this
 
review, unsustained allegations will not be discussed.
 
The pattern that was established for the opinions
 
provides a brief summation of the charges that were sustained
 
with an indication whether or not the conduct condemned was
 
wilful misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the administration
 
of justice. Discussions about the nature of the conduct of
 
individual judges often display patterns of behavior that are
 
shocking in their vulgarity and in their lack of concern for
 
civilized standards of social intercourse.
 
In Judge Geiler's case findings were made in three
 
74
 
summary statements.
 
"Vulgar and profane conduct engaged in with the intent of
 
curtailing victim's cross-examination of witnesses, and
 
profane and abusive reprimanding of court employees
 
constitutes wilful misconduct in office. ...Use of vulgar
 
language in dealing with professional associates, employees,.
 
and officers of the court constitutes conduct prejudicial to!
 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into|
 
disrepute. ...Bad faith interference with attorney-client
 
relationship between public defenders and their clients
 
constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of
 
justice."®^ The Supreme Court found that these various acts
 
justified removal from office.
 
It is important to note that in this case, the masters
 
concluded that Judge Geiler was not guilty of twenty-three
 
charges of wilful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
 
administration of justice in office as alleged by the
 
Commission. The masters found that Judge Geiler had been
 
guilty of five charges of conduct prejudicial to the
 
administration of justice and concluded that as to the other
 
counts he had not been guilty of either wilful misconduct or
 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. "The
 
masters unanimously recommended that petitioner be censured
 
for the following reasons: 1. Indiscreet use of vulgar,
 
unjudicial and inappropriate language directed toward court
 
attaches and lawyers, and 2. His crude and offensive conduct
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in public places.
 
The examiners and Judge Geiler separately filed
 
objections to the masters' report and the Commission held oral
 
arguments in accordance with the rules of court. The Supreme
 
Court after Consideration of the evidence presented made its
 
own findings of fact ahdconclusibns of law.
 
The Supreme Court found Judge Geiler guilty of five
 
charges of wilful misconduct and four charges of conduct
 
prejudicial to the Administration of justice and ordered that
 
he be removed from office.
 
In discusAihg this case and in other cases, the Supreme
 
Court emphasizes that it is not bound by the conclusions of
 
the masters, by examiners, or by the conclusions of the
 
Commission. The Supreme Court does not rehear the case; it
 
determines whether the evidence supports the finding^.
 
In statements above, I have emphasized that the offenses
 
of the judges who have been removed from office and publicly
 
censured are related to the seven deadly sins; The masters
 
did not recommend that Judge Geiler be removed from office,
 
that conclusion was made by the State Supreme Court. Their
 
conclusions are confirmed by the nature of his conduct. Judge
 
Geiler had shocked a public defender by touching his buttocks
 
with an electric cattle prod. In an another incident "(he)
 
had approached a court commissioner from behind and had
 
grabbed this victim's testicles."®' "Petitioner had made
 
lustful references to his female clerk,... and was found to
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have habitually used vulgar and profane 1anguage in his
 
conviersations with this elSr]<;:'''° ''Petitioher was also found
 
to have invited two female attorneys into his chambers and
 
taiJced' about tha salacious nature of evidence concerning
 
hqinbsexual acts and rape, and punctaated his coitimentary with
 
profane terms for bodily functions."'^
 
Other charges that were sustained or found to be yalid
 
involved Judge Geiler's interference in eight cases with
 
public defenders/ efforts to represent clients properly. The
 
Supreme Court writes with elegance about the rights of
 
indigent defendants and condemns the acts of Judge Geiler and
 
his abuse of power. "(Judge Geiler's) bad faith was directed
 
towards our legal system itself; his arbitrary substitutions
 
of counsel because of his personal beliefs as to the
 
defendants' guilt and his personal ; hostility to their
 
attorneys smacks of an inquisitorial intent to serve imagined
 
truth at the expense of justice. Not only waS Judge
 
Geiler's conduct unjudicious, but he acted in bad faith. In
 
addition, many of his acts were unlawful.
 
SECTION B. Soruance v. Commission^
 
As this is only the second case in which the California 
State Supreme Court removed a judge from office, the 
interpretation of the Constitution and the delineation of the 
grounds that justify removal are important in reviewing and 
understanding the procedures used and the reasoning of the 
court. '■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • /■ ' " 
The Supreme Court found that Judge William D. Spruance
 
conducted his court in a "bizarre and unjudicial manner."'^
 
Judge Spruance had cross-examined in an improper manner an
 
attorney who had taken the witness stand after filing an
 
affidavit against the judge. Then Judge Spruance levied
 
"witness fees" agairist the attorney as a condition for
 
disqualifying himself from hearing the case. He was rude and
 
cavalier in his treatment of attorneys and had given a witness
 
the "raspberry" to express his disbelief of testimony by the
 
witness. In a traffic matter in which a defendant had been
 
late to court. Judge Spruance had made a "vulgar gesture" to
 
him.
 
Judge Spruance had used his judicial office to favor his
 
political supporters, friends, and relatives of friends. In
 
one case he had tried to get a deputy district attorney and
 
that attorney's supervisor to reduce a charge of driving under
 
the influence of alcohol to reckless driving. The defendant
 
was a friend of Judge Spruance and the case had been tried in
 
another court. To further complicate the situation, the
 
defense attorney was dating Judge Spruance's daughter. It was
 
clear that he had intruded into a case that would not normally
 
have come before him in order to use his office to influence
 
the outcome of the case to benefit a friend.
 
Judge Spruance presided at the court trial of the son of
 
a man who had been active in the campaign to elect Judge
 
Spruance to office. After the district attorney had refused
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 a suggested plea ba.rgain, Judge SpruauGe purported to conduGt
 
an evidentiary hearing and suppressed evidence in the case.
 
Following that he found the defendant not guilty on what he
 
termed to be a technicality.
 
The Supreme Court found that Judge Spruance, "...as an
 
experienced criminal defense attorney/ should have known that
 
there was ample evidence in the absence of any defense to find
 
the defendant guilty of at least one of the two counts.
 
Petitioner's attempt to put a gloss of good faith on the whole
 
incident, by declaring that the defendant ^had been saved by
 
a technicality' was intended to conceal the fact that
 
petitioner's conduct was motivated by his relationship with
 
the defendant's father and with the defendant's counsel, as
 
well as petitioner's desire to punish the deputy district
 
attorney for his refusal to accept the suggestion of a
 
negotiated plea.
 
A nephew of a friend and political supporter appeared
 
before the defendant on a charge of "engaging in a speed
 
contest." Without a district attorney present and without
 
giving notice to the district attorney, Judge Spruance reduced
 
the charge to illegal parking.
 
Judge Spruance was cited for running a red light. He
 
went to another judge, who attempted to disqualify himself.
 
Judge Spruance expressed his unhappiness in some manner, so
 
the judge then marked out the word "disqualified," and wrote
 
on the ticket "11-2-71 and his initials, R.F." Without that
 
judge's knowledge. Judge Spruance changed the note to read
 
"11-2-71 all session Dismissed on completion, R.F."
 
Judge Spruance had not attended traffic school.
 
Judge Spruance often appointed two attorney friends to
 
represent defehdants at public expense. In many of these
 
instancesf the^^^ ^ ^^ ^^^^a^^ were not entitled to such
 
representation or had not requested appointment of counsel.
 
The Supreme Court summarized the conduct of Judge
 
Spruance in these words. "Taken as a whole the record
 
indicates that petitioner engaged in a pervasive course of
 
conduct of overreaching his judicial authority by deciding
 
cases . for reasons other than the merits, by improperly
 
influencing another judge, and by using the judicial process
 
to gain special faLVors for friends and political supporters.
 
The record also shows that petitioner has under color of
 
judicial office repeatedly committed petty, vindictive, vulgar
 
and otherwise unjudicial acts."'^
 
The Supireme Court then considered whether the conduct
 
bbjected to is such that discipline can be imposed under the
 
California donstitutioh The court noted that other than for
 
"habitual intemperance or wilful and persistent failure to
 
perform his duties, the Constitution provides that a judge may
 
be eehsiired or removed from the bench only for wilful
 
misconduct or prejudicial conduct.
 
The Supreme Court reviewed each of the allegations of
 
wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct and concluded that
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 though his vulgarity might change his "petty tyranny and
 
favoritism, and other acts were done in bad faith, and
 
constitute wilful misconduct which require his removal from
 
office."^' In 1975, the Supreme Court removed municipal court
 
Judge William D. Spruance from office in the San Leandro-

Hayward Judicial District of Alameda Cbunty.
 
SECTION C. Cannon v. Commission^
 
On July 10, 1975, the Supreme Court, after reviewing the
 
findings and recommendatidns of the Commission on Judicial
 
Qualifications, ordered that Judge Noel Cannon of the
 
Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial District of the
 
County Of Los Angeles be removed from office. The court found
 
that she had engaged in twenty-one acts of wilful misconduct
 
in office and eight acts that constituted "conduct prejudicial
 
to the administration of justice."^°^ A relatively brief
 
summation of the charges will reflect the unusual and peculiar
 
nature of her actions.
 
Judge Cannon developed an hostility toward public
 
defenders who appeared in her court that resulted in her
 
interference with the conduct of an effective defense by the
 
attorneys for their clients. She was arbitrary and found four
 
public defenders in contempt of court and jailed them during
 
preliminary hearings. In some of those matters she then
 
forced other public defenders to proceed to participate in
 
hearings without giving them an opportunity to prepare.
 
She abused her power to set bail and issued bench
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warrants without proper cause. A defendant, who was ill with
 
meningitis, failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. Judge
 
Qannon issued a bench warrant for $50,000.00 and ordered the
 
defendant's arrest at the hospital over a doctor's objections.
 
Charges had been dismissed against a defendant. When the
 
defendant refused to stipulate to probable cause for the
 
arrest. Judge Canon ordered the defendant returned to custody.
 
In a case a involving a juvenile, who had been certified
 
to juvenile court as to some of the counts of a multiple count
 
indictment, the defendant refused to stipulate to a
 
continuance of the preliminary hearing. Judge Cannon then
 
vacated the order certifying the juvenile to the Juvenile
 
Court and set bail. When the mother and the son reacted to
 
the judge's actions she set bail at $100,000 each and took
 
them into custody.
 
In one case in which, Judge Cannon relieved a public
 
defendant as counsel, the Supreme Court made the following
 
statement. "You (Judge Cannon) have engaged in conduct
 
calculated to instill in defense attorneys a state of
 
submissiveness and fear so as to expedite preliminary
 
hearings, thereby infringing on a defendant's constitutional
 
right to effective assistance of counsel. In this case
 
the public defender had attempted to determine what questions
 
Judge Cannon had objected to in cross-examination. After
 
relieving her as counsel for the defendant. Judge Cannon said,
 
"We have had the record read. If you can't tell from that,
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you are not qualified to represent the defendant.
 
judge Cannon during procedures in chambers "cautioned a
 
deputy public defender not to ask certain ^stupid' questions
 
at a preliminary hearing. If you are thinking of any
 
outlandish questions, check with the people in lock-up to see
 
how they would recommend the food in county jail for the
 
weekend.
 
The list of incidents seems to be without limit.
 
Newspaper articles in the Los Anaeles Times from the early
 
1970's until she was removed from office had detailed what had
 
been described as bizarre conduct. Judge Cannon had her
 
chambers painted pink, had a pink mechanical canary in her
 
chambers that could be heard during court proceedings, and had
 
a liye pink poodle that she kept in her chambers or held on
 
her lap during court proceedings. When criticized by her
 
colleagues, she accused them in the L.A. Times of "immorality,
 
intemperance, inability, absenteeism, and unpunctuality.
 
Three incidents have been described involving guns. When
 
she had displayed her pink chambers to the press, she had
 
commented to reporters that "women should arm themselves
 
against attack with derringers and hat pins."^°^ At her
 
apartment she got into an argument with a maintenance man and
 
demanded the presence of security personnel. After about
 
thirty minutes of shouting profanities, she told one man, "I'm
 
going to shoot you, George, you son of a bitch. And you are
 
going to die slowly.
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On her way to the court house on Nov. 30, 1972, an
 
officer advised her not to use her horn repeatedly. The
 
officer said, "...She told me she would honk her horn any time
 
she damn well pleased. The officer advised her that
 
making excessive noise was covered by a Vehicle Code Section.
 
At which time she said, "You go to hell. Officer.
 
This situation is a classic example of what can happen if
 
emotions continue to escalate. It may also be an example of
 
what can happen if a judge's colleagues are not informed of a
 
problem. In many courts, judges often function in isolation.
 
In the Los Angeles County Judicial District, there is a
 
presiding judge. He should have been informed by the
 
marshal's office that Judge Cannon appeared to be out of
 
control. The following exchanges should be read by all
 
judges.
 
When Judge Cannon arrived at her chambers, her emotional
 
state is illustrated by her comments. She said to her
 
bailiff, "Find the son of a bitch; I want him foiand and
 
brought in right away. Give me a gun; I am going to shoot his
 
balls off and give him a .38 vasectomy." At about the same
 
time. Judge Cannon said to her other bailiff, "God damn, get
 
that son of a bitch here; find that bastard; I'm not going to
 
start court until that son of a bitch is here; when I find
 
him, I'm going to cut off his balls and have them hang over my
 
bench; I'm going to castrate him; I'm going to give him a
 
vasectomy with a .38."
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Judge Cannon then left her chambers and went with one of
 
her bailiffs to the police officer's waiting room. There she
 
spoke to a sergeant and said, "God Damn it, find him, find
 
that son of a bitch for me. I am not going to take the bench
 
until you find that male chauvinist pig."
 
She returned to her chambers, and several officers came
 
to her court. She then told her bailiffs, "God damn it, no
 
one is to leave, if anyone tries to leave, shoot the bastard."
 
She appeared to be hysterical. While they were present, she
 
said that "She could soxind her God damn horn any place in the
 
city and no male chauvinistic officer could tell her
 
otherwise.
 
The officer arrived later in the morning and could hear
 
her shouting at the sergeant. He waited about ten minutes and
 
entered. The Supreme court foxind the testimony of the police
 
officer to be true. In brief, she chastised him mildly,
 
discussed unrelated matters about the questions asked by
 
public defenders, and talked about a religious seminar that
 
she had attended during a holiday. She suggested that the
 
guillotine had been used recently in France and thought it
 
should be used in the U.S. She gave him some religious
 
pamphlets to read and he left.
 
The officer was asked, "Did she ever ask you to
 
apologize, during the conversation?" the answer was,"No." He
 
was asked, "Later on did you receive a letter of commendation
 
from Judge Cannon?" He answered, "Yes." He was asked to
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 relate the substance of the letter of commendation. "Yes,
 
sir, it was just addressed to Chief Davis, Chief of Police,
 
and it said the Los Angeles Police Departinent is the finest in
 
the world and Officer (Blank) was the finest of the fine, and
 
it was sighed, Noel Cannon.""^
 
With reference to these and other incidents of conduct
 
relating to defense attorneys other than public defenders, the
 
Supreme Court made the following findings, "Petitioner's
 
conduct was arbitrary, unreasonable and in bad faith, and
 
constituted wilful misconduct in office. Petitioner not only
 
used profane, abusive, and inexcusable language, but she also
 
misused the authority of her office by ordering persons to
 
appear in her court where no matters were pending requiring
 
their attendance and by directing her bailiffs to use force if
 
they attempted to leave.
 
The Supreme Court addressed other aspects of her unusual
 
if not outlandish conduct and found some of it inappropriate
 
but not wilful misconduct and some of the charges were not
 
sustained.
 
One important matter that should be addressed is that she
 
had installed a minister in a room adjaceht to the "lockup."
 
She had arranged for him to be paid froia some private funds
 
that she had contributed to a fund. She admitted that her
 
conduct was inappropriate and agreed that "religion in any
 
form should not be injected into the judicial process,"''''^
 
In another case she unlawfully ordered a court reporter
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 to delete material from the transcript of a preliminary
 
hearing. The statements are quoted: "Now, (a public defender)
 
did this to me and he better not do it again, and none of you
 
had better do that to me again, lying to me in open court.
 
...I have had this practiced on me by Public Defender after
 
Public Defender, and in particular by (a public defender) of
 
your office who lies to me in open court.
 
Although Judge Cannon admitted to this allegation> she
 
argued that it was not related to the formal charges against
 
her. The Supreme court found that "Petitioner's conduct in
 
ordering a portion of the record deleted in People v. Moore
 
was a violation of Code of Civil Procedure Section 274c> and
 
constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of
 
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.
 
Seventeen defense attorneys and one district attorney
 
appeared at hearings to testify in behalf of Judge Cannoni
 
They denied that she had been rude or abrasive in her conduct
 
with them and said that they had not observed her treating
 
other attorneys improperly. She was praised for her hard
 
work. The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented in
 
mitigation of the charges was irrelevant to the nature and
 
severity of the proven allegations.
 
The Supreme Court removed her from office but found that
 
"since her unjudicial conduct did not amount to moral 
turpitude, dishonesty or corruption ...that if othefwise 
qualified she can practice law in Califbrhia."^^^ 
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SECTION p. Wenaer v^ Coiniaission^^^
 
On July 13, 1981, the Supreme Court concluded after a
 
review of the evidence and arguments presented in this case
 
that the unanimous recommendation of the Commission on
 
Judicial Perforitiance should be followed and that the Hon.
 
Jerrold L. Wbnger should be removed from office. In reaching
 
this conclusion, the Supreme Court found that Judge Wenger had
 
committed wilful misconduct in nine instances and had been
 
guilty of prejudicial conduct in another instance.
 
Many of Judge Wenger's acts were not isolated instances.
 
He continued to repeat errors that he had made previously in
 
similar circumstances. When peremptory disqualifications
 
against him were filed, he would contact improperly the judge
 
to whom the case had been assigned. In three cases he
 
denounced the disqualifications by three attorneys as being an
 
affront to the court. in another case Judge Wenger asked
 
questions about the advice that an attorney had given his
 
client.
 
When Judge Wenger did not like what attorneys had done in 
a client^s interest, he would threaten them or "ban" them from 
his court room."' He abused the contempt power by 
"attempting to punish nonobedience to his informal directions 
(in a civil matter) as a contempt^ ■ 
One of the unusual charges against Judge Wenger was that
 
"You have wilfully and unlawfully resisted, delayed and
 
obstructed a public officer in the discharge or attempt to
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discharge the duties of his of that on or about July
 
11, 1979/ you refused, for improper personal reasoris, to allow
 
Susan D , a duly appointed E)eputy District Attorney of El
 
Dorado County to appear in the Justice Court of El Dorado
 
Judicial District on matters duly and lawfully assigned to
 
her. The court noted that Judge Wenger had interfered
 
with the official duties of the Deputy District Attorney, by
 
banishing her from his court. "This act limited the District
 
Attorney^s options to make personnel assignments and thus, did
 
obstruct a public officer from performing official duties to
 
that extent. The Supreme Court found that the conduct
 
constituted wilful misconduct in office.
 
The reason that Judge Wenger unlawfully banished Ms.
 
Susan D from his court was that she had reported
 
incidents of questionable conduct to the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance without first consulting him.
 
Judge Wenger committed other acts of wilful misconduct.
 
These deserve noting; ^  ,
 
"Judge (Wenger's) backdating of affidavit for arrest
 
warrant was wilful misconduct in office.
 
In another instance, "Judge (Wenger's) issuance of (a)
 
no-bail arrest warrant without the filing of a criminal
 
complaint or initiation of a contempt proceeding was conduct
 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.
 
Judge Wenger asserted that he finally understood what his
 
flaws were and requested that he be permitted to continue to
 
sit as a Justice Gourt Judge. The Supreme Court held that his
 
late realization of his mistakes was not a factor that was in
 
mitigation of his conduct.
 
"Mitigation requires more than an lonfulfilled intent to
 
reform. ...The uim of cbmmis proceedings is not punishment
 
but to pfbtect the judicial system and the public which it
 
serves from judges who are unfit for office. ;..Faithfulness
 
to that aim requires removal here."^^^
 
As Judge Wenger's acts did not constitute grounds for
 
disbarment, fehe Supreme Court found that if otherwise
 
qualified he could practice law.
 
SECTION E. Gonzalez v. Coitanission''^^
 
in 1983, the State Supreme Court sustained eighteen
 
findings of the Commission on Judicial Performance as to
 
wilful misconduct and sustained two of three findings of
 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice as to
 
Mario P. Gonzalez, a municipal court judge of the East Los
 
Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County. He was
 
removed from office.
 
The summary by the Commission lists his various acts
 
under headings. The titles are brief editorials about
 
judicial conduct.
 
"Arbitrary Prejudice to Rights of Criminal Defendants."
 
Because of his animosity toward the public defenders and
 
the concepts of the functioning of that office, he denied
 
defendants' constitutional rights. In one instance he refused
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to hear a bail ittbtibn^ a public defender had ^opehed
 
his mouth- during the judge's questioning of the defendant.
 
Thb Supreme Court held "that such hostile, arbitrary, and
 
unreasonable conduct jeopardizes the liberty of an indigent
 
defendant for reasons not related to the merits of the case
 
and therefore constitutes wilful misconduct.
 
"Impugning Judicial Colleagues."
 
"Judge Caonzalez has made insulting and derogatory
 
comments from the bench and in chambers impugning the
 
character and competence of his judicial colleagues.
 
Petitioner's brash criticisms and colorful insults were
 
manifestly uttered in bad faith while petitioner was acting in
 
his judicial capacity.
 
"Abuse of Judicial Authority". "Judge Gonzalez has
 
engaged in a continuous course of overreaching and abuse of
 
judicial authority. ...Judge Gonzalez has conducted court
 
business in violation of proper judicial procedures, to the
 
detriment of the fair, orderly, and decorous administration of
 
justice."^29
 
"Abandonment of Judicial Role." "By leaving the bench
 
during judicial proceedings Judge Gonzalez has demonstrated a
 
flagrant lack of respect for his judicial office. ...If only
 
for a few moments at any one time, on these occasions he
 
abandoned his role in the adjudicative process in utter
 
disregard for his obligation diligently to perform the duties
 
of his office.
 
 "Political Explditation of Office." "Though his ^press
 
release ppifiion' [in which Judge Gonzalez declared, a dog leash
 
license ordinance unconstitutional] may indeed have earned him
 
a certain political notoriety, such a blatant exploitation of
 
the judicial office for political ends seriously and
 
impermissibly undermines public esteem for the impartiality
 
and integrity of thp judiciary.
 
"Misuse of Lawful Power." "By his wholesale plea
 
bargaining scheme Judge Gonzalez has deliberately misused his
 
otherwise lawful power to reduce sentences and fines in
 
individual cases... Judge Gonzalez' further declared aims of
 
filling the county coffer and scoring convictions for the
 
state are of course completely extraneous to the
 
administration of justice. Judge Gonzalez certainly should
 
have known that his^bargain day' sentencing offer - even if
 
limited to vehicular offenses - contravened the principle of
 
individualized sentencing embodied in our Penal Code."^^^
 
"Offensive Comments in Court." "Judge Gonzalez should
 
have known that his admittedly '^salty'courtroom comments were
 
unbecoming and inappropriate.
 
"Derogatory Remarks Off the Bench." "Derogatory remarks,
 
although made in chainbers or at a staff meeting, may become
 
public knowledge and thereby diminish the hearer's esteem for
 
the judiciary - regardless of the speaker's subjective intent
 
or motivation. The reputation of an indiyidual judge
 
necessarily reflects on the community's regard for the
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"Reactions to Allegations of Misconduct." "In a tone
 
that rapidly grows tiresome, he reiterates a conspiracy theory
 
typically raised as a defense in judicial misconduct
 
investigations, and contends that the three attorneys simply
 
fabricated their stories. As he does with virtually every
 
allegation. Judge Gonzalez fiindamentally misperceives the
 
nature and gravity of the charge and instead views the entire
 
matter as one of political disagreement or personality
 
difference."^25
 
SECTION F. Furev v. Commission
 
Judge Robert H. Furey, Jr. was removed from office as the
 
Justice Court Judge of the Santa Catalina Judicial District in
 
1987. The Supreme Court sustained eight counts of wilful
 
misconduct, and ten counts of conduct prejudicial to the
 
administration of justice;that brings the judiciary into
 
'disrepute. ^ '
 
Many of the allegations of acts of misconduct that were
 
sustained by the State Supreme Court appear to have resulted
 
from arbitrary reactions to behavior of persons appearing in
 
court who tried to ask questions about the procedures and
 
orders that Judge Furey was making.
 
Judge Furey jailed a defendant for contempt when the
 
defendant accused the judge of harassing him. The defendant
 
had appeared to explain why he had not completed a community
 
service program. Judge Furey interrupted him and threatened
 
him with contempt. Although the defendant appeared to be
 
mentally ill, Judge Furey ignored that and ordered him taken
 
into custody. At a probation violation hearing, over
 
counsel's objection that the defendant had not received
 
written notice of the violation, the judge criticized what he
 
called a "perfunctory medical excuse" and sentenced the
 
defendant to 180 days in the county jail. The appellate
 
department of the superior court reversed the order revoking
 
probation and the jail sentence and ordered all proceedings
 
against him terminated.
 
"The Supreme Court found that Judge Furey's impatience
 
and hostility and his abuse of the contempt power constituted
 
prejudicial conduct.
 
A defendant appeared to request a continuance to pay a
 
$300.00 fine as the sentence had been conditioned with an
 
alternative of serving ten days in the county jail. Judge
 
Furey refused the request and said, "It is $300 or ten days,
 
today." When the defendant pointed out that other defendants
 
were being granted stays to pay finesy Judge Furey ordered him
 
to be silent. The defendant reacted and Judge Furey imposed
 
an additional ten days for contempt. The defendant reacted a
 
second time, and Judge Furey added another ten days. When the
 
defendant reacted a third time the Judge added another ten
 
days. Later that day the defendant was released when a public
 
defender appeared on his behalf.
 
"The Supreme Court found that Judge Furey's abuse of the
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contempt power as well as his impatience and hostility toward
 
many defendants who appeared without counsel constituted
 
prejudicial conduct
 
When a defendant appeared and filed an affidayit of
 
prejudice against Judge Furey the case was transfeftsd to
 
another court. Judge Furey then wrote a to that judge
 
recommending that the judge impose a stiffer sentence than
 
standard because of "the defendant's bad attitude.
 
The Supreme Court found that .because of Judge Furey's
 
inexperience and admission of his error, that the act
 
constituted prejudicial conduct rather than wilful
 
misconduct.
 
A defendant appeared in court to discuss his inability to
 
pay a fine for jaywalking. JUdge Furey had presided at the
 
trial and knew that the defendant was indigent and possibly
 
mentally ill. Thinking that the defendant might be violent,
 
Judge Furey had a bag that was outside of the defendant's
 
reach searched. A small paring knife was found. Judge Furey
 
then found the defendant to be in violation of a statute
 
prohibiting knives over four inches long from courtrooms. He
 
then ordered the defendant taken into custody and set bail at
 
$10,000.00.
 
A public defender was requested to appear with the
 
defendant later that day. At that hearing Judgefurey found
 
the defendant in contempt of court for bringing the knife into
 
the court room and sentenced him to five days in the county
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jail and ordered a mental examination. The piiblic defender
 
Objected to the mental examination and Judge Furey reacted by
 
imposing a fine of $500.00 on the defendant to be served at
 
$30.GO for each day spent in custody. The defendant made some
 
delusionary remarks and Judge Furey made two more findings of
 
contempt and fined him $500.00 to be served at $30.00 per day.
 
The public defender filed a petition for a writ of habeas
 
corpus that was granted by the superior court.
 
"The Supreme Court adopted the conclusions of the
 
Commission that Judge Furey engaged in prejudicial conduct by
 
his display of impatience and hostility to the defendant and
 
by his abuse of the contempt power. ... The result of the
 
judge's actions was that a mentally disturbed indigent
 
defendant who had appeared in court to request an extension to
 
pay a fine of $50.00 was sentenced to approximately 65 days in
 
jail."^^^
 
On one occasion. Judge Furey told the defendants before
 
hearing any evidence regarding their cases that if there were
 
any discrepancies in the officers' testimony and their
 
testimony, that he would believe the officers. He said that
 
officers would not commit perjury over a trivial matter.
 
After an officer had testified in a case, the defendant,
 
who was not represented, started to read from the vehicle
 
code. Judge Furey stopped him and found him guilty. The
 
conviction was reversed by the appellate division of the
 
superior court.
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"The Supreme Court adopted the conclusions of the
 
Commission that Judge Furey committed wilful misconduct when
 
tie made his announcement to the defendants and when he denied
 
the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the officer and
 
to make a closing argument.
 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court in
 
expressing its opinions often explains the distinctions
 
between such concepts as wilful misconduct and conduct
 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. In Judge
 
Furey's case, the Court noted that a finding of "wilful
 
misconduct requires clear and convincing evidence of a
 
malicious or corrupt purpose." The court concluded that Judge
 
Furey's purpose "was to coerce guilty pleas and thereby
 
expedite the calendar and therefore the judge was guilty of
 
wilful misconduct.
 
Much of the Supreme Court's opinion is devoted to Judge
 
Furey's inappropriate conduct in actions taken with reference
 
to one woman. Judge Furey became aware of a letter that the
 
woman had written to the Commission on Judicial Performance
 
and posted in various public places in Avalon. She alleged
 
that he "had evicted her from his courtroom (on Catalina
 
Island) and had ordered his bailiff to punch her in the
 
mouth."
 
Judge Furey wrote her a letter which ordered her to
 
appear in court. She appeared and then refused to answer
 
Judge Furey's questions. He then ordered her to appear in the
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Long Beach Municipal Court, where he sometimes sat on
 
assignment, to show cause why she should not be found in
 
contempt. He also threatened her that if she were found in
 
contempt and taken into custody he would order a mental
 
examination to be conducted of her. He added that she must
 
stay out of his courtroom unless she were a party or a
 
witness.
 
Several other incidents occurred involving this woman
 
that were precipitated by Judge Furey. In one instance where
 
she appeared as a defendant in a case in the Santa Catalina
 
Court she filed an affidavit against Judge Furey He then
 
transferred the case to another judge and wrote that judge a
 
letter in which he alleged that "any statements made by the
 
defendant should be viewed with skepticism. ...Her ability to
 
distort and/or lie can be most persuasive.
 
In a case in which she appeared in clothing that Judge
 
Furey considered to be an affront to the court, he ordered her
 
taken into custody and "ordered that she not be allowed to
 
make a telephone call."^^® She was released that day after
 
the superior court granted a petition for a writ of habeas
 
corpus and the contempt order was vacated.
 
The Supreme Court found in several incidents that Judge
 
Furey Was guilty of wilful misconduct. In summary of the
 
incidents and in stating the court's reasons for adopting the
 
Commission's recommendation for removal from office it noted
 
these factors. The court considered other instances where
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judges had been removed from office and weighed Judge Furey's
 
claim that removal from office was too harsh. The court had
 
previously commented that whether or not some persons may have
 
applauded his treatment of a "controversial and difficult
 
person" was not in issue. "...a judge's prime responsibi1ity
 
is the even handed dispensation of justice, even for the
 
controversia1 and difficult persons in society. In the
 
several instances discussed, the court foxand that Judge Furey
 
had been guilty of wilful misconduct and had abused his
 
contempt power.
 
The Supreme Court pointed out that "neither hard work nor
 
inexperience can mitigate wilful misconduct. Judge Furey
 
asked that he be suspended for a period of time rather than
 
being removed from office.
 
The court noted that suspension is not an option that is
 
open to the Supreme Court. The powers provided the Supreme
 
court are only to piiblicly censure or to remove from office.
 
The attitude of the Supreme Court in this and in other cases
 
was expressed in these words: "The purpose of these
 
proceedings is not to punish errant judges but to protect the
 
judicial system and those subject to the awesome power that
 
judges wield. ...(the court then added) That purpose will best
 
be served in this case by adopting the recommendation of the
 
masters and the Commission."^-®
 
SECTION G. Ryan V. Commission^^^
 
On May 8, 1988, Judge Richard Ryan was removed from
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office in the municipal court by the State Supreme Court. The
 
Court held that Judge Ryan had committed four acts of wilful
 
misconduct and fourteen acts of prejudicial conduct.
 
The four acts of wilful misconduct are listed below:
 
Judge Ryan held an attorney in contempt for statements
 
mads to the judge/s secretary outside of the judge's presence
 
and after a court session had ended. Even though he realized
 
that his order was invalid he continued to pursue the action
 
with the district attorney's office. He failed to notify the
 
attorney after he dropped the contempt action. The Supreme
 
Court found that Judge Ryan's pursuit of the contempt action
 
was done in bad faith and for an improper purpose "...and that
 
Judge Ryan committed wilful misconduct
 
A woman appeared before Judge Ryan in a civil matter and
 
wa;s ordered to pay a judgment. She reacted and said, "You
 
can't get blood out of a turnip." Judge Ryan heard her
 
comment and ordered his bailiff to take her into custody. He
 
did not give her any advisory of rights and sentenced her to
 
24 hours in the county jail. He asked his bailiff for the
 
citation for contempt and was given an incorrect code section.
 
He failed to comply with the requirement that a judge prepare
 
a summary of the acts that led up to the finding of contempt.
 
The Supreme Court's comments as to this act are very
 
strong. "This is another inexcusable example of Judge Ryan's
 
abuse of the contempt power. Once again, the judge completely
 
ignored contempt procedures. Judge Ryan failed to return (the
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defendant) to court to inform her that she was in contempt.
 
Moreover, he never gave her a chance to respond to the
 
contempt order. Judge Ryan committed unjudicial conduct in
 
relying on the bailiff for the legal citations to put in his
 
order. ­
Judge Ryan was too anxious to eliminate a jury trial in
 
a drunk driving charge. He offered a defendant a "no time"
 
disposition and when it was refused told the district attorney
 
that he would impose a sentence of thirty days if the
 
defendant were convicted in a jury trial. The district
 
attorney questioned the action and Judge Ryan said that he
 
would do so because the defendant refused the plea bargain and
 
further that he lied during the trial. (This statement was
 
made before there had even been a trial and was evidence of
 
Judge Ryan's bad faith.)
 
The defendant was convicted and Judge Ryan sentenced him
 
to thirty days in the county jail plus fines and assessments.
 
He refused to give reasons for the sentence on the record.
 
This was considered to be an unusually harsh sentence and the
 
defendant/s attorney filed a petition for a writ of habeas
 
corpus. The superior court ordered Judge Ryan to justify his
 
sentence.
 
Judge Ryan hired an attorney to represent him at county
 
expense. After exhausting appellate remedies. Judge Ryan
 
alleged that the defendant had lied during his trial. No
 
charges or allegations of perjury were ever made by the
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district attorney's office.
 
Because of imprbper laotiyes, the
 
masters and the Commission "determined that the judge (Ryan)
 
had committed W in this matter. In
 
further explanation of its conclusion, the Supreme Court
 
pointed out that "the judge was willing to fabricate
 
justifications for a challenged ruling. This is misconduct of
 
the very worst kind, evidencing both moral turpitude and
 
dishonesty.
 
In another case Judge Ryan, following a preliminary
 
hearing, contacted the district attorney ex parte to urge that
 
a case be prosecuted as a felony rather than as a misdemeanor.
 
Although no harm resulted to the defendant, the Supreme Court
 
concluded that by "intruding into the charging authority of
 
the administrative branch of government Judge Ryan committed
 
wilful misconduct.
 
In a trial of a hit and run accident, Judge Ryan
 
conducted his own investigation of the incident, contacted a
 
parts manager and called that person as a witness over the
 
objections of the district attorney and the defense attorney.
 
The evidence was damaging to the defendant's case. The
 
appellate department of the superior court set aside the
 
conviction because of the judge's improper actions.
 
The Supreme Court concluded that "Judge Ryan's handling
 
of (this) matter was improper and constituted prejudicial
 
conduct.
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Judge Ryan, follQwing acceptance df a plea of guilty to
 
a charge of xanlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, placed
 
the defendant on probat ion for twc yeare on conditiOri that she
 
serve twenty days in the courity jail in a work release
 
prograia. The probation officer fembved her frqm the work
 
release program because of a back injury. Judge Ryan, over
 
the objection of the probation department reinstated her in
 
the program. She was again terminated from the program for
 
failure to comply with the program rules and Judge Ryan
 
scheduled another hearing. The county counsel advised Judge
 
Ryan that he had no authority to act in the matter. Judge
 
Ryan responded by threatening to hire the "most expensive
 
attorney he could find" if his actions were challenged.
 
The county counsel filed a petition for a writ and Judge
 
Ryan hired private counsel to represent the court In doing
 
so. Judge Ryan failed to comply with a county requirement that
 
he submit a written request to siibstantiate the hiring of the
 
attorney. He later billed the county for the attorney's
 
services. The superior court found that Judge Ryan had
 
unlawfully ordered the defendant into the work-release
 
program.
 
The Supreme Court after reviewing the several instances
 
of unlawful acts by Judge Ryan made the following conclusion.
 
"This is another instance where the judge became personally
 
embroiled in a case before him. He exhibited bad faith in
 
threatening to retain ^the most expensive attorney that he
 
could find.' Nevertheless, we do not find wilful misconduct
 
here, because the record indicates that the judge may have
 
been genuinely concerned about (the defendant's) situation.
 
We do conclude however that the judge's improper actions
 
constituted prejudicial conduct.
 
In a matter where the defendant had pleaded guilty to two
 
misdemeanor counts with counsel present, the attorney failed
 
to appear for the sentencing. Judge Ryan proceeded to
 
sentence the defendant without his counsel being present,
 
without giving notice to counsel, and accepted an invalid
 
waiver of counsel. The supreme Court found that these actions
 
were wilful misconduct.
 
In another instance Judge Ryan had sentenced a defendant
 
who had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor chairge with counsel
 
present and had placed him on formal probation for three
 
years. Later, the probation department petitioned the court
 
to revoke probation based upon some criminal convictions. The
 
defendant was brought before Judge Ryan in chambers for the
 
revocation hearing. Judge Ryan asked the defendant if he
 
wanted an attorney appointed, and upon defendant's request
 
appointed the public defender.
 
No court reporter was present and Judge Ryan proceeded to
 
ask the defendant if he had committed the crimes alleged. The
 
defendant admitted to the acts. Judge Ryan then requested the
 
probation officer to prepare a sentencing report.
 
In three instances Judge Ryan was charged with
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prejudicial conduct for failing to provide a court reporter in
 
criminal matters The requirement had been stated In re
 
Armstrong (1981) 126 Cal. App. 3d 556.
 
Judge Ryan took an arbitrary position that reporters were
 
not required and directed his clerk to discharge the reporters
 
that Were assigned to his courtroom unless there was a timely
 
request made for their services. The district attorney made
 
it a practice to stamp on all filings a request for a court
 
reporter. In pro per defendants were not informed of the
 
right to have a court reporter present and did not know they
 
had to request that a court reporter be present to provide a
 
verbatim account of the proceedings.
 
In one instance a superior court judge had remanded a
 
matter to Judge Ryan for further proceedings with a court
 
reporter present. Judge Ryan protested the ruling because he
 
did not believe that reporters were required and that they
 
were an unnecessary expense to the county.
 
The Supreme Court reviewed the background of the three
 
cases and the failures of Judge Ryan to inform the defendants
 
of their rights and of the necessity to make a request. After
 
several instances. Judge Ryan finally conceded that Armstrong
 
requires a court reporter upon request. The Commission noted
 
that "The judge's stubborn and obstructionist attitude have
 
effectively denied those defendants their constitutional right
 
to have court a reporter present; The Supreme Court
 
"...concurred with the masters and the Commission that Judge
 
105
 
Ryan's conduct in these matters was prejudicial."^^'
 
Several allegations of improper communications with the
 
press about pending cases were sustained by the Supreme Court.
 
In one case a reporter heard that he had made his
 
decision and asked Judge Ryan in chambers to let her review
 
it. He did so and told her why he had decided the case as he
 
had.
 
In the case where Judge Ryan had found an attorney in
 
contempt for remarks made to his clerk when the court was not
 
in session, he discussed the contempt order With a newspaper
 
reporter while the matter was pending and while the validity
 
of his order was being contested in the superior court.
 
In the case where Judge Ryan sentenced a defendant who
 
had refused a plea bargain to thirty days in the county jail
 
plus substantial fines when he was found guilty by a jury, he
 
explained his sentence to the press and wrote a letter to the
 
editor of the newspaper. The Supreme Court agreed with the
 
masters and the commission. "Judge Ryan committed prejudicial
 
conduct in the matters.
 
Judge Ryan told sexual jokes on two occasions to women
 
attorneys. They were offended by the jokes. The Supreme
 
Court commented that it was immaterial whether the offensive
 
jokes were told in the court room or in chambers. The Supreme
 
Court also used as examples for its concern about the conduct
 
of Judge Ryan instances involving Judge Geiler and Judge
 
Gonzalez
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 " .o.derogatory remarks, although made in chambers or at
 
a staff gathering, may become public knowledge and thereby
 
diminish the hearer's esteem for the judiciary - again
 
regardless of the speaker's subjective intent motivation. The
 
reputation in the community of a judge necessarily reflects on
 
that community's regard for the judicial system. "We
 
conclude that Judge Ryan's offensive and insensitive jokes
 
constituted prejudicial conduct.
 
The masters and the Commission found that Judge Ryan was
 
not diligent in performing his duties and responsibilities
 
sitting as a judge. Despite his blatant failures and the
 
Supreme Court sustaining such findings other judges are
 
continuing such prejudicial conduct. Evidence from clerks,
 
bailiffs, and court reporters is available but such personnel
 
must be protected from retaliation if they can be expected to
 
come forward to testify about the frequent absences of many
 
judges from their duties.
 
Judge Ryan regularly left the court after completion of
 
his calendar leaving the courthouse at about 2 p.m. each day.
 
On Fridays he left in the morning and often did not return.
 
Canon 3B(1) specifically addresses Judge Ryan's conduct.
 
"Judges should diligently discharge their administrative
 
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial
 
administration, and facilitate the performance of the
 
administrative responsibilities of other judges and court
 
officials."^^5
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One judge has often presented the argument to his
 
associates that as he is quicker in accomplishing his duties,
 
he should not have to do a slow judge's work. His argument
 
overlooks the loss of time to police officers, clerks, and
 
attorneys as they must search for other judges to accomplish
 
administrative responsibilities that are shared by all judges.
 
The Supreme Court was not impressed by Judge Ryan's
 
arguments and found that his failure to "fulfill certain
 
aspects of his judicial function amounted to prejudicial
 
conduct. In summary, the Supreme Court concluded, "Judge
 
Ryan committed four acts of wilful misconduct and fourteen
 
acts of prejudicial conduct. —The judge's conduct exhibits
 
a pattern of personal embroilment in the cases assigned to
 
him. He has lost his temperance and objectivity on several
 
occasions, resulting in prejudice to the parties appearing
 
before him or in the abuse of his contempt power. He has
 
attempted to defend his position in the courts and in the
 
media with little regard for procedure or judicial
 
decorum.
 
Judge Richard Ryan, a Municipal Court Judge of the
 
Roseville-Rocklin Judicial District, Placer County, was
 
removed from office by order of the California State Supreme
 
Court in May of 1988. He was not prohibited from practicing
 
law, if he passed the Professional Responsibility Examination.
 
SECTION H. McCullouah v. Commission^'^°
 
In 1987, the Hon. Bernard McCullough, a judge of the
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municipal court, was subjected to the discipline of public
 
censure by the Supreme Court In a brief summary of
 
reasons, the Commission On Judicial Performance had stated its
 
recommendations to the Supreme Court.
 
In one instance, Judge McCullough had not decided a
 
submitted case for three years and four months. During that
 
period he had submitted salary affidavits at thirty day
 
intervals certifying that no case was pending and undecided
 
which had been under submission for more than ninety days.^^°
 
The Supreme Court fovind that Judge McCullough's failure
 
to respond to inquiries from the attorneys of record in the
 
case and from the Commission "amounted to persistent failure
 
to perform judicial duties. The Supreme Court found that
 
the failure to decide the case, and his execution of salary
 
affidavits, and receipt of salary for the period was "conduct
 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
 
judicial office into disrepute. Based upon its findings
 
the Supreme Court imposed public censure upon Judge
 
McCullough.
 
In 1989, the Supreme Court removed Justice Court Judge
 
Bernard McCullough from judicial office in the San Benito
 
Judicial District of San Benito County. The Supreme Court,
 
after reviewing the procedures and recommendation of the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance, found that Judge
 
McCullough had committed four acts of wilful misconduct in
 
office.
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In one case, Judge McCullough ordered a jury to find a
 
defendant guilty of the charged crime, a misdemeanor. The
 
Supreme Court noted that depriving a criminal defendant of his
 
fundamental right to be tried by a jury manifests disrespect
 
for the constitutional protections of our legal system.
 
In another case, a friend asked Judge McCullough to
 
excuse him from appearing on an arraignment on a misdemeanor
 
charge. Without contacting the District Attorney, Judge
 
McCullough continued the case. During the next two years,
 
Judge McCullough continued the case twenty times. "The
 
Supreme Court called this a casebook example of wilful
 
misconduct.
 
In two cases, Judge McCullough proceeded to trial in
 
matters even though the defendants' attorneys were not
 
present. The attorneys had called the court explaining that
 
they had conflicts in appearances and had requested
 
continuances. The Supreme Court held that forcing the
 
defendants to trihl without counsel was wilful misconduct.
 
The court suggested that Judge McCullough should have held
 
hearings to determine whether or not there was good cause for
 
the failure of the attorneys to appear in their matters
 
Despite the public censure that the Supreme Court had
 
imposed upon Judge McCullough in 1987 for failure to decide
 
cases and for signing salary certifications while the cases
 
were pending, he continued this pattern of conduct. In 1989,
 
the Supreme Court found that he had failed to sign a judgment
 
in one case for six years.
 
"His failure to respond to our public censure evidences
 
a lack of regard for the Coinmission, this court, and his
 
obligations as a judge.
 
SECTION I. Kloepfer v. Coitimission^^^
 
The Hon. Kenneth L. Kloepfer was removed from office in
 
the Municipal Court of San Bernardino County in 1990 pursuant
 
to the Supreme Court's 1989 opinion that had become final.
 
The Commission on judicial Perfprmance had recommended that tie
 
be censured publicly. Findings by the Commission of four acts
 
of wilful misconduct and twenty^one acts of prejudi'^^^^^^^
 
conduct were sustained. The court discussed hnd rejpcted
 
Kloepfer/s claim that the combination of the investigatory and
 
adjudicatory functions in the commission denied him due
 
process. The court also rejected Judge Kloepfer's claim that
 
due to the delays in the c proceedings that tie ha^
 
been denied due process.
 
The comments of the Supreme Court regarding the two
 
contentions are significant as they firmly establish the
 
periods of time that acts may be considered as they affect the
 
actions of the commission in reviewing conduct of not only
 
Judge Kloepfer but other judges.
 
During the lengthy proceedings attorneys and judges were
 
concerned about the nature of the conduct of Judge Kloepfer
 
and the incidents that had been referred to during and after
 
the completion of the hearings by the masters. As an example,
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the first incident that was discussed occurred within a few
 
months of Judge Kloepfer taking the bench in 1981. A court
 
reporter cried as a result of being berated by Judge Kloepfer.
 
This incident and others have to be placed in context and
 
form a part of the continuing pattern of "rude, abusive, and
 
hostile behavior" that the Supreme Court found was typical of
 
the charges made against Judge Kloepfer.
 
Most of the attorneys who appeared before Judge Kloepfer
 
were aware of many of the incidents that occurred. Some were
 
percipient witnesses to incidents or were recipients of the
 
abuse. The judges were only aware of rumors of incidents and
 
hearsay about occurrences.
 
An unresolved question remains. What can or should
 
judges who only hear about incidents do about allegations of
 
misconduct? These were not pea:ceful periods. Judge Kloepfer
 
and one other judge were in virtual "warfare" during most of
 
the period that incidents were occurring.
 
Ten acts of prejudicial conduct are listed. They can be
 
grouped as conduct directed toward court reporters, conduct
 
directed toward attorneys, conduct directed toward defendants,
 
and conduct directed toward parties and witnesses. Generally
 
the statements of Judge Kloepfer were rude and abusive.
 
As a district attorney/ Judge Kloepfer had been
 
responsible for training newly appointed district attorneys.
 
Yet, his statements in court to some prosecuting attorneys in
 
the municipal court were strong and disparaging. To one
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attorney he stated, "You are an embarrassment to the People of
 
the State of California and it's frightening to think that you
 
represent their interests. Another attorney was accused
 
of being "psychologically afraid to take a case to trial" and
 
then he made this demand, "Give me a list of the cases you
 
have tried and the court in which they were tried.
 
In one trial. Judge KlOepfer displayed such hostility to
 
the defendant, defendant's counsel, and a defense witness that
 
the Appellate Division of the San Bernardino County Superior
 
Court held that defendant had been denied even the semblance
 
of a fair trial. According to the Supreme Court's opinion
 
the conduct of Judge Kloepfer was pervasively rude and
 
threatening as he cdnducted hearings and tria;ls.
 
The Supreme Court addressed Judge Kloepfer's argument
 
that no one was harmed (by his conduct) in strong terms. The
 
Supreme Court stated, "His argument reflects his inability to
 
appreciate how impulsive, discourteous, threatening, and
 
arbitrary statements by a judge affects the perceptions of the
 
judiciary and the justice system.
 
The Supreme Court found that Judge Kloepfer had failed to
 
accord defendants their basic constitutional rights in five
 
instances. Judge Kloepfer had practiced law as a prosecuting
 
attorney for thirteen years before running for office, During
 
the thirteen years hei had tried many kinds of criminal cases
 
and had been responsible not only for negotiating plea
 
bargains but also for representing the people at the time
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guilty pleas were taken by a judge in hundreds of cases. For
 
three years he was the representative of the people on a
 
felony sentencing calendar at which time pleas were confirmed
 
and rights were waived by defendants after being advised by
 
the defendant's attorney, by the district attorney, or often
 
by the judge taking the plea.
 
As a district attorney Judge Kloepfer had taught classes
 
for the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Academy on a variety
 
of subjects including search and seizure and procedures in
 
making lawful arrests. Without this detailed knowledge of
 
Judge Kloepfer's background of training and experience, the
 
Supreme Court found that in the various proceedings where he
 
had denied or circumvented the defendant's constitutional
 
rights that Judge Kloepfer "knowingly failed to ensure the
 
cohstitutional rights of a criminal defendant and did so to
 
avoid the burden of proceedings in which the defendant would
 
have adequate representation."^®^
 
The Supreme Court detailed five instances in which denial
 
of adequate representation occurred; Among them was an
 
instance where the defendant appeared without counsel for a
 
pretrial conference. The defendant had subsequently appeared
 
and his retained counsel was late. without giving the
 
defendant an opportunity to explain Judge Kloepfer remanded
 
him into custody for not going to a panel that assisted
 
defendants to identify an attorney to assist him and for not
 
discussing his case with a district attorney.
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Judge Kloepfer had contended that this was not typical of
 
his conduct. The Supreme Court disagreed. "We disagree with
 
petitioner's characterization of his conduct as atypical. To
 
the contrary, it is all too typical of his pattern of
 
discourteous remarks, threats, and intimidation, and punitive
 
rulings made on the basis of unfounded assumptions.
 
Two other examples of his arbitrary conduct follow.
 
Judge Kloepfer ordered a defendant arrested though she had not
 
been ordered to appear for a hearing and her attorney was
 
present.
 
In another case, a defendant appeared with proof that the
 
case underlying a charge of probation violation had been
 
dismissed. Despite that act. Judge Kloepfer proceeded to
 
conduct a hearing on the alleged probation violation over
 
defendant's objections and request that he be represented by
 
counsel. Based upon hearsay testimony of an officer. Judge
 
Kloepfer found the defendant in violation of probation and
 
sentenced him to six months in the coxinty jail. The public
 
defender, filed a notice of appeal and a writ of habeas corpus
 
for the defendant.
 
Apparently, even when Judge Kloepfer recognized his
 
mistakes he continued to compound them. He ignored the
 
appeal, and by stipulation of counsel reasserted jurisdiction,
 
which he lacked and could not properly do. He set aside the
 
sentence and ordered the defendant released from custody. The
 
public defender then filed an affidavit of prejudice against
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Judge Kloepfer. Judge Kloepfer denied the affidavit and then
 
Gonducted another violation of probation hearing, found the
 
defendant in violation of probation, and sentenced the
 
defendant to four months in the coxmty jail. The Supreme
 
Court found that his series of judicial gaffs all supported
 
the commission's conclusion that he had engaged in wilful
 
misconduct and prejudicial misconduct
 
The Supreme Court found that Judge Kloepfer had abused
 
his contempt power and his power to issue orders to show cause
 
and bench warrants in five instances. The records of
 
proceedings in Judge Kloepfer's court are replete with
 
instances where he ordered persons to "shut up" even though
 
they were seeking information that would have helped them to
 
understand what was going on in the court. He frequently held
 
persons in contempt for asking questions or asking their
 
attorneys questions.
 
In one instance he ordered the person who had posted bail
 
arrested when the defendant failed to appear. The Supreme
 
Court noted, "Ordering a person to appear in court when no
 
matter requiring his attendance is pending constitutes a
 
serious misuse of the judicial office.
 
On the fourth general count, the Supreme Court foiand that
 
Judge Kloepfer failed to remain objective and involved himself
 
in three matters that came before him.
 
In one case after granting a defense motion to suppress
 
evidence he denied the deputy district attorney's motion to
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 dismiss the case. Judge Kloepfer stated that he had read the
 
police report and believed there was enough evidence to
 
proceed and that he believed that the defehdant was guilty.
 
Although Judge Kloepfer had thus established that he had
 
prejudged the case, he denied an oral motion by the defense to
 
disqualify himself from the case.
 
Judge Kloepfer criticized the district attorney's office
 
in open court for seeking extraordinary relief from one of his
 
rulings.
 
Following a preliminary hearing, j;udge Kloepfer stated,
 
"Mr. is fraudulent, a liar, and deceitful!" He then
 
increased bail from $13,000.00 to $150,000.00 and grd®red
 
attorney's fees of $1,500.00 paid from the bail. This was
 
done although the bail had been posted by defendant's
 
grandmother.^®^
 
In the last of the five general charges that were
 
sustained by the Supreme Court, it was found that Judge
 
Kloepfer had improperly ordered defendants to reimburse the
 
county for the services of a public defender in two cases.
 
Judge Kloepfer did not advise one defendant that he had
 
a right to have a hearing as to his ability to pay the fees
 
assessed, and that he had a right to have a hearing as to the
 
appropriateness of the fees. Judge Kloepfer set the fees at
 
$2000.00 and subsequently criticized the public defender for
 
attempting to get the amount of the fees modified. The
 
Supreme Court held that these acts cohstituted wilful
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misconduct.
 
Following a preliminary hearing. Judge Kloepfer ordered
 
reimbursement for the public defender's services by another
 
defendant of $1500.00 without conducting a hearing and ordered
 
that the money be taken from a bail deposit. Neither of the
 
required hearings listed above were held. The Supreme Court
 
held that these acts were prejudicial conduct.
 
Several attorneys testified at the hearings as to Judge
 
Kloepfer's honesty and integrity. Although presented as
 
evidence in mitigation of the requirement for the removal from
 
office, the Supreme Court held, "This evidence, and that which
 
confirms that petitioner had a good reputation for legal
 
knowledge and administrative skills are not mitigating.
 
Honesty and good legal knowledge are minimum qualifications
 
which should be expected of every judge.
 
The summation of the Supreme Court's conclusions show
 
great perception as to the flaws that were demonstrated
 
frequently through the several years that Judge Kloepfer sat
 
as a judge in San Bernardino County. One of his colleagues
 
shortly after he took office had described his conduct toward
 
clerks, court reporters, attorneys, and litigants as being
 
that of "a big bully."
 
Through his years as a prosecutor. Judge Kloepfer had
 
been an aggressive and harsh advocate. His strong statements
 
regairding his intent to impose severe sentences on criminals
 
appealed to the public and to the law enforcement agencies
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that supported him when he unseated Judge D. Larry Thorn in
 
1986. His sentences hs imposed through the years as a judge
 
reflected his view that harsh pxmishment was the only way to
 
deal with crime.
 
The summation of the rather lengthy review of the Supreme
 
Court opinion in the 1990 Annual Report of the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance is as compelling as a Greek tragedy as it
 
illustrates the faults that led to Judge Kloepfer's removal
 
from office. "The court (pointed out) that the judge's years
 
of experience as a deputy district attorney suggested that he
 
was aware of the constitutional and procedural rights of
 
criminal defendants, but failed to use his knowledge to ensure
 
those rights. The court found that the record belied the
 
judge's claim that he had learned from past experience and
 
modified his courtroom behavior. The court stated, ^(the
 
record) demonstrates instead an inability to appreciate the
 
importance of, and conform to, the standards of judicial
 
conduct that are essential if justice is to be meted out in
 
every case (49 Cal.Sd at 866).' The court concluded that Judge
 
Kloepfer's removal was necessary to protect the public and the
 
reputation of the judiciary."^®®
 
SECTION J. Kennick v. Commission
 
In 1990, Judge David M. Kennick of the Los Angeles County
 
Municipal Court was removed from office for persistent failure
 
to perform judicial duties. This was the first time in the
 
thirty years of its existence that the Commission on Judicial
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Performance had made a recommendation for removal of a judge
 
on that basis. Judge Kennick had been absent from work on 96
 
days during 1985 and 1986. However, he had only reported
 
being ill on 21 of those days, and he had not provided any
 
medical evidence to support his claim of illness made at the
 
commission's hearing. The Supreme Court, in sustaining the
 
Commission's recommendation for removal, noted that under the
 
California State Constitution as amended in 1976, "persistent
 
failure to perform judicial duties standing alone is a
 
sufficient ground for removal.
 
It is important to note that Judge Kennick argued that
 
the actions of the commission and the Supreme court were
 
rendered moot as he had retired after the report of the
 
Commission recommending removal had been filed. The Supreme
 
Court held that it was necessary to proceed with the hearing
 
to determine whether or not Judge Kennick could hold judicial
 
office in the future and whether or not Judge Kennick should
 
be suspended from the practice of law.
 
Although the Supreme Court held that the sole reason for
 
removing Judge Kennick from judicial office was his persistent
 
failure to perform his judicial duties, it also reviewed other
 
issues that had been raised in the recommendation for his
 
removal.
 
The Supreme Court held that he had engaged in prejudicial
 
conduct when he was arrested for driving under the influence
 
in that he was rude and uncooperative. Further, he went to a
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California Highway Patrol office and asked a sergeant "if the
 
paperwork could be lost between the office and the court?"
 
The Supreme Court found that he had engaged in wilful
 
misconduct in that he "had shouted at a district attorney,
 
that he was discourteous, impatient, and demeaning to
 
litigants appearing before him, and that he denied parties a
 
full opportunity to be heard, and was rude and intimidating to
 
witnesses. The court also found that he was abusive and
 
intimidating to an attorney appearing before him, and denied
 
her a right to be heard.
 
Judge Kennick was charged with gender bias in that he
 
addressed female attorneys, court personnel, and others as
 
"sweetheart, sweetie, honey, and dear in the course of
 
conducting court business."!'^ The Supreme Court found that
 
such terms were "unprofessional, demeaning, and sexist and
 
that the use of these appellations was prejudicial
 
conduct.
 
But that is not the end of this sad story. Judge Kennick
 
favored friends in making appoihtments of counsel to represent
 
indigent defendants and persisted in communicating ex parte
 
with attorneys that he had appointed to represent defendants.
 
His lack of judgement was further exemplified in that he
 
engaged in prejudicial conduct when he "assured a waitress
 
(while at a bar) that she should not worry about her arrest
 
for driving under the influence.
 
SECTION K. In re Boaas^^^
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The State Supreme Court removed Judge Charles D. Boags
 
from his office as Judge of the Beverly Hills Municipal Court
 
pursuant to Article VI, Section 18(b) of the California
 
Constitution. In December of 1988, Judge Boags was convicted
 
of the charge of conspiracy to obstruct justice, a crime
 
involving moral turpitude. In February of 1989, as a result
 
of the conviction and based upon a recommendation of the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance, Judge Boags was suspended
 
from office without pay. The constitution requires that when
 
such a conviction becomes final a judicial official must be
 
removed from office.^'^ The conviction became final in May of
 
1990 and the Supreme Court removed Judge Charles D. Boags from
 
office.
 
SECTION L. SUMMARY OF REMOVALS
 
From 1961 to 1990, eight municipal and two justice court
 
judges were removed from office for acts of misconduct or acts
 
that were prejudicial to the administration of justice. One
 
municipal court judge was removed from office due to health
 
problems that prevented him from performing his duties. One
 
Supreme Court associate justice was removed from office
 
because of senile dementia. One municipal court judge was
 
removed from office after a conviction for obstructing justice
 
became final. The total number of judges removed from office
 
from 1961 to 1990 was thirteen.
 
A recommendation for removal of one superior court judge.
 
the Honorable Charles F. Stevens, from office was not
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i^ustaihed because of insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court
 
dismissed the action.
 
The Commission recommended that Judge James J. McCartney
 
be removed from office and he was censured publicly. The
 
Commission recommended that Judge Kenneth Lynn Kloepfer be
 
censured publicly and he was removed from office. The
 
Commission recommended that Judge JerroId L. Wenger be
 
censured publicly and he was removed from office.
 
Associate Justice Marshall F. McComb of the State Supreme
 
Court was removed from office because of senile dementia.
 
Judge Charles Robert Roick of the San Diego County Municipal
 
Court was removed from office because of disabilities that
 
prevented him from performing his judicial responsibilities.
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CHAPTER 9
 
SUMMARY OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
 
PERFORMJUTCE and CASES IMPOSING PUBLIC CENSURE
 
When the Coimisslon on Judicial Qualifications was
 
authorized, its power revolved around the two phrases wilful
 
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of
 
justice that brings the judiciary into disrepute. The Supreme
 
Court has imposed public censure on judges in sixteen cases.
 
Many judges have accepted that punishment as an
 
alternative to the possibility of being removed from office.
 
Many judges have resigned or retired rather than challenge the
 
allegations that brought them to the attention of the
 
Commission and to save whatever pension they may have earned.
 
As of the end of 1990, ninety-one had done so. An additional
 
factor that was considered by many judges was that removal
 
from office also raised the possibility of being prohibited
 
from practicing law.
 
I have not intended in this paper to emphasize or
 
concentrate upon statistics. However, following my lengthy
 
examination of the cases cited that support the removal of
 
judges from office, I noted that no superior court judge, or
 
appellate court justice, or supreme cohrt justice has been
 
removed from office for wilful misconduct in office or for
 
conduct bringing the judiciary into disrepute. The only
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CaXifprnia state Supteine^ JustiGe removed from offiqe was
 
Associate Supreme Court Justice Marshall F. McComb who was
 
removed from office because of incapacity caused by senile
 
dementia.
 
I have reviewed the broad statistics indicating the
 
number of sitting judges presiding during the years from 1961
 
to 1990 and the number of complaints filed against them.
 
During the early years of the report, the number of justice
 
court, municipal court and superior court judges who retired
 
during the time that an investigation was being conducted was
 
stated. However, that was not done from 1964 to 1988.
 
In 1976, the voters approved an option of private
 
admonishment as a disciplinary device to educate and alert
 
judges. In this section of paper, I will note the number of
 
sitting judges, the number of complaints filed against them,
 
the number of inquiries/investigations initiated, the number
 
of public censures and the cause of the censure, and the
 
number of private admonishments with a general indication of
 
the reasons for the complaint that resulted in the
 
admonishment. As the style of the reports has changed through
 
the thirty years, the statistics and information provided
 
cannot be correlated. In a few years, I was unable to confirm
 
the number of sitting judges even though I contacted the
 
California Judges Association, the Administrative Office of
 
the Courts and the Commission on Judicial Performance.
 
Since no superior court judge has been removed from
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office, the nature of the complaints that justified public
 
censure should be of interest and may relate to the bases for
 
removal of municipal and justice court judges from office.
 
SECTION A. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL OUALIFICATIONS. 1961
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1961, the n\imber of sitting judges was not
 
stated in the report.
 
Seventy-five complaints were filed against sixty-eight
 
judges. Sixteen were justice court judges, thirty-five were
 
municipal court judges, twenty were superior court judges, one
 
was an appellate court justice, and three could not be
 
identified.
 
During the investigations, two justice court judges, one
 
municipal court judge, and one superior court judge retired.
 
SECTION B. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL OUALIFICATIONS. 1962
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1962, there were 904 sitting judges.
 
Ninety-five complaints were filed. Twenty-seven were
 
against justice court judges, thirty-five were municipal court
 
judges forty-four were superior court judges, and four were
 
appellate court judges.
 
An unstated number of cases were investigated.
 
During the investigations, five municipal court judges
 
and one justice court judge retired or resigned.
 
SECTION C. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL OUALIFICATIONS. 1963.
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1963, there were 927 sitting judges.
 
One hundred fourteen complaints were filed with the
 
coitiiaission against judges. Sixteen were justice court judges,
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thirteen were municipal court judges, and thirteen were
 
superior court judges.
 
Forty inquiries/investigations were conducted. During
 
the investigations, ten judges retired or resigned from
 
office. Five were from the justice courts, four were from the
 
municipal courts, and one was from the superior court.
 
SECTION D. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS. 1964
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1964, there were 933 sitting judges.
 
Sixty-seven complaints were filed against judges. Thirty
 
inquiries were made to judges. Six judges retired without a
 
formal hearing taking place. ( it should be noted that the
 
statement of the number of complaints against judges at the
 
different court levels was not given in this annual report,
 
though provided in 1961, 1962, and 1963.)
 
A recommendation for removal of Judge Charles F. Stevens
 
from the San Diego County Superior Court was made. The
 
statement summarizing the case is brief. The State Supreme
 
Court found that the evidence was insufficient to support the
 
recommendation. The recoinmendation was rejected and the
 
proceeding was dismissed.
 
As no discipline other than removal was available to the
 
State Supreme Court a movement began to include censure as an
 
appropriate punishment in those cases where removal was too
 
harsh a penalty for the offense or offenses committed.
 
SECTION E. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATION. 1965
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1965, the number of sitting judges was not
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provided in the report.
 
Twenty nine inquiries/investigations occurred. Four of
 
the judges contacted resigned or retired after receiving
 
notice of being investigated. No recommendations for removal
 
were made this year.
 
SECTION F. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS. 1966
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1966, there were 965 sitting judges.
 
Seventy-five complaints were filed agaihst: the judges.
 
Twenty-nine inquiries/investigations were made. Some of them
 
justified criticisms or admonishment by the cpinmission but did
 
not warrant removal from office.
 
"In recent years, such irifractions have included neiglect
 
and inattention to duties, disregard for rules and standards
 
of practice, as well as arrogance, aggravated discourtesy, and
 
violations of canons of judicial ethics. Usually specific
 
changes or improvements have resulted from actions of the
 
Commission,
 
SECTION G. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS. 1967
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1967, there were 999r sittiiig judges.
 
One hundred and one complaints were filed. Forty-eight
 
inquiries or investigations were made. Five judges retired or
 
resigned during the course of the investigations.
 
SECTION H. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS. 1968
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1968. there were 1030 sitting judges.
 
One hundred thirty-two complaints were filed. Forty-

eight resulted in inquiries or investigations.
 
SECTION I. COMMISSION ON JUDICiAL QUALIFICATIONS. 1969
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1969, there were 1050 sitting judges.
 
One hxandred fifty-five complaints were filed against
 
judges. Forty-six warranted inquiries or the opening of
 
investigations. Four judges retired or resigned during the
 
investigations.
 
SECTION J. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS. 1970
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1970. there were 1094 sitting judges.
 
One hundred eighty-one complaints were filed with the
 
Commission. In thirty-three cases inquiries/investigations
 
were conducted. The Commission recommended censure of two
 
judges during the year.
 
The State Supreme Court adopted the recommendation that
 
Judge Gerald S. Chargin be publicly censured. In a juvenile
 
court proceeding "Judge Chargin made improper and inflammatory
 
remarks reflecting upon the juvenile's family and members of
 
his ethnic group. The Supreme Court held that the conduct
 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice and brings
 
the judiciary into disrepute.
 
The second recommendation was received too late for the
 
State Supreme Court to take action on it in 1970.
 
SECTION K. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS. 1971
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1971, there were 1087 sitting judges.
 
Two hundred seventeen complaints were filed against
 
judges. Inquiries or investigations were conducted in fifty-

four instances. The Commission recommended to the State
 
129
 
Supreiae Court that Judge Leland W. Geiler be removed from
 
office.200
 
Judge Bernard B. Glickfeld, a judge of the Superior Court
 
was censured for making improper remarks during discussions of
 
the disposition of criminal charges. He made insulting
 
remarks about the victim and repeated some of them in open
 
court in connection with the case. The Supreme Court held
 
that "Judge Glickfeld's conduct was prejudicial to the
 
administration of justice and brought the judicial office into
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Two judges retired or resigned during the conduct of
 
SECTION L. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL OUALIFICATIONS. 1973
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1973, there were 1,135 sitting judges.
 
One hundred ninety-seven complaints were filed against
 
judges. Forty inquiries/investigations were initiated.
 
The Commission recommended censure and severe censure
 
following completion of two investigations. The State Supreme
 
Court imposed public censure on Judge Antonio E. Chavez,2°^
 
and severe public censure on Judge Leopold Sanchez.2*^^ Both
 
of these judges were from the Los Angeles County Superior
 
Court. Each had provided presigned bail release forms to
 
bondsmen.
 
The court held in each case that since no judicial
 
officer had ruled on the propriety of bail that providing
 
presigned release forms to the bail bondsmen constituted
 
130
 
 wilful misconduct. In the Sanchez case, the State Supreme
 
Court commented that there was no showing made that the judge
 
had profited from his actions.
 
The Commission recommended that the Hon. James J.
 
McCartney be removed from office. The matter was pending- at
 
the time of filing of this annual report.
 
During this year, the State Supreme Court removed Judge
 
Leland Wo Geiler from office.
 
Two judgeis resigned during investigations of their
 
alleged misconduct.
 
SECTION M. commission ON TODICIAL QUALIFICATION. 1974
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1974, there were 1133 sitting judges.
 
Two hundred forty-seven complaints were filed. Thirty-

six inquiries/investigations were conducted.
 
The Commission recommended the removal of Judge William
 
D. Spruance from office.
 
The Hon. James J. McCartney was publicly cehsiired after
 
the State Supreme Court rejected the recommendation of the
 
Commission that he be removed from office.^°^ In commenting
 
on changes made to the constitution in 1976, the court used
 
the decision in McCartnev v. Commission to clarify its
 
position o "The persistent failure to perform duties need not
 
be wilful, and persistent inability to perform the judge's
 
duties is a new basis of closing whatever loophole exists
 
between "^disability' and "^failure.'
 
In McCartnev v. Commission on Judicial Oualificatlons.
 
. ■ ■ 13L. - ■ 
the State Supreme Court in 1974 acloiGwledged the judge's
 
inability to conduct court matters effectively, but ruled
 
^such shortcomings cannot be condemned as injudicious
 
behavior In its opinion, the State Supreme Court
 
"likened the judge's handling of judicial tasks to the/^fog­
mired High Court of Chancery in Dickens' Bleak House, which
 
was so dedicated to the intricacies of justice that the
 
estates probated before it were entirely depleted by court
 
costs and legal fees. That infamous inefficiency, so well
 
depicted by Dickens/ was hardly cause for dispensing with the
 
Lord Chancellor.
 
Three judges retired or resigned during investigations.
 
During 1974, the Commission recommended that private
 
admonitions be authorized as an alternative disciplinary
 
measures. It was proposed that private admonitions and a
 
reprimand by the Commission be included in the California
 
Rules of Court to assure that less serious offenses not be
 
ignored.
 
The problem was that to impose public censure or removal
 
from office the Commission had to provide the State Supreme
 
Court with a full record of the proceedings. Many allegations
 
are admitted and the adoption of the recommendation would
 
eliminate a lengthy and cumbersome process for less serious
 
offenses. The California Judicial Council concluded that such
 
a procedure would require a constitutidnal amendment.
 
SECTION N. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS. 1975
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 ANNUAL REPORT. In 1975, the number of sitting judges stated
 
in the report could not be substantiated.
 
Two hundred thirtY-nine coniplaints were filed against
 
judges and forty-eight inquiries or inYestigations also were
 
initiated. Because of these investigations three judges
 
retired or resigned. Municipal court judges William D.
 
Spruance and Noel Cannon were removed from office by the State
 
-Siipreme:.Uoiirt;.';!:
 
SECTION O. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1976
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1976, the number of sitting judges stated
 
in the report could not be substantiated.
 
Two hundred fifty-one complaints were filed against
 
judges and sixty-three inquiries/investigations were begun.
 
Three judges resigned or retired before the invesitgations
 
were completed.
 
In 1976, the Commission was renamed the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance. In addition, the voters approved by a
 
significant vote of eighty-three percent to seventeen percent
 
several modifications in the law that had provided for the
 
actions by the Commission on Judicial Qualifications in 1960.
 
These major changes were:
 
"1) To provide for a tribunal of seven Court of Appeal
 
judges to determine a recommendation for censure, removal or
 
retirement of a judge of the Supreme Court;
 
"2) To add to ^habitual intemperance,' as a ground for
 
discipline, the language ^ in the use of intoxicants or drugs;'
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"3) To allow private admonishment by the Coiamission of a
 
judge ^found to have engaged in an improper action or a
 
dereliction of duty,' subject to Supreme Court review.
 
"4) To change one of the grounds for censure or removal
 
from ^wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties' to
 
^persistent failure or inability to perform the judge's
 
duties.'"208
 
SECTION P. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1977
 
ANNUAL REPORT♦ In 1977, there were 1178 sitting judges. 
Two hundred seventeen complaints were filed. One hundred 
seventy of the files were closed because there were no 
allegations of judicial misconduct. Inquiries regarding the 
actions of fifty-three judges were made. Eleven preliminary 
investigations were held. Three judges were exonerated of any 
inappropriate actions. One judge retired from office while an 
investigation was proceeding. The Supreme Court approved 
private admonishment of eight judges by the Commission on 
Judicial Performance. 
Associate Justice Marshall F. McComb of the California 
state Supreme Court was involuntarily retired by a special 
tribune. He was found to be suffering from a condition of 
senile dementia. 
SECTION Q. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1978 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1978, the number of sitting judges stated 
in the report could not be substantiated. 
Two hundred seventy-four complaints were filed against 
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judges. Seventy-^two inquiries were made. Twenty preliminary
 
investigations were begun. Seven private admonishments were
 
issued.
 
Procedurally, the admonishment may be given following an
 
investigation or a formal proceeding. The record of the
 
private admonishment becomes a part of the judge's file and
 
may be used in the future to support disciplinary actions.
 
Judge Gharles Robert Roick, a San Diego County municipal
 
court judge was removed from office because of disabilities.
 
One judge resigned during an investigation.
 
Judge Arden T. Jensen, a judge of the superior court, was
 
publicly censured for filing affidavits that he had no cases
 
that had been sxibmitted pending for more than ninety days.
 
The affidavits were not correct.
 
SECTION R. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1979
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1979, the total number of sitting judges
 
was not provided in the annual report.
 
Two hundred ninety-one complaints were filed. Seventy-

six inquiries or investigations were initiated.
 
Three private admonishments were administered.
 
Two judges retired or resigned during the conduct of
 
investigations.
 
SECTION S. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1980
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1980, there were 1276 Sitting judges.
 
Two hundred sixty complaints were filed against judges.
 
Sixty-five inquiries or investigations were initiated.
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Eight private adiaonishments were administered. If the
 
judge requests, a formal investigation will be conducted. In
 
this year, two private admonishments were given after formal
 
investigations.
 
From 1960 to 1980, seventy-three judges retired or
 
resigned in lieu of requesting a hearing wi.th reference to
 
investigations being conducted about them.
 
SECTION T. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. I98T
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1981, there were 1,280 sitting judges.
 
Two hundred sixty-seven complaints were filed. Fifty
 
inquiries or investigations were initiated. Four forinal
 
hearings concerning the complaints about judges were
 
conducted.
 
Judge Leland W. Wenger was removed from office.
 
Judge Robert S. Stevens, a judge of the Los Angeles
 
County Superior Court was censured publicly. Prior to
 
becoming a judge he had been a member of the legislature. For
 
four years, he called Mr. and Mrs. Edward Murphy, employees
 
of the legislature:, He talked to them about his sexual
 
fantasies and "proposed that the Murphys engage in various
 
kinds of sexual activity with him and with other persons, all
 
in explicit, vulgar,and offensive language. They objected
 
but he continued to harass them. Several public officials and
 
other legislative employees became aware of the telephone
 
calls'.
 
In August of 1979, the problem was reported in the Los
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Angeles Times. The Commission on Judicial Performance
 
determined that his conduct was prejudicial to the
 
administration of justice and recoitimenddd that he be censured.
 
The Supreme Court imposed the sanction of public censure.
 
Seven private admonishments were authorized by the State
 
Supreme Court.
 
Section U. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1982
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1982, there were 1308 sitting judges.
 
Three hundred sixty complaints were filed against judges.
 
Sixty-eight inquiries Or investigations were initiated.
 
One judge resigned or retired during the conduct of an
 
investigation.
 
Six judges were privately admonished.
 
The report of the Commission for 1982 provides a summary
 
of the bases for the actions taken against the Hon. Hugo
 
Fisher, the Hon. Charles S. Stevens, and the Hon. Lewis A.
 
Wenzel.
 
The Hon. Hugo Fisher, a judge of the San Diego County
 
Superior Court, was publicly censured by the State Supreme
 
Court for a continued pattern of ex parte communications with
 
one litigant's attorneys. This continued for a period of six
 
years. Opposing counsel was riot informed of the contacts.
 
The Hon. Charles S. Stevens, a judge of the Santa Barbara
 
County Superior Court, was publicly censured for coriduct
 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
 
judicial office into disrepute.^- During hearings in
 
chambers he frequently made various inappropriate an^^^^e
 
remarks that disparaged Blacks, Mexicans, and FilipinbsV
 
was excused because most of the members of the Supreme Court
 
held that his decisions were fair in spite of his comments.
 
Justice Kaus and Justice Mosk disagreed with the opinion
 
but for different reasons. Justice Kaus commented, "It is
 
beyond me how it can be argued that such behavior is not
 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, simply
 
because Judge Stevens performed his duties fairly and
 
equitably. *Justice not only should be done, but should
 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.'
 
Justice Mosk dissented because the Commission found that
 
at all times Judge Stevens had performed his duties fairly and
 
equitably and free from bias and should not have been
 
censured. He objected because the Commission was imposing its
 
standards of speech on the judiciary in violation of the
 
United States Constitution. In addition, he contended that
 
such actions were inappropriate as being a waste of the
 
taxpayers' monies and related this "inappropriate action" to
 
the challenge that had been posed to the State Supreme Court
 
that it was delaying decisions during an election year because
 
of the unpopularity of some of it rulings.
 
I do not agree with the conclusions of the Commission and
 
Justice Mosk. The Supreme Court held by a majority of the
 
justices that despite the reports of many degrading remarks
 
about ethnic groups by Judge Stevens that he was fair.^^^
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Judge Lewis Wenzel was suspended from office because of
 
he was charged with publicly offensive, disgraceful behavior,
 
ie., associating with prostitutes and soliciting or engaging
 
in an act of prostitution. Following a review of the
 
transcripts bf tlie testimony in the trial, the Commission
 
found that the offenses involved moral turpitude and
 
recommended that he be suspended without pay until the
 
convictions became final.
 
The State Supreme Court ordered that briefs be submitted.
 
Although, the convictions were overturned because of an error
 
in the instructions given the jurors, Judge Wenzel resigned
 
from office. Then the State Supreme Court dismissed the
 
proceedings as being moot.^^®
 
SECTION V. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 1983
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1983. there were 1,341 sitting judges.
 
Three hundred fifty-one complaints were filed against
 
judges. Sixty-three inquiries or investigations were
 
conducted.
 
Six private admonishments were imposed by the Commission.
 
Three judges resigned or retired during the conduct of
 
investigations into allegations of their misconduct.
 
Judge Mario P. Gonzalez was removed from office.^­
Judge Bobby D. Youngblood, a judge of the Santa Ana
 
Municipal Court, was "severely publicly censured. Some
 
examples of his actions were listed by the State Supreme Court
 
that justified severe public censure.
 
Judge Youngblood had ordered persons to appear before him
 
without legal authority to do so and had jailed one of them
 
unlawfully. He presided over a case involving Pacific
 
Telephone, and at that time was a party in a case against that
 
company. He altered a previously entered judgement after an
 
ex parte communication with the plaintiff and without giving
 
notice to Pacific Telephone. Judge Youngblood contacted
 
employees of Pacific Telephone and threatened to place them in
 
jail if his telephone service were interrupted following his
 
rulings.
 
Judge Harry R. Roberts, a Superior Court Judge of Mono
 
County was publicly censured for eight ailegations of
 
misconduct. Three examples are cited. One count of
 
misconduct was based upon his conviction for obstructing
 
police officers. In another count, though he had a legitimate
 
concern [in a child neglect hearing] he expressed that concern
 
"... in an unacceptable, nonobjective and nonneutral manner,
 
demonstrating unwarranted impatience, disbelief and hostility
 
toward counsel, litigant and witnesses. In a third count,
 
the State Supreme Court concluded that Judge Robert's
 
"... attempt to exert pressure upon prosecutor, defense
 
counsel and appellate court alike discloses an unhealthy and
 
wholly improper concern with the protection of his own rulings
 
from appellate reversal.
 
SECTION W. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1984
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1984, there were 1,341 sitting judges.
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Three htindred eighty-eight complaints were filed. Sixty-

two inquiries or investigations were conducted by the
 
Commission.
 
Judge Marion E. Gubler of the Burbank Municipal Court was
 
publicly censured for several acts of misconduct. In a major
 
challenge to the authority of the State Supreme Court to
 
publicly censure a sitting judge for what was contended to be
 
legal error, the State Supreme Court "refined the error vs.
 
misconduct distinction which, it had defined in earlier
 
Commission cases. ...the court identified bad faith as the
 
^touchstone' for finding wilful misconduct, discussed the
 
element of ^conduct prejudicial' and the ^grossly negligent'
 
misuse of judicial power.
 
This decision of the State Supreme Court was fifty-nine
 
pages long. A summation points out that "Most of the charges
 
(against Judge Gubler) stemmed from the Judge's efforts to
 
coerce from criminal defendants statutory payment to the
 
county for their legal representation by public defenders.
 
These efforts included requiring the payment of attorneys
 
fees before fines, ordering unauthorized appearances of
 
defendants in court for fee-collection purposes, recording fee
 
orders as apparent conditions of probation, and taking
 
attorney fees from bail deposit without defendants' request or
 
consent. The Judge had also once threatened to increase
 
another judge's fee order.
 
To emphasize the significance of Judge Gubler's actions,
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the Supreme Court noted in its opinion that he had "given
 
defendants the incorrect impression that payment of fees could
 
be enforced by criminal sanctions. ...Though some of the acts
 
in question would not necessarily constitute misconduct or
 
even legal error when viewed in isolation, they became
 
misconduct as part of petitioner's larger scheme for using
 
threats. ...That scheme violated the provisions of Penal Code
 
Section 987.8 that provide for collection of attorney fee
 
orders only by execution as on a judgment in a civil action
 
and prohibit enforcement by contempt.
 
The State Supreme Court found that Judge Gubler/s attempt
 
to influence the decision of a court commissioner in setting
 
the fee for an attorney's services was improper. After Judge
 
Gubler had been disqualified from hearing the matter, he wrote
 
a letter to the comitiissioner assigned the case and suggested
 
that the fee be set at $500.00.
 
The State Supreme Court concluded Judge Gubler's "act of
 
writing the note was for a corrupt purpose, ie., for a purpose
 
other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties, and thus
 
constituted wilful misconduct.
 
Several of Judge Gubler's acts should be listed.
 
Judge Gubler increased fees for a defendant because he
 
was angry with the defendant's attorney. The court held that
 
Judge Gubler's "hostile, arbitrary and unreasonable conduct
 
jeopardized the liberty of an indigent defendant for reasons
 
not related to the merits of the case and constituted wilful
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misconduct.
 
In three cases, Judge Gubler assessed tinreasonable fees
 
based on inadequate information as to the ability of the
 
defendants to pay. Further, the judge did not conduct
 
hearings to ascertain whether or not the defendants could pay
 
all or part of the fees.
 
in one case the statement Wjas ambiguous and the defendant
 
had been released on bail, another defendant was not even
 
asked about his financial status, and in the third case, the
 
defendant's attorney had indicated that his client was
 
indigent and was retarded. The court Considered that Judge
 
Gubler's conduct in these instances was prejudicial to the
 
administration of justice and brought the judiciary into
 
disrepute.
 
In four cases, Judge Gubler ordered the release of
 
confiscated firearms. Two of them were prdered released to
 
his bailiff and to a friend of his bailiff. The other two
 
were released to the friend of the bailiff for sale to other
 
persons. The judge argued that the question was whether or
 
not his acts were legal and that issue should be resolved
 
through legal action not by disciplinary action.
 
The Supreme Court held that the release of the guns to
 
the bailiff was contrary to P.C. 12020 and P.C. 1030 and that
 
such acts were improper. The court pointed out that such acts
 
violated Judge Gubler's obligations under canon 2(b) of the
 
Code of Judicial Conduct. The court held that such acts
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constituted conduct prejudicial to the adininistration of
 
justice.
 
One judge resigned or retired during ah investigation.
 
One private admonishinent was issued.
 
SECTION X. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1985
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1985, there were 1385 sitting judges.
 
The format of the annual report was changed from a letter
 
report which had become rather lengthy to a printed booklet.
 
The format and outline of subjects reported upon was improved
 
and contributed to its readability.
 
Part I provided a background discussion of the
 
"Development of the Commission on Judicial Performance, 1960 ­
1985."
 
Part II was titled "Summary of Commission Disciplinary
 
Action in 1985."
 
Three hundred seventeen complaints were filed. As was
 
true in previous years, the great majority of the complaints
 
were closed because they did not relate to allegations of
 
judicial misconduct. Inquiries or investigations were
 
initiated in fifty-four matters and forty-seven judges were
 
questioned about allegations. Eleven investigations were
 
begun. Four hearings were conducted and two judges resigned
 
after formal proceedings were begun.
 
Part III was titled "Public Discipline." Judge Robert Z.
 
Mardikian of the Fresno Superior Court was publicly censured
 
for failure to decide 14 cases within ninety days of their
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being taken under submission. Several of the cases had
 
been resubmitted without consultation or request of the
 
litigants or their attorneys. Previously, the Commission had
 
made inquiries about some of the cases but that had not caused
 
Judge Mardikian to speed up the decision making process.
 
The Commission rejected findings that "the delays were
 
the product of an intentional disregard of and refusal to
 
perform judicial duties and that many of the salary affidavits
 
which petitioner executed were false and knowingly believed to
 
be false. The Commission took into consideration Judge
 
Mardikian's reputation as a hardworking and diligent judge.
 
He had health and family problems, and the Fresno Court lacked
 
proper staffing.
 
As a result of this base the Supreme CoUrt in its
 
decision discussed actions that an overworked judge can take
 
to resolve his problems. Actually, they appear to be simple
 
management techniques. The major suggestion was that judges
 
assign priorities to the cases that they have taken under
 
submission in order to meet deadlines.
 
The Supreme Court commented that routine resubmissions
 
cannot be condoned, and personal difficulties cannot be
 
accepted as justification for failures to complete work in a
 
timely manner. The Supreme Court provided an out for the
 
overworked judge. The suggestion was made that "proper cause
 
would exist if the parties stipulate to vacation of the order,
 
on the basis of change of circumstances, or if there exist
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 extraordinary circumstances such as sudden illness which
 
prevents the judge from attending to liis duties for a
 
protracted period of time, and where feassighment of the
 
matter would cause a delay of egual or greater length.
 
Five judges were pirivately eensuredi,
 
The incidents emphasize the recurring nature of many
 
problems that judges appear to cause. Examples follow:
 
One judge deprived a defendant of his right to counsel
 
and another was vengeful and punitive in the actions he took
 
toward a defendant.
 
One judge abused his power by issuing an order in a
 
matter that was not in litigation or properly before him.
 
One judge abused defense counsel and deprived the
 
defendant of a fair and impartial trial.
 
One judge failed to decide a case within a year of the
 
filing of post trial briefs.
 
"Two judges engaged in unacceptable off-bench conduct
 
outside of and unrelated to the performance of their judicial
 
duties.
 
SECTION Y. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1986
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1986, there were 1429 sitting judges.
 
Four hundred and seventy-six, complaints were filed
 
against judges. Three hundred Sixty^three were closed after
 
examination by the staff as they did not allege actionable
 
conduct. One hundred and thirteen complaints warranted
 
inquiry or investigation. Twenty-six complaints resulted in
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private disciplinary actions against judges. Investigations
 
were begun in four cases. One judge was censured publicly and
 
two judges were removed from office.
 
Part I. Public Discipline
 
The Hon. Frank Creed, Jr., of the Fresno Superior Court
 
Was censured publicly for failing to decide cases within the
 
90 day period following taking the matters under submission.
 
This case was brought before the Commission on Judicial
 
Performance by the Commission on Judicial Appointments. The
 
evidence presented to the three judges appointed masters in
 
the case found that for a period of five years "Judge Creed
 
had repeatedly and unjustifiably delayed filing decisions in
 
cases submitted to his court. During this time, he continued
 
to execute erroneous salary affidavits and to collect his
 
salary even though cases remained pending and undecided in his
 
court for periods of 90 days."^^' The Commission adopted the
 
findings of the masters and the Supreme Court imposed the
 
disciplinary action of public censure.
 
The Supreme Court made what in my opinion is a strange
 
conclusion. It found that "He did not knowingly falsify the
 
salary affidavits, and did not intentionally or maliciously
 
disregard his adjudicative responsibilities. The Supreme
 
Court noted that no one was harmed by the excessive delays,
 
that he had an excessive workload, and an inadequate staff.
 
The court also praised him for being a hard working judge.
 
Part III. Private Discipline and Dispositions.
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Private discipline was imposed upon three judges.
 
One judge failed to decide cases within 90 days despite
 
filing salary affidavits.
 
One judge failed to decide three cases within ninety days
 
of taking it lander submission. One of the cases had been
 
undecided for four years. One judge was censured privately
 
for abusing the power of contempt in two matters. Also, he
 
was discourteous to witnesses, litigants, and attorneys and it
 
appeared to observers that had he prejudged the matters.
 
As has been done for several years, twenty-two advisory
 
letters were sent to judges who had been discourteous, or had
 
appeared to violate specific canons of judicial conduct.
 
SECTION Z. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1987
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1987, there were 1,446 sitting judges.
 
Five hundred forty-seven complains were filed. Four
 
hundred twenty-two complaints were closed because they did not
 
relate to conduct that is within the jurisdiction of the
 
Commission. One hundred twenty matters warranted follow-up.
 
Seventy-five letters of inquiry were sent to judges.
 
Preliminary investigations were begun in twenty cases.
 
Private disciplinary action was taken in thirty-eight
 
matters.
 
Five judges resigned or retired after investigations were
 
begun.
 
The Commission recommended severe public censure of the
 
Hon. L. Eugene Rasmussen. Judge Rasmussen did not contest the
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conclusion and the recommendation was adopted by the Supreme
 
Court.
 
Judge Robert H. Furey, Jr., was removed from office and
 
Judge L, Eugene Rasmussen and Judge Bernard McCullough were
 
censured publicly.
 
The wilful misconduct of the Hon. hi Eugene Rasmussen>
 
Justice Court Judge of the South Lake Tahoe Justice Court,
 
occurred when he violated Canons of Judicial Conduct. These
 
several incidents occurred from 1981 to 1984.
 
Canon 2 of the California Code of Judicial Conduct,
 
states that "A judge should respect and comply with the law
 
and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that
 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
 
of the judiciary.
 
At a football game Judge Rasmussen called a coach a
 
"pervert" and initiated revocation of probation proceedings
 
against the coach for personal reasons unrelated to his duties
 
as a judge. He told a defendant what his sentence would be
 
during a time that the defendant's attorney was not present.
 
He was openly critical of a fellow judge, and had suggested
 
that an attorney who had objected to his questions to a client
 
in chambers be investigated by the State Bar. He frequently
 
harassed attorneys who had filed affidavits of prejudice
 
against him.
 
Judge Rasmussen had violated Canon 3A(3) which states: "A
 
judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to
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litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals
 
in his official Gapacity." In addition to the misconduct
 
mentioned above, he would withhold judgements in cases
 
lohrelated to matters that were prdpei^iy feefo^re him; he refused
 
to disqualify himself although he had indicated what his
 
sentence would be to a defendant whose counsel was not
 
present; and he would attempt to discourage attorneys from
 
filing affidavits of prejudice.
 
The Supreme Court held that his misconduct was "a
 
disturbing, intolerable affront to the legal profession, and
 
to the public. The strength of this statement seems to be
 
inconsistent with the continuing pattern of misconduct and
 
imposition of the discipline of public censure.
 
Judge Bernard McCullough was censured publicly following
 
a recommendation submitted by the Commission to the Supreme
 
Court in 1986. Judge McCullough had failed to decide one case
 
for three years and nine months. This occurred after he had
 
been censured privately on three occasions as to that case.
 
During the period he executed salary affidavits certifying
 
that he had no case pending for more than ninety days. The
 
State Supreme Court concluded that his failure to decide the
 
case and to respond to the private admonishments and his
 
execution of the salary affidavits were conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office 
^ into disrepute. ■ 
One section of the report was devoted to listing thirty­
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fpixr; examples of miscpnduGt that warranted the imppsition pf
 
private discipline.
 
This repprt is the first pne to include a section devoted
 
tp repbrting pri complaints ahout gender bias, it provides a
 
brief discussion of what constitutes gender bias and refers to
 
the changes that have ocburred in Califprnia with regard to
 
the new Standards of Judicial Administration specifically
 
directed at eliminating gender bias in the courts. In
 
addition, the report notes the continuing efforts of the
 
California Judicial College to alert newly elected or
 
appointed and experienced judges to the various ways that
 
gender bias becomes apparent in a court proceeding.
 
The report discusses briefly the two California cases
 
that imposed discipline because a judge's conduct evidenced
 
his prejudice against women. These cases were reviewed
 
previously. They are: In Re Charles S. Stevens^^^ and Geiler
 
V. Commission on Judicial Qualifications 
Examples of gender bias that has occurred are presented 
from court records in New York, Minnesota, and Illinois. 
SECTION AA. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE■ 1988 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1988, there were 1,462 sitting judges. 
In PART III, "Summary of Commission Disciplinary Action 
in 1988," the various actions are discussed that were taken in 
response to six hundred ninety-three complaints. 
One hundred ninety-nine of the complaints were 
investigated. An official inquiry was made in one hundred 
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fourteen of them. In twenty-two eases formal investigations
 
were-- initiated.'\ - r
 
Thre^^^ or resigned during the conduct of
 
the investigations.
 
There were eight private admonishments imposed and forty-

seven advisory letters were sent to judges.
 
Public censure was recommended to the State Supreme Court
 
in three cases. The judges were David M. Kennick, David
 
Press, and Kenneth Lynn Kloepfer.
 
Judge Richard Ryan was removed from office in 1988. This
 
case was discussed in detail above.
 
Examples of actions that were the basis of private
 
disciplinary actions were provided.
 
Delay in deciding cases occurred despite filing of salary
 
affidavits.
 
One judge made statements that were so contrary to the
 
law that they could not have been legal error. In the
 
Commission's opinion the acts "constituted an abandonment of
 
the law and showed bias."^^
 
One judge arrived late each day and took long lunch
 
hours. He would work beyond normal court hours which
 
inconvenienced court personnel, attorneys and litigants.
 
Sometimes he did not bother to appear for work.
 
One judge conducted a trial and the defendant was a
 
personal friend. His rulings showed a bias for the defendant.
 
He wrote a letter of recommendation for the defendant and
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tried to cause some of the law enforcement officers to help
 
the defendant.
 
One judge was perceived to be campaigning when he used
 
the bench to address jurors. In addition, he appeared to
 
promise certain rulings in his campaign materials.
 
Before one of the local newspaper reporter, one judge
 
accused an attorney of unethical conduct.
 
Several typical remarks that caused the Commission to
 
send advisory letters related to improper conduct in various
 
judicial proceedings. A few typical problems were harshness,
 
sarcasm, impatience, and name-calling.
 
Several letters expressed concern about abuse of the
 
judge's contempt power. Some of the judges used the power of
 
their position to malign attorneys. Other judges often made
 
improper remarks to juries.
 
Some of the judges accepted ex parte communications from
 
prosecutors and attorneys about clients or parties.
 
Some judges failed to decide cases within the ninety day
 
period after taking the case xmder submission and submitted
 
affidavits that they had no cases that had been more than
 
ninety under s\ibmission.
 
Also, the Commission listed another dozen examples of
 
misconduct under the heading "miscellaneous." They might
 
better have been titled, "Examples of poor judgment."
 
One judge deliberately gave an inaccurate address on his
 
declaration of cahdidacy. Another judge appeared to favor a
 
defendant who was a law enforcement officer. He overturned a
 
verdict of guilty against the officer and ordered the record
 
sealed. These acts were beyond his authority. During a
 
settlement conference, one judge appeared to threaten the
 
attorneys if they settled the case at a later time. At an
 
order of examination, a judge seized the debtor's wallet,
 
examined its contents, took some cash and divided it between
 
the creditor and the debtor. The judge's opinions that the
 
debtor's conduct was evasive did not justify his conduct.
 
The Commission named another section of the report "Small
 
Potatoes." Among the subjects that are discussed are Ticket
 
Fixing, Favoritism, Ex parte communications, Humor, Short
 
hours. Duties of presiding judges, and Delay of decision. One
 
that should arouse the interest of judges who read the annual
 
reports is the sub-section titled "Failure To Cooperate with
 
the Commission."
 
All of the subjects addressed in formal opinions are
 
published by the State Supreme Court as it has evaluated the
 
evidence presented to it after formal investigations. The
 
implied advice contained in the opinions is available to the
 
judges and to the public.
 
SECTION BB. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1989
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1989, there were 1,555 sitting judges.
 
Eight hundred and sixty complaints were filed against 505
 
judges. Inquiries were made regarding one hundred forty seven
 
of them. Staff inquiries were made in eighty-one of those
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 cases. Following these screening efforts, investigations were
 
begun in thirty-eight cases. Formal charges were issued in
 
five cases and one formal hearing was held.
 
The Commission recommended that Judge Bernard McCullough
 
be removed from office.
 
" Four public reprovals by the Commission were issued.
 
This report, for the first time in many years, indicated
 
the number of complaints that were received against judges in
 
the various courts of the state. Forty-two complaints were
 
made against justice court judges, two hundred ninety-four
 
complaints were made against municipal court judges, four
 
hundred ninety-eight were made against superior court judges,
 
and twenty six were made against appellate court justices.
 
Seven hundred eighty-two complaints were closed without
 
any discipline being imposed. Many of the complaints were
 
filed because of dissatisfaction with the outcome of a case.
 
The position of the Commission throughout its history is that
 
it is not the proper agency to consider the legal issues that
 
are raised. The appellate process should be followed by
 
litigants when they are dissatisfled with a judge's rulings or
 
findings.
 
Three judges retired while investigations were being
 
conducted.
 
Part IV. "Piablic! Disci|)lihe''
 
Judge Charles D. Boags of the Beverly Hills Municipal
 
Court was suspended from his position when he was convicted of
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the charge of obstructing justice.
 
The Supreme Court removed Judge Bernard McCullough of the
 
San Benito Justice Court from office. This opinion was
 
summarized above.---..V'- ­
Pursuant to an amendment to the California Constitution
 
approved by the voters in 1988, the Commission issued four
 
public reprovals.
 
Judge Bruce Clark of the Ventura Municipal Court was
 
publicly reproved for ex parte communications about a case
 
with Assemblywoman Cathy Wright. Judge Clark was visited at
 
his home by Ms. Wright who asked that her daughter be excused
 
from appearing in court. He did this and ordered that the
 
tickets be dismissed upon her completing traffic school. He
 
did not inform the prosecutor of his actions. The Commission
 
found that Judge Clark had violated Canons 2A, 2B, and
 
3A(4)
 
Judge Calvin Schmidt of the Harbor Municipal Court
 
(Orange County) was issued a public reproval for ordering
 
released from custody a stepdaughter of a friend. Bail had
 
been set by another judge. After the stepdaughter failed to
 
appear in court following filing of new charges, Judge Schmidt
 
released her again though bail had been set at $50,000.00.
 
The Commission found that the "releases were arbitrary
 
and capricious exercises of judicial discretion and undermined
 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
 
judiciary. Judge Schmidt also made contributions from his own
 
campaign funds to non-judicial candidates in patent violation
 
.of. Canon 7.
 
Judge Glehda born of the Corcoran Justice Court in Kings
 
County received $75,000 from a client that was not paid for
 
legal services. ShO did not advise the law firm for which she
 
worked of receipt of the money nor did she report it to the
 
State Bar. Also, she failed to include it on her annual
 
"Statement of Economic Interests" which is required of all
 
judges. The Commission found that the receipt of the money
 
occurred off the bench and that her judicial actions were not
 
compromised.
 
The Commission issued a public reproval of Judge John
 
Schatz, Jr., of the Santa Clara County Superior Court. Judge
 
Schatz contacted other judges and prosecutors about charges
 
made against his son. When questioned by the Commission about
 
these contacts he denied them. Judge Schatz also contacted
 
judges and the prosecutor to request dismissal of a pending
 
burglary charge because his son was going to enlist in the
 
military. The charge was dismissed but the son did not enlist
 
in the military. Despite the false statements made by the
 
judge, the Commission decided that a public reproval was
 
adequate because "the judge recognized that his conduct was
 
inappropriate" and because of "his assurance that the conduct
 
would not be repeated.
 
Part V. "Private Discipline
 
Thirteen judges were administered private admonishments
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pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 904.3. The
 
reasons appear to be a repeat of the major items listed from
 
year to year as those offenses that do not justify more harsh
 
censure. Records are kept as to these actions, but such
 
records have only been used in one case to substantiate
 
removal from office.
 
The inappropriate conduct included the following; abuse
 
of contempt power, conducting proceedings with a friend as a
 
litigant, requesting favorable treatment from other judges in
 
sentencing relatives, reckless driving involving alcohol,
 
retaliating against an attorney's client, berating attorneys,
 
failure to advise defendants of their constitutional rights,
 
attempts to influence the work of law enforcement officers,
 
failure to decide a case within ninety days, and one judge
 
engaged in a personal non-professional relationship with a
 
court employee during the court day.
 
Statistics are not reported as to which courts the judges
 
were assigned.
 
Thirty six advisory letters were sent to judges. The
 
majority of the letters related to the demeanor of the judge.
 
The items were listed under the following subject headings.
 
"Demeanor, Ex Parte Commianications, Rushing Through Calendars
 
Without Regard for the Rights of Defendants, Abuse of Contempt
 
Power, and Delay(s) in making decisions in cases.
 
SECTION CC. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE. 1990
 
ANNUAL REPORT. In 1990, there were 1,555 sitting judges.
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The COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL gERFORMANCEv 1990 ANNUAL
 
REPORT. is significant for California. It is the thirtieth
 
report made about the actions that were initiated in 1960 to
 
compile the incidents of complaints against judges and to
 
indicate the actions taken to correct errant behavior.
 
Jack E. Frankel, the first Director and chief attorney,
 
guided the Commission for all of those years and retired in
 
1990. The report was dedicated to him and provides a glowing
 
assessment of his heroic efforts to improve the process and to
 
report about the actions taken by the Commission. The report
 
also reports about progress made in other states that were
 
modeled after the California experiment. Patricia Henley was
 
appointed Executive Director and Chief Counsel of the
 
Commission to replace Jack E. Frankel.
 
I will not siommarize the achievements of Mr. Frankel nor
 
attempt to forecast the future. With reference to this annual
 
report, I shall stick to the format that has evolved in
 
summarizing the reports above.
 
Eight hundred eighty-five complaints were filed against
 
judges. Twenty-nine preliminary investigations were conducted
 
and nine formal investigations were begun.
 
Every report has commented about the inappropriateness of
 
many of the complaints about judges. This report is the first
 
to identify statistically those who complained about judges.
 
Seventy-one percent were made by litigants or their families,
 
fourteen percent came from the public, eight percent were made
 
by lawyers, and complaints from all other sources, including
 
judges, court employees, jurors, and others, totaled seven
 
percent.
 
Forty-five percent of the complaints were about what was
 
perceived as legal error; ten percent were complaints about
 
demeanor and alleged rudeness; and five percent alleged bias.
 
Eight hundred thirty-two cases were closed in 1990 that
 
did not involve discipline. One hundred and six cases were
 
investigated and of these forty-five were closed without
 
discipline being imposed.
 
From 1961 to 1991, ninety-one judges voluntarily resigned
 
or retired upon being notified that a formal investigation
 
about their conduct had been initiated. No indication has
 
been made in the annual reports as to the courts which the
 
judges left. Discipline was imposed in fifty-seven cases that
 
were investigated.
 
Three judges were removed from office in 1990. They were
 
Judge Kenneth L. Kloepfer of the San Bernardino County
 
Municipal Court, Judge David Kennick of the Los Angeles
 
County Municipal Court, and Judge Charles D. Boags of the
 
Los Angeles County Municipal Court. These cases have all
 
been discussed above.
 
Judge Raymond D. Mireles of the Los Angeles County
 
Superior Court was issued a public reproval. Judge Mireles
 
ordered two police officers to bring a "piece of" or a "bodily
 
part" of a certain attorney to his court. They brought him to
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the judge's court using force. Judge Mirelds did not explain
 
to them and the attorney that he had not intended that they
 
act so forcefully. The Commission found that he did not
 
actually intend that the officers comply literally with his
 
order. J-V; ;'
 
Judge Glenda K. Doan was issued a public reproval. This
 
case was discussed above.
 
In 1990, the Commission issued 11 private admonishments
 
and 41 advisory letters.
 
The incidents resulting in private discipline and
 
admonishments were similar, although with some variations from
 
those reported in the 1989 report, and no useful purpose will
 
be served by repeating them at this time.
 
Areas that should be mentioned are the "Mistreatment of
 
Attorneys, Delaying filing decisions. Conscious Disregard of
 
the Law, Ex Parte Communications, and the frequent occurence
 
of the Abuse of the Contempt Power.
 
Nineteen advisory letters were sent to judges commenting
 
upon a variety of instances of conduct that warranted
 
reprovals or admonishments but did not constitute in the
 
Commission's opinion a basis for public reproval or public
 
censure.
 
PART Vll is titled "Looking Back and Looking Forward."
 
Jack Frankel, on the occasion of his retirement was asked
 
to write an essay about his experiences as Director of the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance and states the reason that
 
the Coiteiission on Judicial Qualifications was established.
 
Goscoe Farley, the Executive Director of a Judiciary
 
Committee on the Administration of Justice noted these
 
complaints about judges that had resulted in the formation of
 
the committee that he chaired.
 
"These complaints were directed at certain judges
 
who failed in one way or another to render the
 
service required by their position. Some delayed
 
decisions for months or even years. Some took long
 
vacations and worked short hours, despite backlogs
 
of cases awaiting trial. Some refused to accept
 
assignments of cases they found unpleasant or dull.
 
Some interrupted court sessions to perform numerous
 
marriages, making this a profitable sideline by
 
illegally extracting fees for the ceremonies. Some
 
tolerated petty rackets in and around their courts,
 
often involving "kickbacks" to court attaches. Some
 
failed to appear for scheduled trials because they
 
were intoxicated, or took the bench while obviously
 
under the influence of liquor. Some clung doggedly
 
to their position and their salaries for months and
 
years after they had been disabled by sickness or
 
Mr. Frankel discusses the implications of judicial
 
selection criteria and emphasizes that in the late 1950's
 
criteria for appointment and selection were important topics.
 
The authorization for appointment of a Commission on
 
Judicial Qualifications did not address needed changes and no
 
significance difference has occurred in California to change
 
the power of the Governor to appoint whom he wishes to
 
judicial office.
 
I have noted above my criticisms of the appointment
 
process. Merit selection and movement away from the "litmus"
 
tests that now prevail ; should improve the quality of the
 
judiciary. As Mr. Frankel states the present system of
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 appointment for a return of political support will not assure
 
that the judiciary is selected from the more highly qualified
 
and experienced attorneys.
 
I will close these comments upon the work of the
 
commission by quoting Mr. Frankel. As mentioned above my
 
purpose in this section has not been to review the work of Mr.
 
Frankel in leading the Commission. I do note that some of his
 
concerns are concerns that I have expressed. The requirement
 
for the Commission has been established in its thirty year
 
history. The pattern of its work has evolved. There are some
 
criticisms that I will make in a section below that will
 
summarize my opinions.
 
"The Commission on Judicial Performance has now gone
 
about as far in terms of disciplinary grounds and
 
measures as the concept will allow. The
 
constitutional grounds for removal or censure now
 
include persistent failure and inability to perform,
 
as well as the traditional wilful misconduct and
 
conduct prejudicial; the grounds for admonishment
 
include engaging in improper actions or dereliction
 
of duty. Besides removal and involuntary
 
retirement, there is the confidential advisory
 
letter, monitoring for up to two years, private
 
admonishment, severe private admonishment, public
 
reproval, censure, and severe censure.
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chapter
 
(SENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS
 
In late fall following my appointment to the bench in
 
1975, I attended a program conducted for municipal court
 
judges. As I was going to one of the meetings, I recall two
 
judges conversing about some judicial appointments. One of
 
them decried the appointment of a little bitty "two titty"
 
judge to office. From the results of the study of gender
 
bias, it would appear that sexist attitudes still exist.
 
The study conducted from 1988 to 1990, indicates that
 
there are many serious problems that must be addressed by
 
sitting judges if the work situation for female employees and
 
women judges is to improve.
 
Many of the incidents of wilful misconduct noted in this
 
study about ethical perceptions reflect bias against women
 
litigants, women attorneys, staff, and witnesses. The
 
correction of the problems will take concerted action by
 
judges as they preside in the court and as they conduct
 
proceedings in chambers. The recommendations of the committee
 
that examined the problem is comprehensive and too long to be
 
quoted as a part of this study. The significance of the study
 
is the fact that it found bias against women to be prevalent
 
in all stages and levels of judicial proceedings. The areas
 
that were examined by the committee were: civil litigation and
 
courtroom demeanor, family law, domestic violence. Criminal
 
and juvenile law, and court administration. Recommendations
 
within each of the areas show that the problems are prevalent
 
throughout the judicial process as indicated above.
 
In the "Civil Litigation and Courtroom Demeanor" area ten
 
recommendations are 1isted concerning such subjects as:
 
judicial conduct, conduct of other bench officers, judges and
 
court employees, efforts at informal resolution of gender bias
 
complaints, membership (of judges) in discriminatory clubs,
 
attorney conduct exhibiting gender bias, appointed counsel,
 
attorney employment, and membership (of lawyers and judges) in
 
discriminatory clubs.
 
The recommendations under the heading "Family Law"
 
indicate a deep concern about the fairness of the present
 
procedures. They are: child support too low, child support as
 
bargaining chip, division of marital assets, judges, lawyers,
 
mediators, devaluation of family law, other barriers to
 
access, and the heed for research.
 
Under the area "Victims of Domestic Violence" are these
 
headings: temporary restraining orders, emergency protective
 
orders, court safety, non-English-speaking, victims, family
 
court services, personnel, diversion, district attorneys and
 
city attorneys, law enforcement, and judicial education.
 
Procedures with reference to "Appointed Counsel" are
 
detailed. Recommendations with reference to "local probation
 
programs," and "institutions and placements" are provided.
 
"Education and training programs" are discussed and
 
important minimum goals are listed.
 
It would seem that in a civilized society, the difference
 
between men and women would be recognized. One of the areas
 
of flagrant discrimination has been the inadequacy of the
 
design and construction of jails to assure that the needs of
 
women are met. The committee found it necessary to mention
 
under the heading of "Special needs for institutional females"
 
that the California Youth Authority and local agencies examine
 
such matters as:
 
"Provision for adequate and appropriate clothing designed
 
for women, provision for meeting hygiene and sanitation needs
 
and increased access to laundry facilities during the
 
menstrual cycle, and hardware and shackles amenable to female
 
form. ...The protocols should also address pregnancy-related
 
issues. Limits on the use of leg chains, waist chains, and
 
handcuffs should be encouraged unless there is a security
 
risk. Pregnancy should not limit a woman's ability to earn
 
work credits. Job assignments should be made with a
 
physician's approva1."
 
I emphasize that the items listed above are just a few of
 
those listed that express a concern about the inadequacy of
 
treatment and facility design of prisons and jails with
 
regards to women.
 
The next area that is listed is titled "Medical problems
 
for incarcerated females." Among the subjects discussed and
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recommendations made are that women in custody be provided
 
full gynecological care and pregnancy-related services.
 
Attorneys who have represented juveniles and prison
 
inmates have been aware of many problems indicated by this
 
title, "Sexual assault and harassment." The nature of the
 
problems that exist in juvenile and prison facilities are
 
legion. The report recommends that the authorities be
 
required to assure "detainees' safety from sexual harassment
 
and assault perpetrated by guards, counselors or staff, other
 
inmates, detainees in the institution, and inmates with whom
 
contact is made during transportation to and from court and in
 
the courthouse lock-up. It is unfortunate that it should
 
take a study of this type to force an examination of the lack
 
of safety of inmates in state and county custody.
 
The next three areas that are considered are related to
 
and identify concerns with the lack of knowledge of parents of
 
the laws that affect them and their children. Many parents
 
are not aware of their obligations under the law to their
 
children. Often, the parents or one of them is not given
 
proper notice as to actions that may be taken by the courts
 
with reference to children. Even though family law is
 
relegated to a low priority in many court systems, it and
 
"Enhancing the status of the juvenile court" should become
 
goals of the California court system.
 
The recommendations of the Committee are stated rather
 
succinctly. "Reevaluation of weighted caseload measures to
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accurately reflect the complexities of juvenile court law,
 
statutorily mandated multiple review hearings, and intense
 
court supervision required in juvenile dependency case.
 
Review judicial assignment procedures and inadequate
 
facilities and staffing in juvenile court. Review methods to
 
enhance status of juvenile court and the judicial assignments
 
to that court.
 
Throughout this study, the importance of examination by
 
judges of their attitudes and how their conduct affects the
 
attitudes of staff, attorneys, and litigants is emphasized.
 
The last section of the study is titled, "Judicial
 
training=" The points stated in summary require that the
 
Center for Judicial Education and Research cooperate with
 
local courts to develop "training on issues relating to
 
criminal and juvenile law that pertain to attitudes of gender
 
bias. A critical aspect of this awareness is that the
 
attitudes of judges toward low-income women and their children
 
are significantly different from their attitudes toward middle
 
and upper income persons. ­
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 : \':CHAPTER vll 
' ■courtroom;FAIIMESSv 
For several years at each seminar or training session for 
judges a training program has been conducted on judicial 
fairness. Judges who are appointed or elected to office, are 
scheduled to attend such a seminar within ninety days after 
they take office. The Center for Judicial Education and 
Research conducts most of these courses. In addition, courses 
on judicial fairness are held during a two weeks seminar that 
is held each summer for newly appointed and elected judges and 
others who wish to review procedures and changes in the laws. 
The purpose of the course on Judicial Fairness is briefly 
stated: "Our courts have the duty to be fair to all people who 
use them. The courts should also appear to be fair. All 
participants in our justice system, however, are the products 
of their personal lifetime experiences, including unsuspected 
biases, stereotypes, and prejudices, which cause some people 
to view the system and individuals within it, as unfair. 
"This course helps in identifying problem areas and 
assists in managing and controlling the conduct of attorneys, 
witnesses, parties, spectators, and court staff, to create a 
more fair and humane physical and psychological environment in 
our courts. The faculty will solicit and offer practical 
techniques useful to judges in promoting equal treatment in 
 the courts and in improving the public's perception of our
 
In January of 1991, a sem that was prepared
 
by the CJER for sessions a^dht gender bias contained the
 
fdllowing subjects and artiGles:
 
"TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
I. Codes and Standards
 
: \II^-; ­.Articles."
 
^IiI,./^■ CaseS;'- ' -.y^.' 
IV. Bias Studies 
V. Resource Bibliography 
VI. Future Challenges 
VII. Summary of Selected Testimony on Gender
 
Bias in the Courts.
 
The course includes, in Section II, seventeen articles. 
Among them are "Ruling Without Bias, How Stereotypes about 
Women Influence Judges, Racial Discrimination in Criminal 
Sentencing, Time for Judges to Overturn Their Biases, The Way 
Others See Us, Bias in the Courtroom, Women Lawyers - Judges 
say Gender Bias is Thriving in Rural Courtrooms, Judicial 
Performance Panel Gets Few Complaints of Sexist Judges, 
Justice in a Rural County: Is It Fair or Biased? Encouraging 
Fairness from the Bench, and Can Justice Survive Bias in the 
Courtroom?" 
These articles cover a wide range of areas in which bias 
has been noted and continues to occur throughout the state and 
at all stages of judicial proceedings. They provide a judge
 
with an opportunity to examine conduct that is reprehensible.
 
Experienced judges who participate in the seminars lead
 
discussions and assure that such subjects are discussed within
 
small group sessions before judges become set in patterns of
 
behavior that exhibit gender or ethnic bias.
 
Each section listed above contains articles and comments
 
about various aspects of maintaining fairness in the
 
courtroom. Not all the articles can be read and discussed
 
during the time allotted to the subject of gender bias.
 
To provide judges an opportunity to examine the subject
 
in depth, the manual contains an extensive bibliography that
 
was prepared by the Hon. Richard A. Bancroft (Ret.), Alameda
 
County Superior Court and the National Judicial Education
 
Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts.
 
There are approximately 200 listings about gender bias.
 
In addition, a listing of books, articles, and cases,
 
about problems experienced by ethnic minorities is provided to
 
the student judges.
 
Another section about "People with Disabilities" is
 
provided to assure that a judge is aware of the instances in
 
which discrimination has occurred in the courts with reference
 
to persons with physical or mental handicaps. As mentioned
 
above the significant event in California that resulted in so
 
much attention being directed to the questions of gender bias,
 
occurred in 1986. At the annual meeting of the CJA in 1986,
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by a narrow margin, the meinbership affirmed the view that
 
judges should not belong to organizations that "invidiously
 
discriminate."
 
Since then many seminars and portions of seminars have
 
been devoted to the subject of gender bias and concern about
 
bias shown to ethnic groups and the physically and mentally
 
disabledc
 
The result of that vote has been that conduct of judges
 
has been examined more rigorously by the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance. Also, complaints about the conduct of
 
judges evidencing gender bias have increased as information
 
about the process that is followed by the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance has been widely disseminated to bar
 
associations and to the public by information releases.
 
172
 
 : CHAPTER,.12 \
 
■;V: .^.rSUMiyU^TION 
Ibegan this paper with the ppinion that many judges lack 
sensitivity to the nature of problems and stress faced by many 
persons who come into court and as a result often precipitate 
incidents that are a disservice to justice. In this paper I 
have reviewed the relatively new California Judicial Conduct 
Handbook. all the opinions of the Supreme Court on removals of 
judges from office, all the opinions of the Supreme Court on 
pxiblic censure of judges, and have commented on the training 
program that is presented to all new judges within ninety days 
of their taking office. Based on all of this information, I 
conclude that my opinion was correct. Many judges are 
insensitive to the stress that is experienced by defendants, 
court room clerks, attorneys, witnesses, jurors, and litigants 
when they are in court. 
The information that is available to judges is 
comprehensive and much of it relates to my suggestion that 
many judges should look at their conduct from the standpoint 
of its relationship to the six deadly sins. It may be easy to 
say that other judges abuse women and women attorneys, but it 
is another to describe their conduct and then to relate that 
conduct to what you may also be doing. Icannot make direct 
correlations between the repbrted incidents, the descriptions
 
of the conduct, and the six or more deadly sins that judges
 
commit. In broad terms they have occurred often in courts
 
under the guise of the administration of justice.
 
A few of the judges did admit to making mistakes. Judge
 
Cannon agreed that she should not have placed a religious
 
program that she financially supported in the county jail. A
 
few judges said, I know what my mistakes are, I can do better.
 
One of the tragic aspects of a review of these many cases is
 
that most of the judges who were removed from office or
 
censured did not believe that they had done anything wrong.
 
Lust in its ugliness has been described in lurid detail.
 
The spelling has not changed from its early Anglo-Saxon
 
origin. Its meaning is more often expressed in its synonyms
 
and perhaps those words are what we have noted in the opinions
 
of the Supreme Court. Appetite, desire, greed, passion,
 
eroticism, sensuality, lechery, lewdness, and salaciousness
 
all relate to conduct described and engaged in by some judges.
 
Sloth has been and continues as an offense against the 
people and the courts. "/;• ■ ■ ■ 
Reactions of judges to people and people to judges often
 
result in angry confrontations. Too many such incidents have
 
been the stibject of Supreme Court decisions. Anger usually
 
eliminates judgement and creates problems between a judge and
 
attorneys, and judges and litigants.
 
I have not found a touchstone or talisman which will
 
assure that a judge will not make a mistake. I did not have
 
one when I sat as a judge. As a result of the detailed
 
reviews that I have made I will list a few statements or
 
phrases or words that may help judges to pause to consider
 
their acts before they make a mistake in judgement or in
 
conduct.
 
In 1961, seventy-five complaints were filed against
 
sitting judges. In 1990, eight hundred ninety-five complaints
 
were filed against sitting judges. Many reasons can be given
 
for the great increase. If it were just the difference in the
 
number of judges, the number of complaints would merely have
 
doubled.
 
Probably the most significant factor in the increase in
 
reported complaints was the establishment of the Commission on
 
Judicial Qualifications. However, it took more than that act
 
to create the climate wherein reports would be filed. Each
 
year they seem to come in ever increasing numbers.
 
Although, the efforts to make judges aware of the kinds
 
of acts that have been described as gender bias, that area
 
does not account for the almost twelve fold increase in
 
allegations of misconduct of judges. The major area that cuts
 
across the wilful misconduct that has been the cause of
 
removal of judges and the conduct that is prejudicial to the
 
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
 
disrepute is summed upon in one shameful word. It is ABUSE.
 
Abuse can be categorized in different areas. The major
 
area is that of abuse of persons. Probably abuse occurs most
 
frequently in contacts with the powerless. That means the
 
poor, the indigent, and the uneducated. The well known
 
attorney and his or her clients rarely encounter discourtesy
 
and abruptness from a judge, whether he or she is local or
 
from the big city. I shall return to this concern in comments
 
below.
 
Other areas in which judges commit abuses are in abuse of
 
the contempt power and in abuse of the judicial process. In
 
theory none of the offenses that have been described in
 
graphic detail should ever have happened. Judges are
 
intelligent; most have earned at least two academic degrees;
 
and in California all have passed an intensive two and a half
 
or three day bar examination.
 
If that is not enough, examine the praise that is heaped
 
upon them when they are recommended for office. If they run
 
for office, read the indorsements about their skills and
 
abilities in prosecuting successfully hundreds or even
 
thousands of criminals.
 
And yet, mistakes keep occurring and too often the
 
mistakes are repeats of what occurred last year, and the year
 
before that, and the year before that. I shall repeat a
 
statement that expresses ah anomaly. No superior court judge
 
or appellate court judge has ever been removed from office in
 
California for wilful misconduct in office or conduct
 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
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judicial office into disrepute.
 
In 1989, two hvindred ninety-four complaints were filed
 
against municipal court judges and four hundred ninety-eight
 
cpmplaints were filed against superior court judges. There
 
were six hundred five municipal court judges and seven hundred
 
eighty-nine superipr court judges sitting that year. So the
 
difference in the number of judges does not account for tbe
 
great difference in the number of complaints made against the
 
judges in the superior courts contrasted to the number of
 
complaints made against those judges in the municipal courts.
 
The nature of the complaints were similar.
 
Of the judges who have been removed from office for the
 
reasons stated above, none were superior court judges. Of two
 
judges removed from office for disabilities, one was Judge
 
Charles Robert Roick, a San Diego County Municipal Court
 
judge; the other was Associate Supreme Court Justice Marshall
 
F. McComb, who was removed from office because of senile 
dementia. Only one judge has been removed from office in the 
past thirty years for conviction of a crime of moral 
turpitude. ■ '\:V 
The most serious discipline that has been imposed upon a
 
superior court judge pursuant to the authority of California
 
Constitutioh and the recommendations of the Commission on
 
Judicial Performance to the State Supreme Court has been
 
severe public censure.
 
In my view, the acts considered by the Supreme Court in
 
its decisions witil refers to some superior court judges
 
justified removal from office. Yet, dissenting opinions were
 
only expressed in two cases. Justice Richardson wanted more
 
information about the allegations against Judge Robert S.
 
Stevens. Associate Supreme Court Justices Mosk and Kaus
 
dissented for different reasons in the case against Judge
 
Charles S. Stevens.
 
A question tlaat faced the Supreme Court was whether
 
justices of the State Supreme Court had delayed publication of
 
ceftain decisiohs until after a general election had been
 
held. Associate Justice MOsk referred to what he considered
 
a waste of time in his dissent to the Charles S. Stevens case
 
and the waste of time of the justices in the hearing to which
 
they Were subjected, but there was no relationship shown.
 
Under limited circumstances cases that have been taken
 
under submission by the appellate courts or the State Supreme
 
Court can be resubmitted. By doing this the requirement that
 
cases be decided within ninety days of their being taken under
 
submission has been avoided.
 
However, all trial court judges must sign an affidavit on
 
a monthly basis stating under penalty of perjury that they
 
have ho cases pending for more than ninety days that have hot
 
beeh decided.
 
The problem is that affidavits have beeh sighed ahd
 
cohtihue to be sighed eveh though offeh the declaratioh is
 
false. Mahy judges have sighed such affidavits over extehded
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periods of time. The Supreme Court decisions have found such
 
acts to constitute the filing of false affidavits. One
 
municipal court judge had filed such affidavits over a six
 
years period of time. A superior court judge had done so for
 
a period of three years.
 
Perhaps the word sophistic will express my concern about
 
the many instances where the Commission on Judicial
 
Performance found that some of the superior court judges did
 
not intend to prepare improperly those affidavits. In fact,
 
despite such a finding by the Commission, the Supreme Court
 
disagreed in the case of Superior Court Judge Creede.
 
Sophistic is defined as specious or fallacious. One
 
definition of sophistry is plausible but fallacious
 
argumentation.
 
It is hard to believe that a continued pattern of conduct
 
of signing and filing under penalty of perjury an affidavit
 
does not indicate an intent to collect salary that cannot be
 
paid without the required statement that no cases taken under
 
submission remain pending for more than ninety days. A
 
private admonition or even in some few instances the
 
imposition of public censure has not been sufficient to
 
prevent the recurrence of this improper conduct by too many
 
I do not advocate an indiscriminate removal of office for
 
any judge. The Supreme Court has acted with restraint
 
throughout the thirty years of the history of the Commission
 
on Judicial Performance. It has provided reasoned opinions
 
that have fully justified the removal of the judges and has
 
complied with the Constitution and the procedures established
 
in the California Rules of Court.
 
I mention this because it was not until I had read all
 
thirty opinions several times and was trying to check out
 
relationships between or among the opinions that I realized
 
that only mxmicipal court and justice court judges had been
 
removed from office as a result of the complaints and
 
procedures established for the Commission on Judicial
 
Qualifications/Performance and the power entrusted to the
 
Supreme Court.
 
I have reviewed all of the opinions regarding the judges
 
removed from office and I have reviewed all of the opinions
 
regarding judges who were censured pxiblicly for their acts.
 
The acts are not significantly different. Sixteen judges have
 
been censured publicly. Eleven were superior court judges;
 
four were municipal court judges; and one judge was from a
 
justice court.
 
As I mentioned above, I did not become aware of the
 
availability of reports of the Commission on Judicial
 
Performance until 1985. Other than my making requests to two
 
judges for reports for certain years, I have not had any
 
discussions with any judge about the reports. I have never
 
heard them discussed at any judges' seminar during the twelve
 
years I sat as a judge.
 
 with reference to a recommendation that a judge be
 
disciplined, the members of the Ethics Committee discussed on
 
a few occasions, whether or not a judge who was being
 
investigated could ask his associates and attorneys who
 
appeared before him if he could solicit them for monetary
 
support. Letters were written to the judge's attorney as the
 
judge's identity was kept confidential. I do not recall the
 
advice that was given and do not have copies of any of the
 
letters.
 
A few months ago, I asked a superior court judge if he
 
were aware that no superior court judge had ever been removed
 
from office by the State Supreme Court. His reaction was
 
strong and emphatic. He stated that should be expected as the
 
actions of superior court judges are under the constant
 
surveillance of the appellate court
 
I believe that he missed a very significant point. The
 
appeal process rarely is based upon the misconduct of a judge.
 
The appellate process protects litigants only as it affects
 
legal issues. The attitude of a judge, the tone of his or her
 
voice, the actions within chambers, the denigration of women,
 
the abuse of clerks and court reporters, and the
 
differentiation in treatment of juveniles is rarely found in
 
the written transcripts of case proceedings.
 
I became so involved in reviewing the many reports and
 
the Supreme Court decisions that I have not had the time to do
 
a suirvey of the judges of California as to their interest in
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or concern about the reports.
 
Justice Mosk in a dissent in the case In re Robert S.
 
Stephens^®^ commented about what he considered to be a waste
 
of the Supreme Court's time and resources to examine the
 
question of whether or not the Supreme Court Justices had
 
deliberately delayed making decisions in certain controversial
 
cases in an election year^ Other than in that footnote, I
 
know of no question being raised as to the value of the
 
reports to judges, attorneys, litigants, and the public.
 
During a 1986 judicial campaign in San Bernardino County,
 
the many complaints that had been made by attorneys against
 
Judge Kenneth Lynn Kloepfer were published in the local
 
newspaper. Despite such information that became the basis for
 
the removal of Judge Kloepfer from office in 1990, he was
 
reelected by a two to one margin. This information did not
 
come from the conduct of hearings by the Commission but was
 
apparently made available to a candidate by attorneys who had
 
appeared in court before Judge Kloepfer.
 
There may be isolated instances where the reports of the
 
Commission on Judicial Performance have influenced the outcome
 
of an election. In general, I doubt that they have done so.
 
Judge James J. McCartney, after being unseated by Daniel
 
Rankins in 1976, left San Bernardino County. He returned to
 
the county in 1982 and ran an aggressive campaign against the
 
Hon. Joseph Katz, a judge of the superior court. Strong
 
statements were made by each of the candidates. The Superior
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Court judges unanimously opposed Judge McCartney. I do not
 
know what use Judge Katz made of the public censure of Judge
 
McCartney. Judge Katz won by a two to one margin.
 
Despite the questions I have raised above, I am in favor
 
of the continued work of the Commission on Judicial
 
Performance. However, I believe that its standards should be
 
applied equally at all levels of the judiciary. I am aware of
 
and am sure other judges retired and active know of alleged
 
conduct of judges in the superior courts and in the municipal
 
courts that reflect violations of some of the most basic
 
standards of ethics and courtesy.
 
Arrogance is not just a word in a dictionary. I was
 
surprised to find it in only two references in the several
 
hundred pages of reviews and comments that I have examined in
 
preparing this paper. Arrogance is related to courtesy and
 
the manner in which one person relates to or communicates with
 
another. Pride, anger, lust, covetousness, sloth, and envy
 
are emotions and motives that affect superior court judges and
 
appellate court judges as well as those who serve in the lower
 
courts.
 
It would be naive to believe that a municipal or justice
 
court judge who has been rude and discourteous to attorneys,
 
litigants, witnesses, jurors, and staff and has suffered no
 
public or even private censure changes his or her behavior
 
when he or she becomes a superior court judge.
 
Every annual report that has been prepared throughout the
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 thirty years of the Commission has commented on the small
 
percentage of judges that are the subject of the complaints
 
that were filed during that year. The statistics do not
 
reflect the complaints that are not filed for fear of
 
reprisals, loss of job, or temerity.
 
: The report on Gender Bias probably comes closest of any
 
publicatipn to identifying the seriousness of and the
 
pervasiveness of the problem of abuse of women attorneys by
 
judges, and the abuse of women litigants by judges.
 
We can hope that the comment about the small percentage
 
of judges who are offenders in court proceedings is accurate
 
but a study should be conducted to determine whether or not
 
that self-congratulatory statement is deserved.
 
This has become a long paper. Much of the information
 
that has been reviewed became available to me after I began
 
this study three years ago. My interest in the problem
 
expanded and I believe it was necessary to review in broad
 
detail the more recent materials to provide a comprehensive
 
examination of the information about misconduct that is
 
readily available to judges.
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CHAPTER 13
 
CONCLUSION
 
I have discussed briefly the materials that I have
 
reviewed above and now raise two questions.
 
Why have only justice and municipal court judges been
 
removed from office? A simple answer would be that superior
 
court judges are more intelligent and more experienced than
 
municipal court judges. That ignores the fact that many
 
superior court judges were first appointed or elected to sit
 
in a municipal court or justice court.
 
My experience in appearing before superior court judges
 
as contrasted with appearances in other courts is that the ego
 
of superior court judges and the arrogance of displayed
 
conduct is more forceful than that of municipal court and
 
justice court judges. The phrase that expresses the power of
 
the king in the middle ages that "The king can do no wrong1"
 
becomes theirs by right of office. The discourtesies of the
 
judges in the municipal courts and the justice courts are
 
found in the discourtesies of judges in the superior courts.
 
Why has the preparation of false affidavits for payment
 
of salary been treated so casually? Although several judges
 
have been publicly censured for such acts each of the recent
 
annual reports of the Commission reviewed above refers to the
 
filing of false reports as a continuing problem.
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My personal experiences and concerns cannot provide an
 
answer to the questions. I pose them because they identify a
 
concern aS to the objectivity of the panels of judges that
 
ha:ve examined the conduct of judges for the past thirty years.
 
Have different standards been applied to the conduct of
 
municipal court judges and justice court judges than those
 
applied to superior court judges? The perfunctory answer by
 
the Gommission would likely be a flat "no." As I am unaware
 
of any Studies that have been made of the opinions of the
 
Supreme Court Justices in the removal actions and in imposing
 
public censure upon judges, I cannot be conclusive in my
 
opinions.
 
I did not begin this study expecting to find such a
 
disparity in the removals from office and I am sure that few
 
judges are aware of what I noted only after having reviewed
 
all of the opinions that were written that justified the
 
removal of judges from office.
 
One of my major purposes in writing this paper was to
 
state in an acronym, a word, a phrase, or a sentence a concept
 
or idea that would serve as a warning to a judge. My hope was
 
top simplistic. I believe that the problems are too complex
 
to express in one or two ideas. However, there are some
 
generalizations that can be made in the form of brief
 
sentences. They relate to the major area that I believe is
 
the source of problems that judges experience and that have
 
been the basis of removal from office of many judges. They
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 relate to my first!expressed concern that many judges lack a
 
sensitivity to the emotions that accompany a person who
 
appears in court a^ a plaintiff or a defendant.
 
One quick terse sentence that expresses this warning is
 
DON'T BE ABUSIVE, for the individual judge the warning can be
 
changed to any of the following statements:
 
' . ■ . . - ■ ■ ■ . ■ i . ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 
DON'T ABUSE PEOPLE, or DON'T ABUSE ATTORNEYS, or DON'T
 
ABUSE LITIGANTS, or DON'T ^USE WITNESSES, or DON'T l^USE
 
AIDES. i
 
But that is not the whole story about abuse. A judge
 
MUST NOT abuse THE !JUDICIAL PROCESS.
 
Arrogance as a description of conduct was found in one
 
sentence in the California Judicial Conduct Handbook and in
 
one annual report of the Commission. I did not find it used
 
in any of the other materials I reviewed^ However, if you
 
check the synonym^ for arrogance, some of them relate
 
specifically to the conduct of judges. Pride, egotism,
 
conceit, hubris, condescension, and disdain, are just a few of
 
the words that can reflect the attitudes of many judges.
 
I tried to relate the seven deadly sins to the act of
 
judging. Although the idea of a sin being related to the
 
misconduct of a jud^e functioning in a judicial role may be
 
somewhat old-fashxorled I believe that there is great value in
 
using the terms and have noted the synonyms for the basic
 
words. Perhaps by u$ing some of those synonyms the reality of
 
the gross nature of;some of the conduct of those few judges
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relate to my first expressed concern that many judges lack a
 
sensitivity to the emotions that accompany a person who
 
appears in court as a plaintiff or a defendant.
 
One quick terse sentence that expresses this warning is
 
DON'T BE ABUSIVE. For the individual judge the warning can be
 
changed to any of the following statements:
 
DON'T ABUSE PEOPLE, or DON'T ABUSE ATTORNEYS, or DON'T
 
ABUSE LITIGANTS, or DON'T ABUSE WITNESSES, or DON'T ABUSE
 
AIDES.
 
But that is not the whole story about abuse. A judge
 
MUST NOT ABUSE the JUDICIAL PROCESS.
 
Arrogance as a description of conduct was found in one
 
sentence in the California Judicial Conduci"- HandhnnV and in
 
one annual report of the Commission. I did not find it used
 
in any of the other materials I reviewed. However, if you
 
check the synonyms for arrogance, some of them relate
 
specifically to the conduct of judges. Pride, egotism,
 
conceit, hubris, cohdescension, and disdain^ are just a few of
 
the words that can reflect the attitudes of many judges.
 
I tried to relate the seven deadly sins to the act of
 
judging. Although the idea of a sin being related to the
 
misconduct of a judge functioning in a judicial role may be
 
somewhat old-fashioned I believe that there is great value in
 
using the terms and have noted the synonyms for the basic
 
words. Perhaps by using some of those synonyms the reality of
 
the gross nature of some of the conduct Of those few judges
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 who make newspaper headlines can be emphasized.
 
A judge should be industrious. Yet, there are judges
 
who believe that they are exempt from the requirement to work
 
for a reasonable number of hours each day. Sloth is a strong
 
word, but not too strong to express the laziness, languor,
 
lethargy, or torpor that impedes the activities of many
 
judges. Only Judge David M. Kennick was subjected to the
 
ultimate sanction of removal from office for failure to
 
perform judicial duties. Investigations that have begun often
 
have been hampered by a lack of persons who could or would
 
testify as to the frequency of the absence of a judge.
 
Lust has been discussed in milder terms in several of the
 
opinions that supported the removal of judges. Stronger words
 
such as lechery or lewdness, though not used, were more
 
appropriate to illustrate the vulgarity of the conduct of some
 
judges.
 
Anger as a specific has not been the basis of removal of
 
a judge from office. More often it may be found in
 
discourtesy, or rudeness or in acts that ate expressed in the
 
abuse of persons. Animosity or hostility have more often been
 
used to depict the improper actions of a judge toward persons.
 
Fury and wrath have not been used, but terms noted are
 
those of displeasure, irritation, exasperation, acrimony, and
 
indignation. They are all within the context of explanations
 
of public censure. I assume such terms are found within the
 
letters of admonishment and in the private warnings sent to
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judges.
 
I shall complete this discussion of aspects of conduct
 
with what I consider a major sin of many judges. Just as
 
abuse can be followed by words or phrases so can this key
 
concept. DON'T BE DISHONEST. Any judge can make mistakes;
 
but some of the acts occur because of a lack of ethical
 
principles. The title of this paper expresses my interest in
 
ethical perceptions of the people who appear in courts. A
 
judge's staff may cover for his or her absences, but the
 
people who work for a judge know whether or not he or she is
 
industrious or carries his or her share of the court's
 
business.
 
A judge must not sign a false affidavit just to assure
 
that he or she will be paid at the end of each month. Any
 
competent administrator who forwards the judge's affidavit
 
that no case has been sxabmitted for more than ninety day knows
 
whether or not it is false.
 
A judge must work a reasonable work day. Studies
 
conducted in San Bernardino County in the early 1980's showed
 
that many judges worked a minimum of ten hours a day. A judge
 
who frequently disappears shortly after noon without
 
contacting other judges to assure that they can complete their
 
work is inconsiderate to say the least.
 
The stronger phrase is that it is dishonest as the work
 
sheets that are prepared by the clerks and court administrator
 
for submission to the Administrative Office of the Court are
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incorrect. One judge frequently continued matters to a 1:30
 
p.m. calendar, knowing that the case would be continued. Upon
 
ordering that continuance, he would depart without making
 
himself available for assignments from the calendar court
 
judge.
 
Clearly, it was inappropriate and resulted in other
 
judges being assigned cases that he should have heard. In the
 
Kennick case, the Supreme Court emphasized the requirement
 
that judges be available for administrative functions as well
 
as being available for obvious judicial actions.
 
A judge who ignores the law is either ignorant of the law
 
or intellectually dishonest. Several of the opinions that
 
have discussed removals from office have commented about
 
judges who were aware of the law and did not follow it. In
 
some statements this has been identified as an ABUSE OF
 
PROCESS. Ignorance of the law has never been a defense to a
 
crime; it should not be considered as an excuse for a judge's
 
inappropriate conduct.
 
I have not previously discussed envy as one of the
 
cardinal sins or as one of the sins of judges. Perhaps a
 
brief listing of some of the synonyms would emphasize that it
 
is necessary to be aware of it as a potential for trouble for
 
a judge. Jealousy, resentment, mistrust, paranoia, suspicion,
 
are synonyms and warning words.
 
In my relationships with other judges in San Bernardino
 
County, I noted suspicion of the acts of other judges by one
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or more judges. I have been aware of jealousy and resentment
 
among judges as evidehGed by their acts. I have known of some
 
who were so paranpid as to evidence signs of mental illness.
 
In some instances the mistrust and paranoia affected the
 
efficiency and effectiveness of some of the courts.
 
Although, not identified as a problem for Judge
 
McCartney, paranoia was one of his major problems in dealing
 
with other judges, his staff, and the public. A Superior
 
Court Judge in Riverside County became so concerned about his
 
safety that he made nightly walks in his neighborhood with a
 
paper bag over his head.^®^
 
I believe that the greatest sin of all for a judge is to
 
be a victim of his or her own intellectual dishonesty. A
 
judge must follow the law. The Supreme Court in several
 
opinions stated that the judge knew the law and did not follow
 
it. The judges were criticized for that deficiency and in the
 
case of municipal court judges some were removed from office.
 
I have deplored the failure of the Commission on Judicial
 
Performance to condemn the continued filing of false
 
statements by several judges to obtain monthly payments of
 
their salaries.
 
Judges who do not work a reasonable day and rationalize
 
that conduct on the grounds that they should not be penalized
 
for being quick are not fulfilling their responsibilities to
 
the piiblic as encompassed in the oath they took.
 
Enough is enough. As with many papers, more questions
 
have been posed than have been answered. Materials are
 
available in a convenient form to remind judges of their
 
obligations to be industrious, courteous, and prompt in their
 
judicial actions. I have reviewed several documents that
 
collectively and individually can raise the awareness of
 
judges to the many traps that await them as they function in
 
their judicial roles.
 
A stronger message must be provided to judges to assure
 
their compliance with all of the canons of judicial ethics.
 
As new proposals for improvements and modifications of the
 
canons have just been distributed to all judges and to
 
interested organizations it may become the vehicle for a
 
greater awareness by judges of the significance of all of the
 
actions that they take when empowered by the state to function
 
as judges for all of the people that come before them. Any
 
short statement cannot begin to cover the varied and complex
 
situations that have been noted above. The beginning of that
 
awareness may be foxmd in some brief statement and I have
 
listed three suggestions.
 
DON'T ABUSE PEOPLE!
 
DON'T ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS!
 
BE HONEST!
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